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Preface
This book is based largely on the 2012 conference of the European Network for Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP), held at Poznań
University of Technology, Poznań, Poland, on September 13–14, 2012. The
ENRSP is a research network for independent researchers in the field of private
pensions. Marek Szczepański, chair of Economic Sciences at Poznań University of Technology, organized the conference. It was the first conference of
the network held in Eastern Europe. Financial support for the conference was
provided by ENRSP and by the PZU Pension Society in Poland.
Szczepański has edited a conference volume for that conference, which is
published in English in Poland under the title Old-Age Crisis and Pension Reform: Where Do We Stand? This volume differs from that in that it is oriented
toward pension policy experts in the United States. It does not include all the
papers from the conference, while it does include several papers not presented
at the conference. The volume published in Poland has more of a focus on
Central and Eastern Europe, while this volume, through the addition of several
papers, has more of a global focus. In addition, all of the papers have been
edited so that they use U.S. pension terminology.
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1
Social Security and
Pension Reform
The Views of 16 Authors
Marek Szczepański
Poznań University of Technology
John A. Turner
Pension Policy Center
Countries around the world are reforming their social security and
pension systems. International studies often focus on social security reforms in Europe and North America, and may include Latin America.
Reforms, however, are also occurring in Asia and Africa, and include
reforms of voluntary and employer-provided pensions as well as social security programs. This book discusses both social security and
employer-provided pension reforms, as well as reforms in most regions
of the world.
This chapter provides an overview of the book. Many of the chapters were originally presented at a conference of the European Network
for Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP) in Poznań, Poland,
in 2012, that was organized by Marek Szczepański. Other chapters have
been added to expand the range of countries covered.

OVERVIEW
Part 1 of the book contains this introduction and a chapter written
by John A. Turner and David Rajnes that examines social security and
pension reforms around the world. It includes a survey of some of the

3
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4 Szczepański and Turner

main points of chapters of this book, but has a considerably broader focus in terms of countries and issues. For example, an issue not touched
on elsewhere is the trend in some countries toward adopting automatic
adjustment mechanisms as a way of maintaining the solvency of their
social security systems. In some countries, the level of social security
benefits at retirement is automatically adjusted downward to reflect
improvements over time in life expectancy. Turner and Rajnes’s chapter also discusses the policy that a number of countries have adopted,
which is raising the earliest age at which social security benefits can
be received, and other policies to encourage workers to postpone retirement, which are ways of dealing with the added costs to pension
systems due to increased life expectancy.
Turner and Rajnes discuss in Chapter 2 issues of concern in highincome countries, and also the problem that most workers around the
world are not covered by social security or pension programs. Countries
such as China and Kenya have developed innovative programs to attempt to deal with that issue. The programs in those two countries are
discussed in greater depth in Chapters 10 and 11.

REFORMS IN EUROPE
Part 2, which focuses on reforms of social security and pensions in
Europe, is the largest section of the book. The authors discuss reforms
in Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Portugal, Poland, and other countries in
Central and Eastern Europe.
Chapter 3, by Gerard Hughes, discusses the reform in Ireland mandating that employers provide their employees the option to participate
in an employer-provided pension plan, called a Personal Retirement
Savings Account (PRSA). Although the reform requires employers who
do not provide a pension plan for all their employees to designate a personal pension provider for their employees, less than half of the firms
have done so. This may be in part because employees have shown limited interest, as no one is contributing to a PRSA in four-fifths of the
firms that have designated a PRSA provider. Thus, the hopes that policy
analysts had for this approach to extend pension coverage have not been
realized. Requiring employers to offer pensions, but making the take-up
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Social Security and Pension Reform 5

by employees voluntary, has not succeeded in significantly raising pension coverage in Ireland.
By comparison, the United Kingdom has adopted a policy that goes
further: all private employers will be required to offer retirement plans
meeting minimum requirements for their employees. Those plans can
be defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans. In addition, going
beyond the requirements in Ireland, employers will be required to automatically enroll their employees in the new system, with the employees
having the option to withdraw. It is anticipated that this change will
increase pension participation in the United Kingdom by 5–9 million
workers (Segars 2012). An additional requirement is that mandatory
contributions in the case of defined contribution plans will be made
by employers, employees, and the government. When fully phased
in, contributions will be 4 percent of pay for employees, 3 percent for
employers, and a 1 percent government subsidy, making a total contribution of 8 percent of pay. Initially, contributions will start at a total of
2 percent of pay, reaching 8 percent by 2018.
The requirements apply to workers who earn more than minimum
wage and are at least 22 years old; the maximum age for men is 65,
with the maximum of 65 being phased in for women. The requirement
for automatic enrollment into a qualifying pension plan was initially
phased in on October 1, 2012, and will continue to be phased in through
2016. It will apply first to large companies, and over time to all others.
Eventually automatic enrollment will apply to all employees who do
not have another plan.
For companies that do not offer a qualifying plan, all money
contributed to pension plans for employees will go into the National
Employment Savings Trust (NEST), a jointly trusteed investment vehicle that will offer a number of funds. Employees who use the NEST
plan will have the option to choose investments or have a default investment chosen for them, which will be a retirement date fund based on
what the employee indicates is his or her expected retirement date.
Chapter 4, by Gabriella Sjögren Lindquist and Eskil Wadensjö, focuses on low-income retirees in Sweden. The chapter begins with an
outline of the Swedish system, which some countries have considered
as a possible model for reform. The system includes a notional defined
contribution system as the primary source of benefits and a mandatory
individual account system, neither of which contain redistributive ele-
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6 Szczepański and Turner

ments. Redistribution toward low-income pensioners occurs through
other government programs, such as the guarantee pension, which is
based on the level of other pension income a person receives, and a
housing allowance. Women, the self-employed, immigrants, and persons at advanced ages are more likely to have low income in retirement
than other groups.
Nonetheless, poverty in Sweden is low compared to other European Union (EU) countries. It is defined on a relative basis as having
an income below 60 percent of median income. Because Sweden is
a high-income country, if poverty were defined alternatively as being
below 60 percent of median income in the EU, the poverty rate would
be even lower.
Chapter 5, by Maria Clara Murteira, discusses social security reform
in Portugal and how the EU has affected it. The demand for macroeconomic budgetary reform has put pressure on countries to reform their
social security programs. In addition, demand for fiscal austerity has
put further pressure on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing of social security because of increased unemployment.
Murteira argues that while the social security reform of 2007 was
presented as a technical reform, it in fact involved a fundamental change
in principles and objectives for the social security program. By means
of parametric changes, a structural reform was achieved. She criticizes
the reform because it focused on the means of social policy (financing) and not on its goals (providing adequate retirement income). While
PAYG financing was not replaced by funding, the overall logic of the
system was changed. The goal of social security retirement pensions
in Portugal is no longer to provide income maintenance. Instead, the
goal now is to provide a modest level of income protection against oldage poverty. Murteira concludes that ultimately social security policy is
about political choices, as it is influenced by the beliefs and ideas about
the role of government in society.
Chapter 6, by Magdalena Mosionek-Schweda, describes the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, which is a sovereign wealth fund
and is one of the largest pension funds in the world. The fund has two
parts: one that is (Norway) is entirely invested in Scandinavia and another part (Global) that is entirely invested outside Norway. She focuses
on the Global fund, which is financed by revenues from the extraction
of oil in Norway. It currently is worth about $120,000 per person in
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Social Security and Pension Reform 7

Norway, and is expected to grow on a per capita basis before it is drawn
on to help pay for retirement benefits. The fund does not have a legal
liability for future pension benefits, but it is designed to be used for the
purpose of helping to pay for these benefits. As discussed in Chapters 2
and 10, Ireland, China, and several other countries have similar funds.
If the United States were to return to an era of budget surpluses, as it
did during the Clinton administration, it could establish a similar fund.
Chapter 7, by Maciej Żukowski, describes social security reform in
Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter provides a survey of a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, with a more detailed
discussion of the reforms in Poland. While many aspects of the socialist
economies in this region were not functioning well before the breakup
of the Soviet Union in 1991, they did have functioning social security
systems. However, starting in 1998, most of the countries in the region
have had major reforms to their social security systems, introducing
funded individual accounts as part of the systems. Of the 10 Central
and Eastern European countries that are now members of the EU, all
but Slovenia have adopted mandatory funded individual accounts as
part of their social security systems, along with a reduced PAYG social
security program (U.S. Social Security Administration 2012).
Because of the global financial crisis, since 2010, some of these
countries have reduced the contributions to the funded individual accounts. They have encountered the double payment problem, which is
needing to finance the PAYG systems while at the same time also contributing to a funded system. These countries did not adequately take
into account this problem when they established their individual account systems. The European Union Stability and Growth Pact, which
sets target limits on government debt and deficits, has influenced them
to cut back on their individual account plan contributions. This issue is
also discussed in Chapter 5, where EU policies are seen to have led to a
reduction in the PAYG system in Portugal.
Chapter 8, by Marek Szczepański and Tomasz Brzęczek, discusses
the risks in employer-provided pension plans in Poland. Like Sweden,
Poland has a mandatory notional defined contribution system and a
mandatory individual account system. However, unlike Sweden it has
relatively few voluntary employer-provided pensions. Those pensions
in Sweden cover most workers, in part due to widespread collective
bargaining agreements. Szczepański and Brzęczek survey representa-
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8 Szczepański and Turner

tives of businesses that provide pension plans, who indicate that the two
most important risks facing pension plans are financial market risk and
economic market risk. They find a high degree of mistrust by employers sponsoring pension plans of the advice provided by the pension plan
managers. They also find that pension plans in Poland have invested in
low-risk, low-return portfolios.

REFORMS IN AUSTRALIA, CHINA, EAST AFRICA, AND
THE AMERICAS
The following four chapters comprise Part 3 of the book and discuss pension and social security reform in Australia, China, East Africa,
and the Americas.
Chapter 9, by Ross Clare, discusses the retirement income system
in Australia and issues of equity or fairness. Recent reforms in Australia
have reduced the extent of tax preferences going to high earners. He
finds that less than 15 percent of the government assistance for pension
contributions flows to those paying the top marginal tax rate. Government assistance includes tax preferences and a government matching
contribution for low earners. This compares to the approximately 30
percent of aggregate personal income tax collections that is paid by that
group of taxpayers. Thus, a far smaller percentage of tax preferences
and government contribution assistance in Australia goes to upperincome persons than in the United States. A study in the United States
finds that two-thirds of the benefits from pension tax preferences accrue
to the top 20 percent of the income distribution (Orszag 2000).
To further limit the tax benefits accruing to high earners in Australia,
a proposal is being considered that would reduce the amount of taxpreferenced contributions that could be made by persons with a pension
account of A$500,000 or more. (Australian dollars are roughly equal in
value to U.S. dollars at 2013 exchange rates, although exchange rates
fluctuate over time.) When viewing the Australian retirement income
system in a broader framework, also taking into account the Age Pension, which is received by most persons but whose value declines with
increases in personal income, the amount of government subsidy to the
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Social Security and Pension Reform 9

retirement income system is fairly equal across deciles of the income
distribution.
Chapter 10, by Tianhong Chen and John A. Turner, describes social
security reform in China, which has roughly one-fifth of the world’s
population aged 60 and older. Also adding to the importance of understanding China’s retirement income system, China is undergoing
a period of important changes in its provision of old-age benefits. At
the start of 2009, less than 30 percent of the adult population in China
was covered by a social security old-age benefits program, but by 2012
that number had increased to 55 percent. Affecting its ability to provide old-age benefits, China is also undergoing important labor force
changes—because of its one-child policy, the labor force declined in
2012 for the first time, and declines are projected to continue for many
years.
China has a decentralized system of social security, where the
central government establishes general guidelines, but subprovincial
governments (county governments) have some discretion in establishing the programs, for example, in setting contribution rates. This feature
alone would make the system complex. However, within that framework, there are separate systems for urban workers, rural workers, and
rural workers working in urban areas. Each of these three systems has
two parts—an individual account portion and a PAYG system. In addition, government employees have separate systems, and Hong Kong
has a separate system.
An unusual feature of social security provision in China is that its
new program for rural workers, which is voluntary, has been highly successful in attracting participants. Because voluntary programs generally
fail to cover more than half of the eligible population in high-income
countries, and a much lower portion in middle- and low-income countries, China’s program may provide a model for other countries.
Chapter 11, by John A. Turner, describes social security and pension
reform in the five countries of the East African Community—Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda. The chapter discusses social
security and employer-provided pensions for both private and public
sector workers. Many of the issues these countries face are similar to
retirement income issues in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A
different aspect, however, is that these five countries are attempting to

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

10 Szczepański and Turner

move toward greater economic integration, with the possibility of eventually having a single currency and a common market.
Most workers in the region and throughout sub-Saharan Africa—
and in most middle- and lower-income countries—are not participating
in social security or in another pension program. Therefore, extending
social security or pension coverage to rural and informal sector workers
is arguably the most important issue facing social security programs in
most countries around the world.
Kenya has recently developed an innovative voluntary pension
program that may hold promise for extending pension coverage to lowincome workers in other parts of the world. In this system, workers
can contribute small amounts, as little as $0.25, using their cell phones
and a mobile money system. Advances in cell phone technology have
greatly reduced the cost of cell phones and usage rates so that even poor
people in Kenya have cell phones, and so that small transactions are
economically feasible. Many more people have cell phones than have
bank accounts. This program is a promising development for extending
pension coverage to poor people in other countries.
Chapter 12, by Denise Gómez-Hernández and Alberto M. Ramírez
de Jurado Frías, analyzes defined contributions in a sample of countries
from North, Central, and South America. Instead of using a replacement
rate to measure the effectiveness of the defined contribution systems,
they compare projected pension benefits to a measure of the basic
market basket of goods. They find that differences in the level of fees
charged to pensions across countries have an important effect on the
outcomes of the pension systems.

REFORM ISSUES
Part 4 contains the final two chapters, which discuss particular
issues in social security and pension reform rather than focus on particular countries. Chapter 13, by Adam Samborski, discusses issues
in pension fund governance, focusing on principal-agent problems in
pension fund governance. In agency theory, agency relationships are
understood as contracts under which a principal engages a third-party
(agent) to perform certain actions on its behalf in dealing with a second
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party, which is the provider of the service. The agent provides a managerial or advisory role. In pension arrangements, the plan participant is
the principal, the plan sponsor is the agent, and the financial institution
managing the pension funds is the second party. This implies the need
for the principal to delegate specific powers to the agent to make certain
decisions. However, both the agent and the second party may have conflicts of interest so that they are motivated to not act in the best interests
of the pension participant.
Chapter 14, by John A. Turner and Dana M. Muir, discusses issues
in financial literacy, financial education, and financial advice. A lack of
financial literacy is widespread in countries around the world. This is
particularly a problem in countries that rely on mandatory individual
accounts and defined contribution pensions, where workers have added
responsibility for financial decision making. Financial education has
been considered as a remedy, but studies have shown that many workers lack interest in gaining the required knowledge. Financial education
may be more successful if it is incorporated into school education programs for students. Financial advice has been recognized as another
way of dealing with financial illiteracy. However, many financial advisers have conflicts of interest that cause the advice they provide to not be
in the best interest of their clients. Because of the way financial advisers
are compensated, the advice that provides them the highest income may
also lead to pension participants and plan sponsors paying higher fees,
but with no improvement in investment outcomes. Surveys have documented that persons receiving financial advice may receive lower rates
of return net of fees than those not receiving advice.

CONCLUSION
Many countries around the world are undertaking social security
and pension reforms. These reforms are motivated in part by population
aging, but they also are occurring in response to economic development
in Africa, China, and elsewhere, and are due to changing views about
how retirement income should be provided. Countries often look to international experience when considering reform options, and this book
discusses social security and pension reform issues in different parts of
the world.
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Social Security and Pension
Trends around the World
John A. Turner
Pension Policy Center
David Rajnes
Social Security Administration
Retirement income systems are in a state of change. Increasing longevity and declining birth rates cause population aging and put pressure
on retirement income financing. For this reason, countries around the
world are reforming their retirement income systems of pensions and
social security old-age benefits. Changing views about the provision of
retirement income and innovations in program design are also influencing the trends.
This chapter surveys trends in social security and pension programs around the world. It first discusses social security reforms and
mandatory individual account programs, and then discusses reforms of
employer-provided pension plans.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND MANDATORY INDIVIDUAL
ACCOUNT PROGRAMS
Social security programs and mandatory individual account
programs are considered together as part of government mandated provision for retirement.
Raising Retirement Ages
With people living longer in many parts of the world, the cost
of providing social security and pension benefits in traditional pen13
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14 Turner and Rajnes

sion systems is increasing because those benefits are being provided
for more years. To offset this cost increase, many countries in Europe,
Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have legislated increases in the early
retirement age for social security benefits, sometimes called the eligibility age or minimum age for retirement. That is the earliest age at
which social security retirement benefits can be received. Often those
increases are legislated to occur a number of years into the future, or are
phased in over a number of years. In some countries, changes have also
occurred in the age at which the worker can receive a full benefit, but
those changes are more aptly described as changes in benefit generosity,
rather than changes in retirement ages.
Japan is raising the eligibility age for both of its social security
programs (Rajnes 2007). Japan passed legislation in 1995 that raised
the eligibility age for its flat rate pension (National Pension) by one
year every three years, with it increasing from age 60 to 61 in 2001
and reaching 65 in 2014. Based on legislation passed in 2000, Japan is
raising the eligibility age for its earnings-related pension (Employees’
Pension Insurance) by one year every three years starting in 2013. With
these changes, men born after 1960 and women born after 1965 have a
retirement age for both programs of 65 by 2025 for men and 2030 for
women.
New Zealand raised its eligibility age from 60 in 1991 to 65 in 2001.
Those workers who turned 60 before March 31, 1992, were eligible for
a social security benefit at age 60. The legislation, which passed August
1, 1991, took effect the following April, when eligibility increased from
age 60 to 61. Beginning July 1, 1993, eligibility rose by three months
for each six-month period until April 1, 2001, when the eligibility age
reached 65. Thus, a five-year increase in the eligibility age phased in
over nine years. A Transitional Retirement Benefit was paid over this
period to those affected by the changes, with the age of eligibility for
this benefit also rising until it was phased out on April 1, 2001.
Some Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries have had a longstanding eligibility age of 65, and
some are raising the eligibility age even higher. In Australia, Austria,
Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, the eligibility age for
men has been 65 since at least 1949. In 2012, the Netherlands passed a
law that will raise the retirement age in 2020 from 65 to 66. In Ireland,
starting in 2014, the age of entitlement for social security benefits will
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be raised from 65 to 66. In Australia, it will be gradually rising to 67
from 2017 to 2023 for both men and women.
Some countries have had a higher eligibility age in social security
in the past than they do currently. In 1913, when social security was
introduced in Sweden, the eligibility age was 67 (Lindquist and Wadensjö, this volume). The eligibility age in the United States was 65 in 1940
but now is 62.
In Central and Eastern Europe, a number of countries—Bulgaria,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and Poland—
are increasing their retirement eligibility ages as a move toward insuring
the solvency of their social security systems. In 2012, Latvia enacted
legislation raising the eligibility age for social security benefits from
62 to 65, rising by three months a year, and reaching 65 in 2025 (U.S.
Social Security Administration 2012).
Some low-income countries in Africa retain low benefit eligibility
ages for social security benefits. For example, the early retirement age
is 50 in Swaziland. However, some high-income countries also have
low eligibility ages. In Kuwait, the retirement age is 50, but it is increasing to 55 by 2020.
Equalizing Benefit Eligibility Ages for Men and Women
Many countries historically have had lower early retirement ages
for women than for men. However, many of these countries have
equalized the ages for men and women by raising over time the early
retirement age of women so that it reaches the level for men. China,
Cuba, Vietnam, and the former communist country of Russia are among
the countries that maintain lower early retirement ages for women than
men.
Changes to Encourage Later Retirement
Many countries have enacted changes other than increases in early
retirement ages to encourage later retirement. Among OECD countries,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Spain have enacted tighter requirements to qualify for early
retirement benefits (Whitehouse and Antolin 2012). In Canada in 2012,
an earlier enacted change took effect, raising benefits for workers who
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postpone taking benefits past age 65, cutting them for workers who retire
before age 65, and introducing a new benefit for workers who are still
working. Bulgaria in 2012 also raised benefits for workers postponing
retirement. In 2012, Denmark scaled back its government-subsidized
program providing early retirement benefits. Sweden has instituted income tax credits for workers aged 65 and older. Portugal has reduced
social security contributions for workers aged 65 and older. France has
increased the actuarial reduction of benefits for early retirement. In Kenya, pension benefits received at age 65 or older are tax free, in order to
encourage postponement of receipt of those benefits.
In raising the retirement age, one option is to provide for early retirement for workers who have worked for many years. Some countries
with special early retirement benefits have raised the number of years
required to be eligible for those benefits. France has raised the number
of years from 37.5 to 40, while Belgium has raised the number of years
from 20 to 35 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005).
In 2011, Spain passed a law that increased incentives for older
workers to remain in the labor force. An innovative aspect of this reform is that the incentives are greater for workers with more years of
service. For workers with less than 25 years of service, for every year
an individual continues working beyond the full retirement age, the incentive will remain at 2 percent; from 25 to 36 years, 2.75 percent; and
37 or more years, 4 percent. Some countries encourage work at older
ages by reducing the social security contribution rate. In Portugal, the
rate the employee pays has dropped from 11 percent to 8 percent since
2009.
Retrenchment in Traditional Social Security Programs
A number of countries have cut back on the generosity of their social security benefits, resulting in falling income replacement rates in
old age. These countries include France, Japan, Sweden, Greece, South
Korea, and the United States. Among OECD countries, cutbacks in
benefit generosity have typically reduced future benefits between onefifth and one-quarter (Whitehoues and Antolin 2012).
Sometimes the cutback is expressed in another way, perhaps to reduce the political reaction to the change. For example, one way to cut
benefits is to postpone access to full benefits to a later age, coupled
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with actuarial reductions in benefits received at an earlier age. This approach has been used by Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the
United States. The United States has reduced benefits at the eligibility
age by raising the Normal Retirement Age from 65 to 67 over the period
2000–2022.
Many countries have reduced benefits in traditional social insurance
old-age benefits programs by increasing the years used in the earnings
averaging period for calculating benefits. Spain has done so, resulting in more years of relatively low earnings being included, lowering
average earnings in the benefit calculation. Finland, Austria, France,
Italy, Greece, and the United Kingdom have also increased the number of years used in benefit calculation. In Italy, the increase was from
the worker’s last five years of earnings to lifetime earnings. Portugal
increased the number of years from 10 years to all years of work. However, it also defined a transitional period, from 2002 to 2016, during
which the most favorable method of calculation—the former, the latter,
or a weighted average of both—could be applied in order to guarantee
beneficiaries the most favorable rule to determine the pension level. In
2007, it subsequently passed a law that shortened the transitional period
(See Murteira, this volume).
Benefits can be reduced by changing the calculation of cost-ofliving adjustments. Germany and Japan have both moved from basing
postretirement benefit adjustments on the growth of net wages rather
than gross wages. With the growth of taxes and social security contribution rates, net wages grow less rapidly than gross wages. Reductions
in cost-of-living adjustments reduce benefits more at older ages than at
younger ages because for each retiree, the effect of the cuts is cumulative over the time period since retirement.
Countries with traditional benefit formulas have a parameter in
those formulas that determines the generosity of the rate at which future
benefits accrue with additional work. Japan, Norway, and Portugal have
cut future benefits by reducing the benefit accrual rate in the benefit formula. For example, Japan cut the accrual rate from 1 percent per year of
work to 0.7125 percent (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005).
Austria has reduced the accrual rates used to calculate the initial benefit
from an annual rate of 2 percent to 1.78 percent starting in 2009.
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Benefit Reductions That Affect Current Retirees
Traditionally, social security benefit cuts have been targeted so that
they did not affect people who were already receiving benefits because
those people were considered to be particularly vulnerable. Because of
their age, for many returning to work to offset the benefit cuts was not
an option. That policy of protecting current beneficiaries has changed
in some countries.
In most countries, benefits in payment are indexed so that they at
least keep pace with the rate of inflation and thus maintain their real
(inflation-corrected) value during retirement. Greece and Norway have
cut benefits by reducing the indexing of benefits in payment. Sweden’s
automatic adjustment mechanism can involve a reduction in indexing
of benefits in payment so that it is less than the rate of inflation.
Increasing Contribution Rates
Some countries have raised contribution rates, particularly countries
that have relatively low contribution rates, but increases are not limited
to those countries. Kenya is an example (Turner, this volume). Contribution rates have been increased in many OECD countries, including
Denmark, Finland, France, and Sweden. They have also increased in
some countries with mandatory individual accounts and mandatory
pensions, such as Mexico, Singapore, and Australia. Australia is raising
further its contribution rate for its mandatory pension system from 9
percent to 12 percent (Clare, this volume).
Increasing the Contribution Base
Social security contributions can be increased by raising the contribution base rather than raising the contribution rate. Countries that
have completely eliminated the ceiling on taxable earnings for social
security financing include Finland and Norway. In 2001, Ireland eliminated the ceiling on taxable earnings for social security for employer
contributions. The United Kingdom also requires employers to pay
social security taxes on employee earnings without a ceiling on those
earnings. Some countries have expanded the range of earnings included
in taxable earnings. Japan, for example, included the twice-yearly bo-
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nuses in taxable earnings. France, in addition to raising the contribution
rate, increased the contribution base to include employer contributions
to occupational pension plans.
New Revenue Sources
Some countries have decided that they cannot raise the payroll tax
any further. For example, Japan has been concerned about the effects
of increases in the payroll tax, which would raise labor costs, on the international competitiveness of its workforce. By comparison, however,
China, which has large trade surpluses, has a social security tax rate that
varies across provinces but averages 28 percent (Chen and Turner, this
volume), substantially higher than in Japan.
In 2012, Japan legislated an increase of its value added tax (VAT)
from 5 to 10 percent, starting in 2014, with the increased revenue being
used to finance its social security program. Although all OECD countries use contributions from employers and employees to finance social
security old age benefits, nearly all those countries also use general revenue funding. France has levied a tax of 1 percent on all income that
is dedicated to financing old-age benefits (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005). More recently, Portugal in 2012 levied a tax on
pensions of more than 1,500 euros per month.
Unification of National Social Security Systems
When social security systems were started they often excluded
certain groups, such as government workers, workers in particular industries that already had good pensions, or workers in industries with
low wages, such as agriculture. Some countries developed multiple
pension systems to cover different workers. Reforms in the United
States, Chile, Nigeria, and Greece have expanded the coverage of national social security systems to include more groups of workers, in
the process unifying. Part of this movement has been a trend to include
government workers in the national social security program. Thailand
is currently phasing out some special programs for government workers. In 2011, China established a national unified social security system
for urban workers, which facilitates workers moving between different
parts of the country (Chen and Turner, this volume). In Africa, Cape
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Verde, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia have all consolidated
their social security programs for formal sector workers (Republic of
Kenya 2012).
Ending Provident Funds
Provident funds are defined contribution plans that typically provide lump sum benefits and have a single investment pool for all
participants. These types of plans were established in many countries
that were formerly British colonies or British protectorates, in part because of their simplicity. Provident funds were established in most of
the former British colonies or protectorates in Africa—Gambia, Ghana,
Kenya, Nigeria, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Swaziland retains such a plan; however, many countries, including
Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, have ended those plans and switched
to social insurance types of plans. Kenya and Uganda in 2012 were
considering converting their provident funds to defined contribution
pensions, rather than to a defined benefit social insurance pension
(Turner, this volume). Nigeria subsequently switched to a mandatory
individual account system. In the Caribbean, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines are among countries
that converted a provident fund to a traditional defined benefit social
security program (Gillion et al. 2000).
Social Security Privatization with Mandatory Funded
Individual Accounts
Most countries provide social security benefits through traditional
defined benefit pay-as-you-go systems (PAYG) based on principles of
social insurance. However, many countries in Latin America, Central
and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere have added mandatory individual
accounts as a component of their social security programs. One of the
motivations for social security privatization was the belief that this
innovation would lead to a closer connection between contributions
and benefits, which would lead to less distortion of incentives in labor
markets.
In 1981, Chile was the first country to privatize its social security
program with mandatory individual accounts. Chile completely ended
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its PAYG system for private sector workers, replacing it with an individual account system, while most other countries that followed it
cut back on the PAYG system and combined it with a mandatory individual account system. Since 1990, 10 other countries in Latin America
have followed Chile (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011). The first countries following Chile to switch to individual accounts (with the year
implemented) were Peru (1993), Colombia (1993), Argentina (1994),
Uruguay (1996), and Mexico (1997). These were followed by two of
the poorest countries in the region, Bolivia (1997) and El Salvador
(1998). In 2008, Panama added mandatory individual accounts as part
of social security for new entrants into the social security system.
Beginning in the late 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union,
a number of countries that were part of the Soviet Union or that were
in Central and Eastern Europe added mandatory individual accounts
as part of their social security systems. Kazakhstan (1997), Hungary
(1998), and Poland (1999) were early leaders, but they were followed
by Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), Croatia (2002), and Estonia (2002)
(Szczepański and Brzęczek, this volume). Other countries include
Bulgaria (2002), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003),
Slovakia (2005), and Romania (2008) (Żukowski, this volume). In
addition, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Russia have enacted reforms.
Mandatory defined contribution plans have also been introduced in
countries in other regions, either in addition to or in replacement of existing traditional social security programs. In 2011, Thailand introduced
the National Pension Fund as a mandatory defined contribution plan to
supplement its traditional social security plan. In 2010, Egypt passed a
law replacing its PAYG system with a system of mandatory individual
accounts. In 2010, Brunei added mandatory individual accounts to its
existing mandatory social security system. Between 1988 and 2008, 29
countries followed Chile and established a funded first pillar social security system (Holzmann 2012).
Retrenchment on Privatization
Some countries that enacted reforms privatizing social security
by adding individual accounts have later cut back on those reforms,
reducing or eliminating the contributions to privatized individual ac-
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counts. Argentina ended its system of privatized individual accounts in
2008, while Bolivia nationalized its system of individual accounts in
late 2010. Retrenchment has been more common in Central and Eastern
Europe than in South America, in part because of the financial crisis
there and the subsequent economic downturn. In Central and Eastern
Europe, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Slovakia
all retrenched their privatized systems in some way since 2010 (Fultz
2012). Starting in 2010, Hungary ceased funding for its second-tier program and returned most of the accumulated funds to the participants.
Retrenchment has occurred in part because of the double payment
problem, where payments are being made into the new individual accounts, while payments are still required into the traditional PAYG
system to pay the benefits promised from that system. Some governments have found that it was too expensive to pay for the existing PAYG
system and for the new individual accounts, particularly in an economic
downturn. In 2012, the Slovak Republic reduced the contributions to
the mandatory individual accounts and transferred those contributions
to the PAYG system. It also temporarily permitted workers to withdraw
from the system.
In 1997, China established a multipillar reform, adding funded individual accounts to a PAYG system. However, it later decided not to
fully fund those accounts, taking some of the money originally designated for the individual accounts and using it to finance the PAYG
benefits. Those accounts now are more like notional accounts, with an
unfunded liability arising due to their total liabilities exceeding their
total assets (Chen and Turner, this volume).
It was initially thought that competition among service providers
would reduce high fees in mandatory individual account systems, but
that has not proved to be the case. The reason may be that participants
are not sensitive to fees when choosing among service providers, perhaps because they do not understand how much fees can reduce future
account balances.
Chile and Mexico have taken steps to reduce fees. In Chile, every
two years a bidding process determines the lowest-fee pension fund
provider. All new entrants must use that provider. Mexico has taken
steps to increase competition among pension fund providers as a way
to reduce fees. The United Kingdom has limited the maximum fees that
can be charged on stakeholder pensions, which are a form of voluntary
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individual account pension. Australia has introduced a low-cost fund as
an alternative in its mandatory employer-provided pension system. The
United States and the United Kingdom have taken steps to have more
disclosure of fee information to pension participants.
Defaults to Deal with Decision-Making Problems
Defaults have been used in mandatory individual account systems
for workers who do not wish to make an investment choice. For example, in the Swedish Premium Pension system, which is a mandatory
individual account system, if a worker fails to choose an investment, the
worker is placed in the default investment. In 2010, Sweden changed
that default so that the risk of the portfolio varies by the age of the participant, with the percent invested in low-risk assets increasing as the
participant ages. In Australia in the mandatory pension fund system, if
an employer does not wish to choose a pension fund for its employees,
it can use the default fund for employers in its industry. In New Zealand in the KiwiSaver program, workers who do not choose a pension
provider are automatically enrolled in the employer’s preferred plan,
but if the employer has not chosen a plan they are randomly assigned
to one of six default plans. In Peru, recent reform measures encourage
more competition among AFPs (Pension Fund Associations) by assigning new labor force entrants to the AFP with the lowest administrative
fee. From October through December 2012, all new entrants to the system of individual accounts were assigned to Prima, the pension fund
management company (AFP) that offered the lowest administrative fee
in the tender held in September.
Raising Limits on International Investments
Some countries have raised the limits on international investments
allowed both for mandatory pension plans and for voluntary pension
plans. A few countries have no limits on these investments. In 2008,
Uruguay raised from 0 to 15 percent the limit on international investments in its mandatory individual account system, and Colombia raised
its limit to 40 percent. In 2009, Brazil raised to 10 percent the limits
on international investments for certain pension funds provided voluntarily by employers. In 2010 and 2011, Chile raised the limits on the
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percentage of a pension fund’s assets in its mandatory system that can
be invested in international investments, with the limit reaching 80 percent in 2011. Peru raised the limit in its mandatory system to 30 percent
in 2010. In Sweden in mandatory individual accounts, and in the United
States in voluntary individual account defined contribution plans, individuals can invest entirely in international investments.
Notional Account Plans
In notional account or notional defined contribution systems (or
nonfinancial defined contribution systems), each worker has an account,
but the account is not fully funded, generally only having limited funding. Rather, it has a notional or accounting value for each participant.
This system is essentially a PAYG system, though there may also be a
reserve fund. A notional rate of return is assigned to each account. One
of the motivations for this type of plan is that it attempts to make a closer
connection between contributions and benefits, based on the view that
such a connection may encourage workers to view the contribution not
as a tax but as a payment for a future benefit. When Sweden reformed
its social security system by enacting a notional account system, it extended the years taken into account in calculating benefits from 15 years
to all years of work (Lindquist and Wadensjö, this volume).
Sweden, Poland, Latvia, Norway, and Italy—a diverse set of countries—have adopted this type of system. Egypt adopted this type of
system in 2010, with implementation expected in 2013 (Holzmann
2012).
Automatic Adjustment Mechanisms
At least 12 countries have adopted automatic adjustment mechanisms as a way to maintain the solvency of their PAYG social security
programs. In 1998, Brazil adopted life expectancy indexing of its social security benefits for private sector workers. At retirement age, the
calculation of social security benefits takes into account the average
life expectancy for the population at that age, with an annual updating of life expectancy at retirement age. Life expectancy is officially
estimated by the annual household survey of the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics.
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Finland, Portugal, and Norway adjust the generosity of benefits
received at retirement automatically for changes in life expectancy.
Portugal passed legislation in 2007, introducing a sustainability coefficient in the benefit formula for calculating pensions. This coefficient
equals the ratio between life expectancy in 2006 and life expectancy in
the year preceding retirement. The level of statutory pension is multiplied by the coefficient, reducing the benefit level as life expectancy
increases (Murteira, this volume). The August 2011 pension reform law
in Spain required that a sustainability factor be introduced to the system
in 2027 that will adjust the relevant parameters of the system to changes
in life expectancy every five years.
In Sweden, life expectancy indexing of benefits is done by using an
annuity divisor that reflects improvements in life expectancy at age 65.
No further reductions in benefits for improvements in mortality occur
after age 65. Thus, the life expectancy adjustment does not take into
account life expectancy improvements that occur after age 65. It is expected that the failure to adjust for life expectancy improvements after
retirement will be expensive, costing about 1 percent of payroll in contributions (Palmer 2000). The initial generation in the system will benefit
from this feature, but subsequent generations will pay for it through the
automatic adjustment process required to maintain solvency.
In Sweden, mortality experience is averaged over the previous five
years to avoid year-to-year fluctuations that do not reflect longer-term
trends. The Swedish system uses, as do the other systems, period mortality tables, which are mortality tables based on the experience of the
cross section of older persons. For each birth cohort in Sweden, the
annuity divisor adjustment is established at age 65, with a provisional
adjustment made for retirements starting at age 61, which is the benefit
entitlement age.
In addition to the automatic adjustment of benefits for longevity
improvement, every year the Swedish government tests whether the
system is in balance. If it falls out of balance, adjustments are automatically made to decrease benefits, without the intervention of elected
government officials needing to decide what to do. Thus, automatic adjustment mechanisms reduce the political risk that no action will be
taken until a crisis—rather, actions will be taken automatically, without
the intervention of politicians.
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In 2012, Greece adopted a pension system with a notional rate of
return and an automatic adjustment mechanism to maintain solvency.
Italy, Poland, and Latvia also have automatic life expectancy indexing
in a notional account system. France in 2003 legislated an increase in
the number of years of earnings required to receive a full pension from
40 to 41, rising by one quarter per year from 2009 to 2012. Thereafter,
through 2020, the contribution period for full benefits will increase automatically as needed to keep the ratio of the contribution period to the
average retirement period equal to its ratio in 2003, which is approximately two to one. This adjustment mechanism effectively results in
a reduction in benefits that is tied to increases in life expectancy. The
French government retains the right to not make these adjustments if
labor market conditions, such as high unemployment, do not support
the extra years of work.
In 2012, the Netherlands passed a law that will automatically adjust
its normal retirement age for increases in life expectancy, starting in
2020. This provides an alternative approach for indexing benefits to
improvements in life expectancy. Every five years, the government will
assess whether life expectancy improvements have been sufficient to
warrant an increase in the retirement age. According to projections, the
retirement age will increase from 66 to 67 in 2025 and from 67 to 68 in
2040. Workers will still be able to receive benefits at age 65, but these
changes in the normal retirement age result in a cut in benefits at that
age by 6.5 percent for every one-year increase in the normal retirement
age.
Japan, Germany, and Canada have also adopted different types
of automatic adjustment mechanisms. While in many countries with
automatic adjustment mechanisms the adjustments occur annually, in
Canada, because of the stability of its long-term financing, it is expected
that its automatic adjustment mechanism will be used rarely, if at all.
One issue with these mechanisms has been how automatic they
actually were in practice, with Sweden, Germany, and Italy making
changes to the adjustment mechanism when unpopular adjustments
were required. In 2009, Germany passed a law that for the second consecutive year overrode the automatic adjustment mechanism.
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National Savings Funds for Retirement Financing
Ireland, France, China, and New Zealand have introduced separate
national savings funds, separate from their social security programs, for
the purpose of prefinancing future social security benefits. Subsequently,
however, some of these countries ended up drawing down these funds
earlier than expected (Whitehouse and Antolin 2012). In Ireland, for
example, the National Pension Reserve Fund was used to help bail out
Irish banks in 2011 because of the financial crisis. In 2007, Argentina
established a national social security sustainability fund to help guarantee the payment of future social security benefits. In 2008, Russia
established the National Welfare Fund to help pay for future public
pension benefits. Norway has a large national savings fund, one of the
largest pension funds in the world (Mosionek-Schweda, this volume).
Extending Coverage to More Workers
The majority of workers around the world, particularly outside of
the high-income countries, lack social security coverage. This is one
of the key problems facing social security programs, particularly for
middle- and lower-income countries. On average, social security programs in Africa only cover 10 percent of workers (Gillion et al. 2000),
partly because many workers are employed in the informal sector, which
many social security programs do not cover. Part of the reason also is
that many workers who should be covered by law are not participating
because of contribution evasion, which is the failure of employers and
workers to make mandatory social security contributions.
Many countries are attempting to extend coverage to more workers.
Burundi has an innovative system where motorcycle taxi cab drivers
are covered through contributions to their national association (Turner,
this volume). To encourage coverage among agricultural workers, who
are typically more difficult to bring into the social security system,
Tanzania has a public relations campaign to encourage more people to
participate in the social security system. Tunisia charges agricultural
workers a lower contribution rate than urban workers. Egypt allows
self-employed workers to declare their level of income, with the minimum level varying by occupation. Vietnam has a program that allows
agricultural workers to make contributions in kilos of rice, and later
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receive benefits in rice. Thailand, China, and India also have a matching
contribution for voluntary programs for informal sector or rural workers. In 2010, the Indian government introduced a new pension initiative,
which runs from 2010 through 2014, to increase participation in the
national New Pension Scheme, aimed particularly at the 300 million
workers in the unorganized sector who are generally excluded from formal pension provisions. The initiative includes a partial contribution
match to encourage participation in the plan.
In 2012, Peru enacted a law extending mandatory coverage to selfemployed workers earning more than 1.5 times the minimum wage.
Chile is also extending coverage of its mandatory individual accounts
to self-employed workers earning above a minimum amount, but with
the choice to opt out during a five-year transition period. In 2010, Malaysia extended coverage to part-time workers. That same year, South
Korea extended coverage of its mandatory employer-sponsored pension system to small employers having four or fewer employees.
Some countries in Africa have not had social security programs for
private sector workers, only for workers in government and governmentcontrolled enterprises. In 2011, Ethiopia extended social security coverage to private sector workers.
It was initially thought that individual account systems would succeed in extending coverage to more workers because of the link between
contributions and account balances and thus benefits. In fact, the link
is quite variable. It is variable because of financial market risk, which
affects both the link between contributions and account balances at retirement and the link between account balances and annuitized benefits.
Perhaps for other reasons as well, the extension of coverage in countries
adopting individual accounts has not occurred. Reforms with individual
account plans did not increase coverage in any of the reforming countries in Latin America (Kritzer, Kay, and Sinha 2011).
Some countries have extended coverage to uncovered workers on a
voluntary basis. China has a voluntary pension system for rural workers
(Chen and Turner, this volume). Kenya in 2011 launched a voluntary
individual account system, called the Mbao Pension Plan (Kwena and
Turner 2013; Turner, this volume), where poor workers can contribute
small amounts (as little as $0.25) using mobile phone technology. This
system is feasible because mobile phone costs have decreased to the
extent that they are available in Kenya for as little as $5 or $10.
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Noncontributory Social Security Pensions
A number of middle- and lower-income countries have established
noncontributory means-tested old-age pensions to provide benefits
to poor people in old age and to extend the coverage of social security programs (International Labour Office 2007). This trend has been
motivated by an attempt to reduce poverty in old age and appears to
be gaining greater acceptance around the world. These programs are
sometimes called social pensions. Countries with social pensions include Brazil, India, Nepal, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa,
and Mauritius. Swaziland and Lesotho have tax-financed programs that
provide cash transfers to older persons (Vincent and Cull 2011). Chile
adopted such a program in 2008, and also established a minimum benefit for participants who had contributed to the mandatory individual
accounts and met certain other requirements. In 2008, Belize extended
to indigent older men its noncontributory poverty program that already
applied for indigent older women. The Maldives adopted a program in
2010. Peru and the Philippines both adopted programs in 2011.
International Agreements to Facilitate Work and Retirement in
Other Countries
Although for many years countries have had international agreements concerning social security benefits for workers moving between
countries, there is an increased interest in global collaboration to provide these benefits. Mercosur—the Southern Common Market—signed
an agreement in 2007 whereby retirees could receive their social security benefits in any country in the region without charge. The benefits
are wired from the social security agency in the home country to the
social security agency in the new country of residence. Formerly, the
benefits were wired to a bank in the residence country, which charged
money transfer and foreign exchange fees. In addition, all documentation is sent electronically, rather than by mail, which expedites the
process of workers receiving benefits from other countries. In 2007,
22 countries signed the Ibero-American Multilateral Social Security
Agreement, which will facilitate the provision of social security benefits to international workers in Hispanic countries. In 2011, a new Ibero
multilateral agreement provides social security benefits to migrant
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workers and their families in eight countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Spain, Paraguay, and Portugal.
The EU has regulations regarding the coordination of social security in EU countries. The East African Community is considering this
issue (Turner, this volume). As well as these multilateral agreements,
increasingly countries have bilateral agreements, sometimes called totalization agreements. New Zealand and Australia are also discussing
the portability of pension benefits between those two countries as part
of an effort to move those countries to a single economic market.

EMPLOYER-PROVIDED PENSION PLANS
Unisex Pensions from Defined Contribution Plans
Because women on average live longer than men, life insurance
companies selling annuities generally charge a higher price to women
than men for an annuity paying an equal annual benefit. Gender-based
benefit calculations when annuitizing defined contribution accounts,
which results in equal expected lifetime benefits for men and women
the same age, is viewed as discriminatory against women by some
people because it provides lower annual benefits to women than men.
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed gender-based pensions for
employer-provided defined contribution plans on the grounds that it
constituted discrimination in compensation against women. In 2012,
the EU outlawed that practice for all annuities, including annuities both
provided through pension plans and purchased individually.
Extending Voluntary Pension Coverage
Extending voluntary pension coverage, as a supplement to mandatory pension coverage, has long been a goal for many countries. Ireland
mandated that by 2003 all employers were required to provide their
employees the option to participate in a Personal Retirement Savings
Account, but many employers have failed to comply with this requirement, and among those that have, some have no participants in the plans
provided (Hughes, this volume). In 2008, the Philippine Congress passed
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a law creating private voluntary retirement accounts as a supplement to
the country’s public PAYG system. Under the law, public- and privatesector employees and the self-employed may set up Personal Equity
and Retirement Accounts (PERAs). In 2009, a program took effect in
Israel through an agreement between labor unions and manufacturing
associations to extend pension coverage to workers not already having
such coverage. In 2011, Chile established new rules to encourage employers to voluntarily provide pension plans. In 2012, India extended a
defined contribution system designed for government workers so as to
make it available to private sector workers, and Malaysia established a
voluntary pension system to supplement its mandatory system.
Some countries, however, provide voluntary pension systems to
workers who do not participate in social security as a substitute for
social security. In 2007, Pakistan introduced a new voluntary pension system. In 2009, China extended voluntary pension coverage to
650 million rural workers by establishing the National Rural Pension
Scheme. By 2011, there were more than 258 million contributors and
100 million beneficiaries (Turner and Chen, this volume).
Pension Regulators
As employer-provided pensions are increasing, many more countries gradually are adopting pension regulators. With the growing
importance of defined contribution plans, pension regulators more often
are not part of Labor Departments but are part of government departments focusing on financial market regulation. Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania have all instituted pension regulatory authorities. Burundi,
however, does not have a pension regulator (Turner, this volume).
The Decline in Defined Benefit Plans and the Trend toward
Defined Contribution Plans
In countries with established pension systems, defined benefit plans
were traditionally the primary plans in the private sector but have since
declined in importance, being supplanted by defined contribution plans.
Generally, the decline has been considerably less in the public sector,
where defined benefit plans still predominate. These countries include
the United Kingdom, Ireland, the United States, and Kenya. In the
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United States, a type of defined contribution plan called the 401(k) plan
has replaced defined benefit plans as the most important type of plan
in the private sector, but Individual Retirement Accounts, which are
defined contribution plans established by individuals without reference
to a particular employer, have since replaced 401(k) plans as the most
important type of retirement plan in terms of assets. The decline in private sector defined benefit plans has not occurred in all countries where
they have been prevalent. For example, it has not occurred in Germany
or Japan. There has also been a movement away from defined benefit
plans for public sector employees, with Kenya and Brazil taking steps
to end those plans for public sector employees.
Automatic Enrollment to Extend Coverage
To solve the problem of workers not participating in voluntary
employer-provided pension plans when they have the opportunity to do
so, there has been a trend toward automatic enrollment. In traditional
plans, workers need to actively enroll in employer-provided defined
contribution plans. If they do nothing, they are not enrolled. Thus, traditionally the default is nonenrollment.
A number of employers sponsoring defined contribution pension
plans in the United States have adopted automatic enrollment. In the
KiwiSaver program in New Zealand, starting in 2007, workers are
placed in the system by default but can opt out. In the United Kingdom,
starting in October 2012, all employers are required to offer a pension
plan to their employees, and they are required to automatically enroll
their employees (Szczepański and Turner, this volume). The requirement starts with large firms and is being phased in over four years so
that it will eventually apply to all employers. The mandatory contribution rate to the plan is 8 percent, also being phased in, with 1 percent of
that provided by a government subsidy.
Defaults
Along with automatic enrollment, which is a form of default, defaults have been used for investment options. Many participants are
uncertain as to what a good investment choice would be. With defaults,
if they take no action they automatically are signed up for the default
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investment. Initially, in the United States that investment was a low-risk
option, but there has been a move toward higher-risk defaults because
low-risk defaults resulted in small accounts due to low returns. The defaults now generally being used are ones that reduce the portfolio risk
as the participant approached retirement. These are sometimes called
target-date funds, or retirement date funds.
In 2012, the United Kingdom established a nationwide default,
known as the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which provides retirement date funds for workers whose employers do not offer
a plan and who do not choose one of the other funds offered by NEST
(Szczepański and Turner, this volume). This system is largely based on
the KiwiSaver system in New Zealand.
Financial Education
Financial education has been a response to the problem of financial
illiteracy for participants in defined contribution systems, both in mandatory and voluntary defined contribution systems (Turner and Muir,
this volume). The increase in financial education provided by governments and employers is a direct result of the growing importance of
defined contribution plans as voluntary or mandatory parts of retirement income systems. Financial education can cover such topics as
investment terminology, asset allocation, risk tolerance, and retirement
goal setting. Using financial education to address the lack of financial
literacy of pension participants is not a quick fix but needs to be a longterm, sustained, and costly effort.
Several international organizations, such as the OECD and the International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS), have taken an
interest in financial education for pension participants in individual account pension systems. In 2008, the OECD created the International
Network on Financial Education. A survey by IOPS found that 16 out
of 19 financial supervisors of pension systems provided some type of
financial education (IOPS 2011). The pension supervisors not providing
financial education tended to be fairly young, with intentions of providing financial education in the future.
Chile, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and the United States have all
developed financial education programs. In 2009, Colombia enacted a
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law providing incentives for organizations to establish low-cost programs for financial education.
Greater Transparency
With some countries moving to defined contribution plans, they
also are leaning toward providing greater transparency, particularly concerning fees. The United States in 2012 released regulations requiring
greater disclosure to private sector pension participants of information
concerning fees. Transparency is also an issue in terms of conflicts of
interest that financial advisers may have. The issue of transparency is
being considered in a number of other countries, as well. In the UK, private pension companies will be forced to reveal fees and charges taken
from employees’ retirement savings under an agreement with the Association of British Insurers. The requirement will be implemented in
2014 for autoenrollment pension plans, and in 2015 for all other workplace pension plans.
Hybrid Plans
Traditionally, pension plans have been divided into either defined
benefit plans or defined contribution plans, but hybrid plans do not fit
neatly into either category. These include defined contribution plans
with rate of return guarantees, such as the Riester plans in Germany.
Hybrid plans developed in the Netherlands include collective defined
contribution plans, which have a defined benefit plan formula but with
the workers collectively bearing the investment risk. The most common
hybrid plan in the United States is the cash balance plan.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has surveyed trends in social security and employerprovided pensions around the world. Many countries have reformed
their social security and employer-provided pension systems. Reforms
of social security programs include raising the benefit entitlement age,
adopting automatic adjustment mechanisms, and raising contribution
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rates. While most countries have retained traditional social insurance–
type social security systems, there have been two other significant trends
relating to plan type. First, countries with provident funds have been
converting those funds to social insurance–type social security systems.
Second, some countries with traditional social security systems have
added mandatory individual accounts, but more recently a number of
countries have cut back on the contributions to those accounts. An additional trend is that low-income countries have continued to look for
ways to include more of their workers in their social security systems,
with some countries adopting innovative programs targeted at groups
who have not participated in or been covered by social security.
Trends in employer-provided pensions include a shift toward defined contributions and away from defined benefit plans, increased use
of hybrid plans, and a greater usage of unisex mortality tables in calculating annuities.

Note
We have received valuable comments from Dalmer Hoskins of the U.S. Social Security Administration. This chapter draws heavily on the Social Security Administration’s
monthly newsletter, International Update: Recent Developments in Foreign Public and
Private Pensions.
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Have Personal Retirement
Savings Accounts Achieved Their
Objectives in Ireland?
Gerard Hughes
Trinity College Dublin
In its report Averting the Old Age Crisis, the World Bank (1994)
argued that OECD and Eastern European economies and several Latin
American economies faced imminent problems with their retirement
income systems. It said that the public pillars of national social security
pension systems should not be relied on to solve these problems, as
high tax rates are required to finance them and they inhibit growth and
reduce rates of return to workers. Believing that the social security pillar of retirement income would become more costly in the future, the
report recommended that these countries make the transition to a multipillar system, which would include a privately managed, mandatory
personal retirement savings plan.
In Ireland, the publication of the World Bank report coincided with
a survey of occupational and personal pension coverage. The results of
this survey were published in 1996 (Hughes and Whelan 1996). The
report revealed that less than half of those in employment and less than
one-tenth of those not economically active were covered by a pension
plan. Following publication of the survey results, the Pensions Board
and the Department of Social, Community and Family affairs jointly
sponsored a National Pensions Policy Initiative. The purpose of this initiative was to facilitate a national debate on how to develop the national
pension system. In its report Securing Retirement Income, the Pensions
Board (1998) recommended that a legal framework be put in place that
would encourage private sector financial institutions to introduce on a
voluntary basis a new type of pension product, the Personal Retirement
Savings Account (PRSA). The retirement income system in Ireland
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consists now of a mandatory social security program, a means-tested
social assistance program, voluntary occupational pensions provided
by employers, PRSAs provided by employers mandatorily but with voluntary participation by workers, and voluntary personal pensions.

OBJECTIVES SET FOR PRSAs
The primary objective set for the PRSA was to increase coverage
of private pension plans for those aged 30 and over from 54 percent to
70 percent within 10 years of their introduction. In terms of all those at
work, this objective can be expressed as a requirement to increase the
coverage rate from less than half to 60 percent in a 10-year period.
A wide range of other objectives were set for PRSAs, but no systematic effort has been made to publish information that would facilitate
evaluation of how successful they are in achieving these objectives.
However, a number of key objectives of PRSAs for which enough information is published facilitate an evaluation of how well PRSAs have
performed since their introduction. There are six key objectives set for
the PRSA product:
1) It should be a lower-cost product than was available in the past.
2) In addition to traditional providers of pensions, the PRSA
should be supplied by the post office and other retail outlets,
such as supermarkets.
3) It should have a flexible retirement age.
4) Owners of PRSAs should eventually buy an annuity for life.
5) It should be mandatory for all employers, except those with
occupational plans for all employees, to provide access for all
their employees to a PRSA provider.
6) The primary market for the PRSA should be employees in
nonpensionable employment, and individuals who change or
lose their jobs should be able to continue contributing to their
pensions.1
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Some of the key objectives set for PRSAs can be evaluated on
the basis of the terms and conditions on which the new pension saving product was introduced after negotiations between the government
and pension providers, while others require data stretching back to
September 2003 when the new product was introduced. We begin our
evaluation by considering objectives 1–4 in the list above and then proceeding to consider objectives 5–6 together with the primary objective
of increasing pension coverage from less than half to 60 percent within
a 10-year period.

PRSA FEES AND PROVIDERS
The terms and conditions on which PRSA products were issued
by pension providers differed in important respects from those envisaged by the Pensions Board in its report Securing Retirement Income
(1998). Instead of one PRSA product with government certification
to indicate that it met certain quality requirements, two products were
introduced—the standard PRSA and the nonstandard PRSA. The difference between the two is that the fees for a standard PRSA are capped
at 5 percent of PRSA contributions and 1 percent of PRSA assets, and
it can invest only in unit funds, whereas a nonstandard PRSA has no
cap on fees and it can invest in a wide choice of assets. Far from being
a lower-cost product than personal pension products previously available, the standard PRSA turned out to have higher fees than was usual
for existing personal pension products.
Table 3.1 shows how fees for a standard PRSA compare with those
for an Additional Voluntary Contribution (AVC) plan for teachers operated by Cornmarket Group Financial Services, an off-the-shelf personal
pension marketed by one of the largest providers of pensions in Ireland,
the Irish Life Assurance Company, and fees for existing personal pension products. For an Irish Life personal pension, a flat rate fee of €3.81
per contribution was charged, whereas 5 percent of each contribution
was deducted for the standard PRSA, and the annual management fee
for the Irish Life pension was 0.9 percent compared with 1 percent for
the PRSA. The capped fee for a standard PRSA of 5 percent of each
contribution is the same as the usual fee for a personal pension contract,
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but the annual 1 percent fee levied on the value of the fund is higher
than the usual annual fee of 0.75 percent of the value of the fund for a
personal pension contract. The note by O’Quigley (2003), which provides the information on the usual fees for personal pension contracts,
points out that the fees for a standard PRSA are “not particularly low”
and that fees per contribution for personal pensions are “frequently less”
than 5 percent. Although the annual fee of 1.25 percent of the value of
the fund by Cornmarket Group for an AVC for a teacher is higher than
the annual fee for a standard PRSA, the source of the information for
this group, Brady (2001a, p. 12), points out that they were charging “at
the top end of what is normal practice in the pensions business.” Fees
for a standard PRSA were also higher than fees for a Stakeholder Pension in the UK, which was introduced in 2001, two years earlier than
the PRSA. The only fee for a Stakeholder Pension was the 1 percent
annual management fee.2 PRSA fees are also higher than the revised
maximum fees imposed in 2010 in Hungary on mandatory and voluntary private pension investment accounts and on mandatory accounts in
Poland in 2012. The deductions from contributions in Ireland are nearly
40 percent greater than in Poland while the annual management fees
are two-thirds greater. Both sets of fees are five times greater in Ireland
than in Hungary.
Why did the standard PRSA turn out to be a higher-cost product
than envisaged by the Pensions Board? The main reason appears to be
that the pension providers were not prepared to offer a PRSA at a much
lower cost than they previously charged for a personal pension, and
they were able to insist on this because the government was not willing
to offer the PRSA product without their cooperation
During the negotiations between pension providers and the government on the terms and conditions that would be attached to the new
PRSA product, financial journalists discovered from their own sources
that the providers were opposed to both a government certification and
any cap on their fees. For example, Kerby (2001, p. 52) reports in Business and Finance magazine that “the pension companies lobbied hard
against a kite-mark or a maximum charge (they certainly didn’t want
anything like the total 1 percent limit imposed on Stakeholder, the UK
version of the PRSA).”
What emerged eventually from the negotiations was a compromise
under which the providers would offer a standard PRSA, with fees gen-
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erally higher than usual for previous personal pension products, and
they would offer a nonstandard PRSA, which allowed the providers to
levy higher fees than previous personal pension products. In the same
article, Kerby (2001, p. 52) points out that “the non-standard PRSA is
certainly a compromise—a way for the pension companies (who have
had this market to themselves up to now) to earn higher margins and to
reward their commission-paid brokers.”
Subsequently, another journalist (Brady 2001b) investigating the
negotiations between pension providers and the government, found a
letter under the Freedom of Information Act from the Irish Insurance
Federation that warned that “if the eventual regime does not give sufficient scope for profitability” there is a danger that “only a limited
number of providers [will] choose to enter the market.”
Very little additional information has emerged about the negotiations between pension providers and the government, but it is likely that
the traditional pension providers were also opposed to new providers
entering the pensions market. Neither the post office nor other retail
outlets, such as national supermarket chain stores, entered the pensions
market. The traditional providers may also have been opposed to a flexible retirement age for the PRSA product, as when it was introduced it
was stipulated that owners of PRSA products could not retire before
age 60. The providers also appear to have been opposed to owners of
PRSAs being obliged to take out an annuity. This was a requirement
when the PRSA was introduced but the pensions industry frequently
insisted that owners of PRSAs should be able to avail of the Approved
Retirement Fund (ARF) and Approved Minimum Retirement Fund
(AMRF) options in the same way as the self-employed. This objective
was achieved in 2011 when the ARF and AMRF options were extended
to owners of PRSAs.3
The hope, expressed by the Pensions Board and others, that promoting the PRSA would help to simplify the pension system was not
realized. Instead, it greatly increased the complexity of the choices that
ordinary savers faced. One professional advisor, Gilhawley (2003), argued that what eventually emerged from the negotiations “isn’t a pretty
sight” and that it “ensured that the PRSA market will be a jungle for the
ordinary saver” (p. 7).
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PRSA ACCESS AND COVERAGE
Following agreement with pension providers on the terms and
conditions on which a standard PRSA could be offered in the market,
providers were accredited by the Pensions Board. Accredited providers
started to advertise their PRSAs in April 2003 so that they would be
ready to be nominated by employers as designated providers by September 2003. This was the date set by the Pensions Board by which the
great majority of employers would be required by law to have nominated at least one provider to supply a PRSA to their employees.
In June 2003, a few months before that date, the Irish Financial
Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA), which was jointly responsible
with the Pensions Board for regulating PRSAs, issued instructions to
PRSA providers that suggested the regulators were concerned to avoid
a repetition in Ireland of practices by personal pension providers, which
led to the pensions misselling scandal in the UK in the 1990s (Ward
2000). These instructions required providers at the point of sale to
•

inform prospective clients about the difference between a standard and a nonstandard PRSA,

•

have a statement signed by both parties that all risks have been
pointed out and that all relevant information has been provided,
and

•

give clients the IFSRA consumer fact sheet about PRSAs to
help them assess which type of PRSA would best suit their
needs.

Kerby (2003) reports that the reason the IFSRA stipulated what information should be available to prospective purchasers of PRSAs was
that the director of the consumer division of the IFSRA had said, “We
do not want consumers encouraged to purchase a nonstandard PRSA
when it is not required, simply to generate additional revenue for the
financial institutions.”
The objective that all employers, except the 4 percent or so with occupational plans for all employees (Hughes and Whelan 1996), should
designate a PRSA provider has fallen well short of target. Figures 3.1
and 3.2 show, starting in September 2003, the cumulative number and
percentage of employers who have designated a PRSA provider and
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Figure 3.1 Number of Employers Designating a PRSA Provider and
Number of Employer Designations Where Employees Have
Taken Out a PRSA Contract, 2003–2012
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SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).

the cumulative number and percentage of firms in which employees
have taken out PRSA contracts. It should be noted that we do not know
how many employees continue to make PRSA contributions because
the Pensions Board does not publish this information. Experience in
the UK shows that about half of contributors to personal pensions have
ceased to make contributions within four years of taking out a contract
(Financial Services Authority 2006).
By the end of 2003, when all employers were legally obliged to
designate a PRSA provider, only 58,770, or less than half of all the
firms listed in the Companies Registration Office, had nominated a provider. In those firms that had a designated provider, only 2,502, or less
than 2 percent of all firms, had employees who had taken out a PRSA
contract. This outcome of the long planning stage for the designation
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Figure 3.2 Percentage of Firms Designating a PRSA Provider and
Percentage of Firms Whose Employees Have Taken Out a
PRSA Contract, 2004–2011
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of PRSA providers was so abysmal that in September 2004, a year after
the launch, the Pensions Board contacted 64,000 firms to remind them
of their legal obligation to designate a PRSA provider for their employees. In the period up to March 2012, about a decade after the launch of
PRSAs, there has been an increase in the number of employers designating a provider and in the number of these firms in which employees
have taken out a PRSA contract to 93,401 and 17,209, respectively.
However, after an initial spurt in the number of employers designating a
provider up to December 2005, the percentage of employers designating
a provider has remained fairly stable at less than 50 percent, while the
percentage of firms in which employees have taken out a PRSA contract
has increased from less than 2 percent to around 10 percent. Looking
at the figures in terms of employers who have designated a PRSA pro-
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vider, they show that 81 percent of employer-designated plans have no
one contributing to them. Where employers do have employees who
have taken out a PRSA contract, the average number of employees with
contracts is about four.
Figure 3.3 shows the cumulative number of standard, nonstandard,
and total PRSAs sold. Sales were slow at first but they increased rapidly
so that by December 2012 over 200,000 PRSA contracts had been sold,
of which over 150,000, or three-quarters, were standard, and almost
50,000, or one-quarter, were nonstandard. On the face of it, this looks
like a satisfactory outcome. That is what the Pensions Board implies in
its quarterly press releases about the sales figures. However, the group
for which PRSAs were originally intended are employees in nonpensionable employment. But this is not the group to which most PRSAs
have been sold. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the number of employees and
Figure 3.3 Number of Standard, Nonstandard, and Total PRSAs Sold,
2003–2012
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PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).
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Figure 3.4 Number of Employees and Self-Employed and Those Not
in the Labor Force Who Have Taken Out a PRSA Contract,
2003–2012
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SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).

self-employed and other individuals not in the labor force who have
taken out PRSA contracts.
In the first year following their introduction, the number and percentage of employees and self-employed and those not in the labor
force taking out a PRSA contract were about the same. After September
2004, the number and percentage of self-employed and purchasers not
in the labor force began to increase much more rapidly than employees. By March 2012, the cumulative number of purchasers of PRSA
contracts who were self-employed or not in the labor force was double
the number of employees who had taken out contracts—132,345 versus
67,973—while the percentage of self-employed and purchasers not in
the labor force relative to all those not in the labor force was three times
greater, 9.4 percent versus 3.2 percent.
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Figure 3.5 Percentage of Employees and Self-Employed and Those Not
in the Labor Force Who Have Taken Out a PRSA Contract,
2003–2012
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SOURCE: Pensions Board Web site: http://www.pensionsboard.ie/en/Regulation/
PRSAs (accessed November 14, 2013).

Gilhawley (2007) has identified four separate markets where PRSAs
are being sold: 1) employees in nonpensionable employment—the target group for which PRSAs were originally intended; 2) self-employed
individuals who can contribute to a Retirement Annuity Contract or a
PRSA or both; 3) employees who are already in pensionable employment who have an AVC plan; and 4) employees and the self-employed
who already have either an occupational pension or a Retirement Annuity Contract who can transfer their pension funds to a PRSA. The
Pensions Board has not published sufficient information to identify how
many PRSA contracts have been taken out by each of these groups or
by those not in the labor force who can also contribute to a PRSA.
However, as employer-designated plans are obliged to offer at least one
standard PRSA, it is reasonable to assume, as Gilhawley (2007) does,
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that all PRSAs purchased through an employer-designated plan are
standard PRSAs. This assumption also enables us to identify how many
standard and nonstandard PRSAs have been sold to the self-employed
and other individuals not in the labor force.
Figure 3.6 shows that when the PRSA product was launched in September 2003, about one-third of all PRSA contracts were taken out by
employees for whom they were intended, and about two-thirds were
taken out by self-employed and others who were not in the labor force.
In the first two years of operation, there was a significant increase in
the percentage of all contracts bought by employees and a significant
decrease for the other group to almost 50 percent in each case. Thereafter, the percentage of all PRSA contracts sold to employees gradually
Figure 3.6 Standard PRSA Contracts Taken Out by Employees and
PRSA Contracts Taken Out by Self-Employed and Those
Not in the Labor Force as Percentage of All PRSA Contracts,
2003–2012
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decreased to around one-third, while the percentage sold to the selfemployed and others gradually increased to about two-thirds. In December 2011, the cumulative figures for PRSA contracts sold indicated
that only one-third of the contracts have been sold into the target market, while two-thirds have been bought by individuals for whom the
PRSA product was not intended.
Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of PRSA contracts purchased
by the self-employed and individuals outside the labor force that are
standard and nonstandard. In September 2003, when the PRSA was
launched, about 54 percent of the contracts bought by people who were
not working were standard PRSAs, while 46 percent were nonstandard.
However, in the next quarter ending in December 2003, about twothirds of the PRSA products bought by the self-employed and others
Figure 3.7 Percentage of PRSA Contracts Sold to Self-Employed
and Those Not in the Labor Force That Are Standard and
Nonstandard, 2003–2012
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not in the labor force were standard PRSAs while one-third were nonstandard. Subsequently, these proportions did not change much, so that
by December 2011, about two-thirds of the PRSAs bought by the selfemployed and those not in the labor force were standard PRSAs, while
one-third were nonstandard.
The influence of the self-employed on sales of PRSAs can be seen,
as Gilhawley (2007) has noted, from the spikes in the quarterly figures
for nonemployer designated sales, which occur in the last quarter of the
year (Figure 3.8). These spikes are related to the October 31 tax deadline for backdating pension contributions by the self-employed to the
previous tax year.
Before the property bubble burst in Ireland in 2007, sales in the first
three quarters averaged around 3,000 per quarter, but this figure jumped
to around 7,000 in the last quarter. After the property collapse, sales in
Figure 3.8 Quarterly Sales of PRSA Contracts to Self-Employed and
Those Not in the Labor Force, 2003–2012
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the first three quarters of the year fell back to around 2,000, while sales
in the last quarter were about double this at around 4,000.
Almost 10 years after their introduction, sales of PRSAs to employees in nonpensionable employment, who are the target market,
have been and continue to be low. On the other hand, sales to the selfemployed and others not in the labor force, for whom they were not
intended, account for the significant growth in sales of PRSAs.

EFFECT OF PRSAs ON PENSION COVERAGE
The primary objective that was set for PRSAs by the Pensions
Board was that within 10 years of their introduction they would help
to increase the coverage rate of private pension plans to 60 percent of
those in employment. Special surveys of pension coverage in 2002,
2005, and 2009 have been undertaken by the Central Statistics Office (2004, 2006, 2011). These surveys enable us to evaluate whether
PRSAs have helped to increase the coverage rate of private pension
plans in a way that will lead to the achievement of the 60 percent target
by the end of 2013. Table 3.2 shows that, contrary to expectations, there
was no increase in the coverage rate of personal pension plans between
2002 and 2005, whereas there was an increase in the coverage rate of
occupational plans.
We know from the quarterly PRSA sales figures that 1.3 percent of
employees had taken out a PRSA contract by the end of 2005, which
Table 3.2 Coverage of Occupational and Personal Pension Plans as a
Percentage of Those in Employment (ILO) Aged 20–69, 2002,
2005, and 2009
Pension
Pension
Pension
coverage
coverage
coverage
Category
Q1 2002
Q4 2005
Q4 2009
Occupational pension only
35.4
40.1
38.9
Personal pension only
12.9
12.1
9.6
Both
2.9
2.8
2.5
Total pension coverage
51.2
55.0
51.0
SOURCE: Central Statistics Office (2004, 2011) and author’s calculations.
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should have resulted in an increase in the personal pension coverage
rate. The fact that the Central Statistics Office survey did not pick up
such an increase but instead recorded a much bigger increase in the
occupational pension coverage rate suggests that the coverage of occupational pensions increased independently of the introduction of
PRSAs. It may also indicate that many respondents to the survey who
purchase a personal pension through an employer-designated plan may
identify it as an occupational rather than a personal pension.
In 2007, the Irish property market collapsed, and a year later the
global financial crisis began. Both of these events resulted in massive
financial and job losses across the Irish economy. For example, total
employment fell by over 300,000, or by 15 percent, between the beginning of 2008 and the end of 2010, and the real value of pension fund
assets fell by 37.5 percent in 2008 compared with 22.3 percent in Hungary, 17.7 percent in Poland, and a weighted average of 23.7 percent
in the OECD as a whole (OECD 2011). The effect of these losses was
that the gains made in private pension coverage between 2002 and 2005
were lost so that the coverage of occupational and personal pension
plans fell from 40 percent to 39 percent and from 12 percent to 10 percent, respectively. Overall the private pension coverage rate fell from
55 percent in 2005 to 51 percent in 2009. This brought the coverage rate
in 2009 back to its level in 2002 before PRSAs were introduced.

PRSAs HAVE REINFORCED EXISTING INEQUITIES
In order to promote PRSAs, the government gave them entitlements
similar to other pension plans to tax reliefs (preferential tax treatment)
on employer and employee contributions and investment income and
capital gains, and made the PRSA pension taxable on payment. Table
3.3 shows estimates of the cost of tax relief on PRSA contributions
since 2004 together with the number of contributors who claimed tax
relief. These figures do not include contributions made by employers
or by employees through their employer-designated PRSA for reasons explained in the note to Table 3.3. As employees contributing to
a PRSA through an employer-designated plan are excluded from these
figures, they refer to the cost of tax reliefs for contributors who are self-
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Table 3.3 Cost of Tax Relief on PRSA Contributions and Number of
Beneficiaries, 2006
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

Cost of tax relief (€million)
13.7
42.2
56.4
61.1
73.8
77.0

No. of beneficiaries
6,300
32,900
45,200
46,600
53,900
56,200

NOTE: The figures do not include contributions made by employees through employers’ payroll systems and in respect of which tax relief is provided on the net pay basis.
Information on such contributions is not captured in such a way as to make it possible
to provide disaggregated figures.
SOURCE: Revenue Commissioners Statistical Reports 2007–2010.

employed or not in the labor force. An estimate of the extent to which
the figures in Table 3.3 are underestimated can be derived from additional information that the Revenue Commissioners sought in 2006
from employers about employer and employee contributions to PRSA
and other pension plans. The improved data for 2006 show that the
cost of tax reliefs for PRSA contributions amounted to €120 million
and that there were 71,500 beneficiaries (Government of Ireland 2007,
Table 7.2). In 2006, therefore, the cost of tax reliefs for PRSAs appears to have been twice as great as the figure published in the Revenue
Commissioners’ report, and the number of beneficiaries appears to have
been nearly 60 percent greater.
Table 3.3 shows that between 2004 and 2009, the Exchequer (the
government treasury) has subsidized PRSAs by at least €320 million
in the form of foregone tax. PRSA employer and employee contributions in 2006 amounted to €330 million, so in that year the Exchequer
subsidy for PRSAs of €120 million amounted to 36 percent of total
contributions.
In Ireland, government subsidies (through tax preferences) for
private pensions overwhelmingly accrue to taxpayers with the largest
incomes (Callan, Keane, and Walsh 2009; Hughes 2000; Hughes and
Sinfield 2004), and some commentators (Hughes and Sinfield 2004)
warned that the introduction of personal pension accounts would reinforce the existing inequalities. This warning has proved to be well
founded.
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Using data from the Revenue Commissioners, Figure 3.9 shows
the distribution of the cost of tax reliefs by income decile for the selfemployed and others not in the labor force in 2006. Nearly 36 percent
of the tax reliefs were captured by the top income decile, and over half
of them accrued to the top income quintile. In sharp contrast, the bottom
income decile received about 1.5 percent of the tax reliefs, and the bottom income quintile received less than 3 percent of them.

CONCLUSION
The great hopes that advocates of private personal pensions in Ireland had for a new voluntary pension product, the Personal Retirement
Figure 3.9 Percentage of Tax Relief on PRSA Contributions by SelfEmployed and Others Not in Labor Force Accruing to Each
Income Decile of PRSA Contributors, 2006
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Savings Account, have not been realized. Few of the key objectives
set by the government regulator of private pension plans have been attained. The fees for a standard PRSA have generally been higher than
the usual fees for personal pension products available before PRSAs
were introduced. Neither the post office nor other retail outlets, such
as supermarket chain stores, entered the new market for personal pensions. Standard PRSAs do not have a flexible retirement age, as owners
cannot receive their benefits until they are age 60. Owners of PRSAs
are not obliged to buy an annuity if they can satisfy the conditions for
transferring their PRSA pension fund into an ARF or an AMRF pension
fund. While it was made mandatory that all employers who did not provide an occupational pension for all their employees should designate
a personal pension provider for their employees, less than half of the
firms registered with the Companies Office have actually designated
a PRSA provider. Employees in nonpensionable employment have
shown limited interest in the PRSA product, as no one is contributing to
a PRSA in four-fifths of the firms that have designated a PRSA provider.
Up to the beginning of 2012, the take-up of PRSAs by employees
has been very poor, with only 3 percent of employees deciding to buy a
PRSA. The take-up has been much greater by a group for whom PRSAs
were not intended—the self-employed and those not in the labor force.
Approximately 9 percent of these have taken out PRSA contracts, and
this group is now the largest market for personal pension products in
Ireland. Up to the end of 2009, the introduction of PRSAs had failed to
make any progress toward their primary objective of increasing pension
coverage of the employed population to 60 percent—indeed, the coverage rate was slightly lower in 2009 than it was in 2002. Given the lack
of trust in the private pension system’s ability to deliver on its promises,
it is most unlikely that the coverage rate will reach anywhere near the
60 percent figure by the end of 2013.
In addition to failing to meet the objectives set by the government
and the Pensions Board, PRSAs have reinforced inequities in the private pension system that existed before PRSAs were introduced. As
with previous private pension products, PRSAs have predominantly
been bought by taxpayers in the top half of the income distribution. The
benefits of government subsidies for PRSAs have been captured mainly
by high-income earners, with over half of the tax reliefs for PRSAs
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accruing to the top 20 percent of those who have claimed tax relief on
their PRSA contributions.
Ireland has spent the last 15 years trying to shift the public/private
balance of pension provision toward private pensions on a voluntary
basis. This policy has failed; the pension coverage rate now is no greater
than it was before the new personal pensions were introduced in 2003.
Some advocates of private pensions argue that coverage should be
made mandatory, as it is in some other countries like Poland, Hungary,
and Australia. Consideration was given to mandatory approaches in the
Pensions Board’s (2005) National Pensions Review in 2005 and in a
report by Fitzpatrick Associates (2006) commissioned by the Pensions
Board in 2006. The Fitzpatrick report considered a number of different
mandatory models and concluded that “ . . . in general it would seem
that the implementation of a mandatory scheme would generate similar effects to those of any new national tax. The extent of the negative
impact on growth rates will be determined by . . . design and delivery
issues . . .” (p. 23).
In addition to this negative assessment of mandatory plans, the experience of countries with mandatory private pensions suggests that
this approach suffers from the same problems of high costs, lost tax
revenue, and uncertain benefits as the voluntary approach (Fultz 2012).
These problems could be avoided if Ireland were to adopt another approach that members of the Pension Policy Research Group at Trinity
College Dublin have advocated for many years (Hughes and Stewart
2007; Stewart 2005).
They argue that it would be more equitable if tax relief for private
pension saving was given only at the standard rate of tax and that the additional tax revenue that this would generate should be used to increase
the basic state pension to above the poverty level. As the great majority
of employees in nonpensionable employment will be dependent in their
retirement on the state pension, this solution has a number of merits.
It would give them an assurance that they could look forward to a
modest defined benefit pension related to the average industrial wage
rather than having to bear all the risks of a voluntary, soft mandatory, or
mandatory PRSA defined contribution plan. If the state pension were
increased to around 40 percent of the average industrial wage it could
significantly reduce pensioner poverty. New Zealand has a flat-rate pen-
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sion benefit similar to Ireland’s, but at a higher level relative to the
average wage, and it has one of the lowest rates of pensioner poverty in
the OECD. It would reduce the cost of tax reliefs on private pensions
in Ireland, which comparative research suggests are among the highest
in the OECD (Yoo and de Serres 2004). It would provide the revenue
needed to maintain the state pension at a time of economic crisis when
there are calls to reduce it. Finally, it would introduce a greater measure
of fairness into Ireland’s pension system by redistributing resources
from the top 20 percent of households which receive nearly 80 percent
of the pension tax reliefs to the 80 percent of households whose main
source of retirement income is the state pension.

Notes
I am grateful to Jim Stewart of Trinity College Dublin and Elaine Fultz of JMF Research
Associates, Philadelphia, for comments on an earlier draft.
1. Previously, individuals who changed or lost their jobs had to cease contributing to
their pension arrangement.
2. In 2005, the annual management fee for a Stakeholder Pension was increased to
1.5 percent for the first 10 years, after which it falls back to 1 percent.
3. An Approved Retirement Fund (ARF) option is an alternative to an annuity
purchase. On retirement, the self-employed owner of a Retirement Annuity
Contract or an owner of a PRSA can decide to invest the pension fund into a
fund administered by a qualifying fund manager and take one-fourth of the value
of the fund as a tax free lump sum. Income and gains from an ARF are tax free
within the fund whereas drawdowns from the fund are subject to income tax. If
the individual has a guaranteed retirement income less than 1.5 times the state Old
Age Contributory Pension, the pension fund has to be invested in an Approved
Minimum Retirement Fund (AMRF) until the person reaches age 75 when the
AMRF can be transferred into an ARF.
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From an international perspective, the poverty rate among pensioners in Sweden is low. This is explained by both the pension system,
especially by the guarantee pension, and housing allowance for pensioners, as well as other parts of the Swedish welfare system. According
to a comparative study of 15 European countries (van Vliet et al. 2011),
Sweden has the lowest proportion of poor among the elderly, along
with Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, in Sweden many retirees have a vulnerable position with a standard only slightly above the
guidelines for when social assistance may be granted. The disposable
income at the 20th percentile is only slightly above the norm for social
assistance. Mainly older retirees (aged 75 and older) are in this group.
In the first half of the 1990s, more and more people were under the
poverty line, which is defined as those who have an income of below 60
percent of the median income, but since 1998, poverty measured in this
way has decreased (Gustafsson, Johansson, and Palmer 2009).
Thus, even though pensioner poverty is rare, there are good reasons for investigating who the poor pensioners are, why they are poor,
and how they are likely to do in the future. The future development
of pensions depends strongly on the transition that Sweden, like many
other countries, has gone through from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions in both the social security pension system and the
occupational pension system. This means that pensions depend on an
individual’s work and labor income history to a greater extent than be63
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fore. To be able to receive a high pension, working in Sweden for many
years is required. Concern for future pensions is also due to the fact
that economic growth affects defined contribution pensions in different ways. Not least, there is concern about the fate of pensions that are
based on individuals’ choices of pension funds. In some other countries,
this has led to a considerable reduction of the pensions for people who
have already left the workforce for retirement, and some people have
returned to work because of economic necessity.
In this chapter, we outline the Swedish pension system, the changes
in employment among those aged 60 years and older, definitions of
retirement, the data used, and the measures we use to study income differences. We then examine how the income distribution differs between
pensioners and those of working age, and whether and how the difference has changed over time, and we discuss the differences in pensioner
income distribution among different cohorts and men and women, and
why the income gaps between pensioner groups have increased. Pension income is the main source of income for those aged 65 and older,
but many also have substantial income from labor or capital, and many
have assets primarily in their homes, which we also report. We then
study how the level of pension income is influenced by the individual’s
work history, record of self-employment, and number of years in Sweden. In the last sections, we study in more detail some groups with low
pension incomes. We end with a summary and offer some conclusions.

THE SWEDISH PENSION SYSTEM
To understand the income differences and their changes over time
among retired people in Sweden, we give a short introduction to the
structure of the Swedish pension system.1 The Swedish pension system
is a three-tier system consisting of social security pensions, occupational pensions, and personal pensions. As the system has changed a
great deal since the 1990s, different cohorts belong to different pension
systems, and some cohorts have pensions from different generations of
pensions systems.
Social security pensions were introduced in Sweden 100 years ago
in 1913. The retirement age when benefits first could be received was
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67. After some minor changes to the system in the 1920s and 1930s,
a major change followed in 1948, when a non-income-tested and
non-income-dependent pension was introduced. This basic pension
(folkpension) was the same for everyone except that married pensioners
got a lower pension than those who were not married. An earningsrelated additional pension (ATP), a defined benefit system, was introduced in 1960 and was based on the 15 years with the highest income.
There was a ceiling regarding the income included for the calculation
of the pension per year in the ATP system. The ATP pension required
that a person work for at least 30 years in order to obtain a full pension;
with fewer years of work, the pension was proportionally reduced. The
normal pension age was lowered from 67 to 65 in 1976, but it was
possible to take a reduced pension earlier or postpone the take-up and
receive an enhanced pension at an older age. The pension benefits were
price indexed.
A new social security pension system—a defined contribution system—was decided on in two steps by the parliament in 1994 and 1998
and implemented from 1999 onward. The pension contribution rate is
18.5 percent of the worker’s income up to a ceiling, 16 percent of which
is allocated to a notional defined contribution system, and 2.5 percent
of which is for an individual account system (called the premium pension), where each individual can choose between many investment
funds. The pension derived from the notional defined contribution is income indexed. Pension benefits from the notional defined contribution
system can be received starting at age 61 but are higher the later they
are taken (it is an actuarially fair system with respect to benefit receipt
at different ages).
For those who have had no income or a low income, there is a
guarantee pension. Qualification to receive this pension is based on
the benefit levels from the income-related social security pension. To
receive a full guarantee pension, 40 years of residence in Sweden is
necessary, otherwise it is proportionally reduced. The guarantee pension is price indexed. Those aged 65 or older who have a low pension or
other low levels of income and have taken up their entire social security
pension may be eligible for a housing allowance.
There has been a gradual change from the old to the new social security pension system. Those born in 1937 or earlier are completely in
the old system. Those born in 1938 are to 4/20 in the new system, those
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born in 1944 are to 10/20 in the new system and those born in 1954 are
totally in the new system.2
When the ATP system was introduced, those employed in the public sector and white-collar workers in the private sector were already
covered by occupational pension plans. These plans deliver additional
income replacement for income under the ceiling and a high replacement for income over the ceiling in the social security pension system.
Blue-collar workers in the private sector achieved an agreement concerning occupational pensions in the 1970s. After the pension reforms
in the 1990s, the occupational pension plans were changed so that many
are defined contribution plans, but there are still important defined benefit elements in all systems, with the exception of blue-collar workers
in the private sector. Sweden has high occupational pension coverage
of its workforce, as around 90 percent of all wage-earners are employed
at workplaces with collective agreements and thus are covered by occupational pension plans.
Many people also have personal pensions. There are tax reductions
for savings for personal pensions, but the maximum tax reduction has
gradually been reduced.
The Law of Employment Security (LAS) covers people up to age
67. Mandatory retirement under age 67 has not been allowed since 2003
(before 2003, this age was 65). In some sectors, 67 is becoming the
normal age of retirement.

CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AMONG OLDER
PEOPLE IN SWEDEN
In Sweden, it is possible to follow labor force participation and
employment in labor force surveys for over 50 years. Statistics Sweden
carried out its first labor force survey in 1961, after the Labor Market Board (AMS) had conducted pilot studies in 1959 and 1960. In
1961, the male employment rate was high for those aged 60–69, but this
gradually declined in the mid-1990s for those aged 60 and older. The
male employment rate has increased since the mid-1990s for those aged
60–64, and since 2003 for those aged 65–66. It is, however, still much
lower than it was in the early 1960s (Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1 Employment Rate for Men, 1961–2011
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The female employment rate was low in the early 1960s, when it
was common for women to be housewives, but for those under age 65
it has gradually increased since then with some business cycle variations (Figure 4.2). The employment rate is still higher among men than
women in all age groups, but the difference has gradually decreased
with new cohorts and also within each cohort.

WHO HAS RETIRED?
This study deals with income distribution among pensioners. The
line between being retired and being in the labor force, however, is in
many cases unclear, and retirement age varies widely among individuals. Taking a pension and retiring is not the same thing. When someone
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Figure 4.2 Employment Rate for Women, 1961–2011
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takes a pension it does not mean that he or she leaves the labor force—a
pension from the social security system can be taken while working,
and the pension is not means-tested against other pension, other income, or wealth. One definition is that someone is retired when his or
her pension income exceeds the sum of labor income and unemployment benefit or other social insurance benefits.
The Swedish Pensions Agency uses four different measures of
retirement in its analysis (Karlsson and Olsson 2012). The first measure is the Average Exit Age, which is the age that a person leaves the
workforce, given that he or she was working at age 50. The other three
measures are different average pension age measures. Average Pension
Age I is the average age for taking an old-age pension (not only the
individual account premium pension), Average Pension Age II includes
those who receive a disability pension (taken up from age 30 or older),
and Average Pension Age III also includes those receiving a disability
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pension, but only when they are 50 or older. Average Pension Age III is
more in line with the definition of the Average Exit Age, which also has
50 as an age limit. Occupational and personal pensions are not included
in the definition of pension income.
According to the Swedish Pensions Agency, in 2011 the Average
Pension Ages I, II, and III were 64.6, 62.5, and 63.9, respectively.
Age limits in the pension system and in the Employment Protection
Act (LAS) influence when someone leaves the workforce. The social
security pension can be claimed at age 61, but the guarantee pension
cannot be taken before age 65. In the next few years, it is expected
that about 25 percent of new retirees will receive the guarantee pension. In 2008, 778,000 individuals had a guarantee pension, of which
180,000 (15 percent) had a full one. Of those who received a guarantee
pension, 80 percent were women (Olsson 2011). Nearly half of female
pensioners aged 65–69 received a guarantee pension in 2008. Housing
allowances for older persons may be granted from age 65 if the full social security pension is drawn. The Employment Protection Act, on the
other hand, covers employees up to age 67.
In addition to these age limits, occupational and personal pension
plans have different age limits. Personal pensions and occupational
pensions from the private sector (ITP and SAF-LO) and the defined
contribution component of the pensions for municipal and county
employees (KAP-KL) can be claimed from age 55. Employees in
the public sector can take their pensions from age 61. Occupational
pensions should, according to collective agreements, be taken out for
retirement purposes.
In our analysis of patterns of income receipt among older persons,
we chose to draw the line at age 65 for several reasons: the majority
take their pensions at age 65, a guarantee pension can first be granted
at age 65, the age limit for unemployment insurance and disability pension is 65, and special rules apply to those 65 years and older regarding
sickness benefit and compensation from work injury insurance. In the
labor market policy programs, there are no formal age limits, but those
aged 65 and older are in practice not assigned to labor market programs.
In addition, many (wrongly) think that the retirement age in the social
security pension system is 65.
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MEASURING INCOME DISTRIBUTION
When studying the income distribution and how it changes, we
can use several different kinds of income measures. The most common
one is the household’s disposable income, that is, household market income minus taxes plus transfers (see, for example, Björklund and Jäntti
[2011]). When we compare the income distribution for those who are
under 65 with the incomes of those who are older, we can use both
the disposable income per individual in the household and the individual household member’s own disposable income. When we look
more closely at the income distribution for those aged 65 and older,
we can analyze different types of income and the distribution of those
incomes. Here, in addition to average disposable income per person in
a household, we analyze individual disposable income, pension income
from the social security and occupational pension systems, and income
from capital. We also study the distribution of wealth. The information
on disposable income, pensions, and capital income is derived from
the Longitudinal Income Database (LINDA) for the years 1982–2009
(see Kruse [2010]). LINDA consists of register data of a representative
sample of the population, including information regarding the person’s
family. The data on wealth come from HEK (the incomes of the households), which is an annual telephone survey of a representative sample
of the population (see Rosén Karlsson [2011]).
In this study, we use percentile ratios when we look at income
inequality and how it has changed over time. We chose this measure
rather than the often used Gini coefficient because of its simple interpretation, and because by using percentile ratios, we can investigate
both the lower and the upper sections of income distribution.3
The ratio between the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile (P90/
P10) shows how many times higher the income of a person with the
90th percentile income is compared to the income of a person who has
the 10th percentile income. If the ratio is 2, the person with the 90th
percentile income has twice as much in income as the person with the
10th percentile income.4
In order to investigate those with high incomes and those with
low incomes, we compare the 90th and 10th percentiles with the median, P90/P50 and P50/P10, respectively. By using percentile ratios as
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a measurement of wage dispersion, one can examine whether income
inequality increases or decreases from year to year. The measure is not
influenced by general income growth.

DOES THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION DIFFER
BETWEEN OLDER AND YOUNGER PERSONS?
Disposable incomes are lower for those aged 65 and older than for
those aged 55–64. Those aged 75 and older have particularly low incomes. Figure 4.3 shows household disposable income per person for
different income groups. Income inequality has increased for those
aged 50–64 and 65–74. For those aged 75 and older, the income differences have been more or less the same until the last few years. Many
in this age group only receive the basic pension from the old pension
system, which leads to a compressed income structure. Over the past
Figure 4.3 Development in Disposable Income per Person in the
Household, 1991–2009
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Figure 4.3 (continued)
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few years, however, income inequality has first increased and then decreased slightly. The share of this age group with income-related social
security pensions and occupational pension systems has increased.
Having already demonstrated the changes over time in income inequality among households, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the disposable
incomes of men and women. Income inequality for men aged 50–64
and 65–74 has increased sharply. In recent years, the trend has been
particularly pronounced among those who are aged 50–64. For those
aged 65–75, the income gap has mainly grown in the upper part of the
distribution (P90/P50).
Figure 4.5 shows that income inequality among women aged 50–64
was high in the beginning of the 1980s. Many women were not employed, and many of those employed worked part time, often short part
time. As women gradually entered the labor market, income inequality among women aged 50–64 decreased strongly. Among women 65
and older, in contrast, income inequality increased, especially in the
upper part of the distribution. More women now have income-related
Figure 4.4 Development in Disposable Income for Men, 1982–2009
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Figure 4.4 (continued)
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Figure 4.5 Development in Disposable Income for Women, 1982–2009
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Figure 4.5 (continued)
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pensions, but many still have a guarantee pension only or one that is
combined with a low-income pension.
Has income inequality increased or decreased? The main tendency
is that it has increased significantly among both men and women aged
65–74 and also among women 75 and older. This applies particularly
to those with high incomes (P90), who now have much higher incomes
than those in the same age with low incomes (P10). In the lower part of
the income distribution, the changes are much smaller (P50/P10).

THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AMONG OLDER PEOPLE
IN SWEDEN
We now compare further the incomes of men and women and
foreign born and native people, respectively. Here, we estimate the percentile distribution separately of each of those four groups and then

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

Social Security and Pension Income in Sweden 77

compare them. There are a number of reasons for conducting these two
comparisons. Women have had and still have a weaker labor market attachment than men, and pensions are based on earned income over the
years. In the old pension system, 30 years of earnings were required for
a full pension, and the best 15 years counted for the calculation of the
pension. In the new system, the income for all years is counted. Women
more often have had career breaks and are more likely than men to have
worked part time. This leads to lower pensions for women than for men
in the new system. This means that women often receive a guarantee
pension, which, unlike the income pension, is not indexed to income
growth in the economy but is price indexed. This situation will probably lead to a gradual reduction of the average economic standard for
women compared to that of men.
The foreign born in many cases have a weak labor market attachment. They often are not in the labor force or unemployed, more so
than natives, and many of those who are employed have low incomes.
Coming to Sweden as an adult can also lead to a low pension—it is
often difficult to enter the labor market, and therefore many have few
years with a contribution to the pension system. Those who immigrate
after age 25 cannot reach the 40 years’ residence in Sweden needed to
receive a full guarantee pension at age 65.
The foreign born in Sweden are a heterogeneous group. Those who
come from other Nordic countries and other countries in Western Europe have generally had a much better situation on the labor market
before their retirement than those from countries outside Europe. The
rules for pensions also differ depending on country of origin due to the
existence of various international agreements. The rules are different
for those coming from other Nordic countries, other EU/EEA countries,
other countries with which Sweden has a pension agreement, and countries with which Sweden has no agreement regarding social security
pensions.

COMPARING THE INCOMES OF WOMEN AND MEN
Figure 4.6 shows that women’s disposable incomes are lower than
men’s. This applies to all three age groups—50–64, 65–74, and 75 and
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Figure 4.6 Disposable Incomes for Women as a Share of the Disposable
Incomes for Men at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles,
1982–2009
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Figure 4.6 (continued)
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older—and all three percentiles that we report—P10, P50, and P90.
However, there are some differences. Women aged 50–64 in the 10th
percentile had low incomes at the beginning of the period compared to
men in the same percentile. It was a period when many women were
not employed; housewives were common. Women’s relative earnings
later increased among those in the 10th percentile. Since the mid-1990s,
women’s disposable incomes have been 70–80 percent of men’s incomes in all three percentiles for those aged 50–64. For those aged
65–74, women’s incomes have fluctuated between 65 and 75 percent of
men’s incomes for the three percentiles over the past 27 years.
Among those 75 and older, women’s incomes declined relative
to those of men throughout the period. During the 1980s, income differences were small in this age group. Among those with the lowest
incomes (P10), women even had slightly higher incomes than men.
This is explained by the fact that women more often than men are not
married (including widows) in this age group, and that a single person received a slightly higher pension than a married person according
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to the rules of the basic social security pension. In the late 2000s, the
income differences between men and women were large in all three percentile groups. The difference was largest for those with high incomes
(P90), where women’s incomes were only about 65 percent of men’s.
The next step is to compare the pensions of women and men aged
65–74 and 75 and older in the same percentiles as before—P10, P50,
and P90 (Figure 4.7). There was a large sudden change in pensions between 2002 and 2003. This is explained by the fact that payment from
the new pension system started in 2003. The basic pension and the pension supplement were replaced by the guarantee pension in that year. In
the statistics for 2002 and earlier, only the basic pension and the ATP
pension, but not the pension supplement, were included as parts of the
pension income. The graphs in Figure 3.1 outline disposable income,
including pension supplements and housing allowances for pensioners.
This explains why we do not see large sudden changes in the graphs in
Figure 3.1.
We finally show the pension income distribution for women and
men aged 65–74 and 75 and older (Figure 4.8). Pension income inequality increased for female pensioners, both for those 65–74 and for
those 75 and older, but the differences in pensions are slightly lower for
the older group. For women aged 65–74, income inequality decreased
in the upper part of the distribution.
For the oldest women, pension income inequality increased. At the
beginning of the 1980s, a large majority of the oldest women only had
a basic pension. Therefore the pension income distribution was compressed. As more women in that age group received income-related
social security pensions and occupational pensions, they pulled away
from those with only a basic pension, and pension income inequality
increased.
For men aged 65–74, pension income inequality has remained fairly
constant. The exception is the P90/P10 ratio. This ratio first declined for
some years and then rose for several years. However, there are larger
changes for those aged 75 and over for P90/P10 and P50/P10. A marked
rise in the ratio P90/P10, and to a lesser extent P50/P10 is followed by
a jump down and then stabilization.
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Figure 4.7 Pension (Social Security and Occupational) Incomes of
Women as a Share of the Pension Incomes of Men at the 10th,
50th, and 90th Percentiles, 1982–2009
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Figure 4.8 Changes in Pension Incomes (Social and Occupational) for
Women with a Pension in Different Age Groups, 1982–2009
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INCOME FROM CAPITAL
Income from capital has become an increasingly important part of
pensioners’ income and now represents one-fifth of the income of those
aged 65 and older. It is unevenly distributed between pensioners, and
mainly concentrated on those with the highest incomes. The fact that
capital income has risen sharply for those with the highest incomes has
contributed the most to increased income inequality among pensioners
(Gustafsson, Zaid, and Franzén 2007).
Those who are 65 and older have on average about the same financial assets but lower debt and higher real assets (property) compared to
those under 65 (Flood 2004). This means that their net wealth is high,
especially when compared to those below age 50. On average, the net
wealth is SEK 1.2 million for those 65 and older, and slightly lower for
those 75 and older. The net wealth of men 65 and older is on average
half a million SEK higher than for women the same age.
Flood (2004) examines the total net assets in different age groups in
2000 and establishes that wealth is greatest at age 56 and remains at a
high level to about age 65. Those 65 and older had less wealth, and their
levels of wealth declined even more as they got older. This corresponds
with the theory of redistribution of income over the life cycle—you
save when you are of working age and use the savings when you have
retired. The differences could also be partly explained by differences
in the cohorts’ wealth positions when they reach retirement age. It is
important to note that the data in Flood’s study are from a cross-section,
and individuals are not followed over several years.
Many banks provide “senior loans” with the home of the retirees as
security. Homeownership can thus contribute to increased consumption.
The share of those who owned a house was almost as great among those
aged 65–74 (41 percent) as among those aged 30–65 (46–49 percent)
(Table 4.1). A quarter of those 75 and older owned a house. On average,
the value of the house was slightly higher for those 65 and older than
for younger age groups. The share of those 65 and older who owned a
house was higher among men compared to women. The houses men
own are also somewhat more valuable than the houses women own.

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Building society flat
Share
Mean value for
with value those with a value
(%)
(thousand SEK)
12.0
944

Summer house
Share
Mean value for
with those with a value
value (%) (thousand SEK)
7.0
761

0.2
14.0
15.0
16.0
18.0
21.0

641
1,017
1,035
951
811
787

0.1
2.0
8.0
15.0
14.0
7.0

429
572
718
785
785
804

1,260
676
940
1,218
1,396
1,316
1,173

26.0
0.1
9.0
45.0
44.0
31.0
17.0

1,132
660
720
1,112
1,173
1,202
1,228

13.0
0.2
14.0
14.0
17.0
20.0
21.0

951
615
1,063
1,028
966
828
824

7.0
0.1
1.0
7.0
15.0
13.0
5.0

757
424
561
703
781
791
816

Men
0–19
20–29

46.0
0.4
24.0

1,492
721
959

31.0
0.1
7.0

1,193
694
741

12.0
0.2
15.0

937
676
978

8.0
0.1
2.0

765
434
582

/356308t

42.0
0.4
24.0
62.0
66.0
56.0
41.0

--

Women
0–19
20–29
30–49
50–64
65–74
75 +
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Housea
Mean value
Share
Mean value for
for those
with value those with a value
Share with with a value
(%)
(thousand SEK)
Gender/age value (%) (thousand SEK)
Women
44.0
1,381
29.0
1,165
and men
0–19
0.4
697
0.1
677
20–29
24.0
950
8.0
730
30–49
63.0
1,297
46.0
1,128
50–64
69.0
1,559
49.0
1,206
65–74
64.0
1,507
41.0
1,262
75 +
49.0
1,287
24.0
1,245

84

Table 4.1 Average Real Assets for Women and Men in Different Age Groups, 2007

64.0
73.0
73.0
61.0

1,370
1,705
1,665
1,407

46.0
54.0
51.0
36.0

1,143
1,233
1,300
1,257

15.0
15.0
16.0
20.0

1,041
935
790
726

8.0
15.0
16.0
10.0

732
789
780
795

A house with one or two (semidetached house) homes.
SOURCE: Statistics Sweden’s wealth statistics.
a
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WHAT CAUSED THE INCOME GAP BETWEEN PENSIONERS?
Pension income is the main income of those aged 65 and older.
In this section, we examine the importance of labor income, labor
market attachment, disability pension, the sector they retired from, selfemployment, marital status, sex, country of birth (grouped level), and
the age for retirement with regard to the probability of belonging to the
groups of low- and high-income pensioners. We investigate the probability of belonging to the 10 and 20 percent group with the lowest
pension income and the 20 or 10 percent group with the highest pension
incomes for those who retired between 2005 and 2008. Our measure
of pension income includes social security and occupational pensions.
Being retired is defined here as receiving a pension income (social security and occupational pension) that exceeds labor income. We use the
pension income for the year after retirement when we examine the likelihood of persons being low- or high-income pensioners. The analysis
includes only those whom we have information for at least five years
before retirement.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of probit estimates. Marginal
effects are reported. Men are less likely to belong to the group of pensioners with the lowest pensions and more likely to belong to the group
with the highest pensions. Being married has no effect on the pension
income group to which a pensioner belongs.
The later persons retire, the lower the probability of their belonging
to the group of pensioners with low incomes. However, the retirement
age does not matter for the probability of belonging to those with the
highest pension incomes. This is a result of effects working in different
directions. Those with high pensions can better afford to take their pensions early, so that many with high pensions leave the workforce early.
On the other hand, the pensions for those who leave the workforce late
will be higher given their earlier incomes, as pensions are based on previous incomes, and the incomes will be higher if the pension is taken
up at a higher age (fewer years with a pension are expected). The estimates show that the higher the income is five years before retirement,
the lower the probability is of being among those with a low pension.
One group with low pensions, which we return to later, is the selfemployed. Those who were self-employed five years before retirement
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belong more often to the group with the lowest pension incomes and
are less likely to belong to the group with the highest pensions. Those
leaving the labor force with a disability pension are another group with
low pensions.
We have also included a variable for those who have a weak labor
market attachment five years before retirement. This group includes
those who did not have any income from work (either as an employee
or as self-employed). Among those who belong to this group, some
have low pensions and others have high pensions. These mixed results
suggest that this group includes both those with a poor labor market
attachment, due to difficulties in getting a job, and the wealthy who
choose to not work but five years later receive a good pension.
The risk of being one of those with the 10 percent lowest incomes
is higher for those born outside Sweden. Being born in another Nordic
country has a negative effect on the probability of belonging to those
with the highest pension incomes. However, there is no difference between natives and those born outside the Nordic countries with regard
to the probability of being in the group with the highest pensions.
Even if pension income is the main income for pensioners, other
sources such as other income transfers, labor income, and capital income are important parts of the retirees’ incomes.5 The share belonging
to the group with the 10 percent lowest pension incomes who belongs
to the group with the 10 percent lowest disposable incomes is 43 percent. Of those with the 20 percent lowest pension incomes, 57 percent
belong to the group with the 20 percent lowest disposable income. We
see a similar pattern for those with the highest pensions. Of those with
the 20 percent highest pensions, 61 percent belong to the group with the
20 percent highest disposable incomes, and of those with the 10 percent
highest pensions, 53 percent belong to those with the 10 percent highest
disposable incomes. In Table 4.3 we show probit estimates for the probability of belonging to the group of those with the lowest and highest
disposable incomes.
Those who have a weak labor market attachment five years before
retirement more often belong to the group of those with the lowest pensions but less often to the group of those with the lowest disposable
incomes. One explanation may be that those who have had a weak labor
market attachment receive other income transfers, and that the group
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Table 4.2 The Probability of Belonging to the Group with 10 or 20 Percent Lowest and Highest Incomes from
Pensions (Social Security and Occupational Pensions), among Those 65 and Older
10% lowest pension 20% lowest pension 20% highest pension 10% highest pension
Men
−0.018***
−0.099***
0.103***
0.036***
0.003
0.006
0.007
0.004
Married
−0.003
0.006
0.012
0.009
0.003
0.006
0.008
0.004
Age at retirement
−0.013***
−0.021***
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Annual labor income/10,000
−0.002***
−0.007***
0.013***
0.004***
five years before retirement
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Self-employed five years
0.058***
0.270***
−0.110***
−0.046***
before retirement
0.010
0.019
0.009
0.003
Disability pension
0.061***
0.074***
−0.081***
−0.024***
0.006
0.008
0.008
0.004
Weak labor market attachment
0.063***
0.086***
0.357***
0.217***
five years before retirement
0.011
0.015
0.030
0.027
Born in Sweden
Ref.a
Ref.a
Ref.a
Ref.a
Born in another Nordic country
0.017**
0.004
−0.064***
−0.015*
0.009
0.013
0.012
0.007
Born in EU15 and OECD6
0.037***
0.028
−0.032
−0.014
0.017
0.023
0.021
0.010
Born in other countries
0.076***
0.166***
−0.030
−0.008
0.017
0.028
0.019
0.010

Number of observations
LR chi2(10)

13,286
2,097.65

13,286
3,331.56

13,286
5,064.41

13,286
2,050.18
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a
Reference category.
NOTE: *significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level; **significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level; ***significantly different
from zero at the 0.01 level. The EU15 and OECD6 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK, and the United States. The annual labor income
is divided by 10,000 to facilitate the reporting of the estimates.
SOURCE: LINDA.

90
Job Name:

-/356308t

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Table 4.3 The Probability of Belonging to Different Deciles of Disposable Incomes among Those 65 and Older
10% lowest
20% lowest
20% highest
10% highest
income
income
income
income
Men
−0.052***
−0.117***
0.074***
0.023***
0.004
0.006
0.007
0.005
Married
0.018***
0.032***
−0.015*
−0.009
0.003
0.005
0.009
0.006
Age at retirement
−0.002***
−0.003***
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
Annual labor income/10 000 five years
−0.004***
−0.010***
0.011***
0.005***
before retirement
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Self-employed five years before retirement
0.030***
0.019**
0.115***
0.054***
0.007
0.011
0.019
0.014
Weak labor market attachment five years
−0.007***
−0.058***
0.318***
0.187***
before retirement
0.004
0.006
0.026
0.024
Disability pension
−0.015***
−0.018***
−0.038***
−0.016**
0.003
0.006
0.010
0.006
Born in Sweden
Ref.a
Ref.a
Ref.a
Ref.a
Born in another Nordic country
0.005
0.025*
−0.052***
−0.029***
0.007
0.014
0.015
0.009
Born in EU15 and OECD6
0.017
0.033
−0.006
0.001
0.013
0.023
0.026
0.017
Born in other countries
0.076***
0.131***
−0.046**
−0.008
0.017
0.025
0.020
0.014

Number of observations
LR chi2(10)

13,286
2,040.15

13,286
3,240.44

13,286
3,238.41

13,286
2,050.18
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a
Reference category.
NOTE: *significantly different from zero at the 0.10 level; **significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level; ***significantly different
from zero at the 0.01 level. The EU15 and OECD6 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK and the United States. The annual labor income
is divided by 10,000 to facilitate the reporting of the estimates.
SOURCE: LINDA.
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may also contain some of those with a strong economic position who
have chosen to stop working early.
Many of those with low and high pensions have low and high
disposable incomes, respectively, but there are some differences. The
self-employed have low pensions on average, but a higher probability
of belonging to the groups of those with the lowest and highest disposable incomes. This reflects the heterogeneity among the self-employed.
While some people have been able to save for old age, others have not.

GROUPS AT RISK FOR LOW PENSIONS AND
LOW INCOME
Self-employed
The income differences among self-employed workers are large.
Many have low incomes, and many do not have a supplementary
pension of the same type employees tend to have. The number of selfemployed is large and growing, making it important to study this group.
Many of the self-employed are foreign born.
Employees who become self-employed have different backgrounds.
Those who take into account characteristics such as education have low
labor income as employees and those who have a high labor income as
employees are overrepresented among those becoming self-employed
(Andersson Joona and Wadensjö 2013). The latter group is doing
considerably better than the first one in being self-employed, which indicates that the conditions for being self-employed vary greatly, as do
the opportunities and knowledge of how best to prepare financially for
life as a pensioner.
More than half of small business owners pay into pensions for
themselves, but a quarter of the self-employed have no retirement
savings; they save neither privately nor through their firms. Of the selfemployed who save, 45 percent save less than 2,000 SEK per month.
In order to receive the same pension that their employees receive from
occupational pensions, the self-employed have to save 5 percent of their
gross incomes from age 25 until retirement. If they start to save later,
the annual savings required are higher (Svärdman 2011). The main rea-
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son the self-employed give when asked why they are not saving for a
pension for themselves is that they cannot afford it. Other reasons are
that they do not see any need, as their incomes as retirees are guaranteed
by other means; they do not know how it works with occupational pensions; and they do not have time to gain an understanding of pension
issues (Burreau 2011).
Today’s retirees who have been self-employed have significantly
lower pensions than those who have been wage earners. Both men and
women who were self-employed five years before retirement had on
average a total pension (social security, occupational, and personal)
corresponding to about 70 percent of the average total pension for
those who were wage earners five years before retirement in the period
2005–2009.6
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show how much the average social security,
occupational and personal pensions are for those who were wage earners or self-employed. Those who were wage earners had higher social
security and occupational pensions but lower personal pensions than
those who were self-employed. The social security pensions of the selfemployed were about 75–80 percent of the social security pensions of
wage earners for both men and women. For self-employed women, the
occupational and personal pensions together constitute about 45–55
percent of the pensions of women who are wage earners, with an exception for self-employed women aged 75 and older who had occupational
and personal pensions that were higher than those for wage earners. The
corresponding figures for men are between 40 and 50 percent.
Guarantee Pensioners, Those without Occupational
Pensions, and the Foreign Born
Some groups other than the self-employed have low pensions, such
as those who have had low or irregular earnings and therefore receive a
guarantee pension. The guarantee pension is only price indexed and not
income indexed like the income pension. The group may therefore lag
behind in income growth compared to those receiving an income pension. For the next few years it is expected that about 25 percent of new
retirees will receive a guarantee pension. In 2008, 778,000 individuals
received a guarantee pension, of which 180,000 (15 percent) received
a full one. Of those who received a guarantee pension, 80 percent were
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Figure 4.9 Pension Incomes for Men, 2005–2009
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NOTE: Employees are defined as those who had their main incomes from employment
five years before retirement. Self-employed are those with their main income from
self-employment five years before retirement. Someone is defined as retired when
pension income from social security and occupational pension exceed labor income.
SOURCE: LINDA.

women (Olsson 2011). Nearly half of female pensioners aged 65–70 received a guarantee pension in 2008. Among women aged 70 and older,
it is even more common to receive a guarantee pension, as the older
cohorts have had low labor force participation. For example, just less
than 60 percent of women aged 70–75, over 80 percent of those aged
80–85, and over 90 percent of those aged 90 and older receive a guarantee pension. The proportion of men who receive a guarantee pension is
much lower. In the age group 65–70, only slightly more than 10 percent
receive a guarantee pension. Among men aged 80–85, a quarter receive
a guarantee pension, and among those 90 and older, half receive a guarantee pension.
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Figure 4.10 Pension Incomes for Women, 2005–2009
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NOTE: Employees are defined as those who had their main income from employment
five years before retirement. Self-employed are those with their main income from
self-employment five years before retirement. Someone is defined as retired when
pension income from social security and occupational pension exceed labor income.
SOURCE: LINDA.

Employees not covered by collective bargaining labor agreements
are a second group at risk for low pensions. Occupational pension is
most important for those who have had incomes above the ceiling in
the income pension system, but it is important not just for them. Most
receive their occupational pensions through a collective agreement.
Over 90 percent of employees are employed in workplaces covered by
collective bargaining agreements and thus have occupational pensions.
Those who lack an occupational pension are primarily those who work
in firms with few employees, those with the highest and lowest wages,
and the self-employed and unemployed. Only a third of small business
owners have signed up for an occupational pension. Employers without
a collective agreement may pay for an occupational pension plan for
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their employees and at the same time for themselves. Of businesses
without a collective agreement, 40 percent have a pension plan. Among
those not covered by a collective agreement pension, approximately
60 percent have signed up for a separate personal pension (Svärdman
2011).
The foreign born are a third group at risk for low pensions. This
is a group with large income differences and includes many lowincome earners. Flood and Mitrut (2010) have written a report for the
Social Council on immigrants coming from non-OECD countries and
their pensions. The pensions of this group of foreign born are predicted
to be low. Between 1992 and 2007, the foreign-born men’s earnings
were about 75 percent, and foreign-born women’s earnings were about
60 percent of native-born men’s earnings. This can be compared with
the native-born women’s earnings, which were about 70 percent of the
earnings of native-born men.
The growth of earnings has important implications for future pensions. Between 1992 and 2007, this was slower for the foreign born
from non-OECD countries than for natives. As an example we take the
cohort born in 1960–1964. The income growth (among those who had
earned income) was 62 percent for native men, 72 percent for native
women, 47 percent for foreign-born men, and 49 percent for foreignborn women.
Labor force participation among the foreign born is lower than
among natives even after taking into account differences in education,
age, gender, etc. This leads to lower pensions for the foreign born than
for natives. It should be emphasized that there are significant differences
depending on country of origin. Low wages, low labor force participation, high unemployment, and fewer years in Sweden lead to lower
pensions. Probably only a few foreign born from non-OECD countries
have pension rights from their country of origin that can be transferred.
Forecasts of future social security pensions show that foreign-born
people from non-OECD countries will have much lower pensions than
natives. Foreign-born men born between 1946 and 1970 will receive
about 60–65 percent of the native men’s social security pension. The
corresponding figure for foreign-born women is about 55 percent of the
native men’s social security pension.
The foreign born from non-OECD countries have significantly
lower incomes and wealth than natives. Native-born men had in 2007
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three to four times higher real assets than foreign-born men. The same
relationship applies to the wealth of native- and foreign-born women.
Also, assets in personal pension savings are much smaller for the
foreign born from non-OECD countries than for natives. For the cohort
born 1945–1949, this amounted to one-third for both men and women
compared to native men in the same cohort. For younger cohorts, the
difference was even greater. For example, for the cohort born 1960–
1964, the foreign-born personal pension wealth was 18 percent of that
of native men in the same cohort, and for the cohort born 1970–1974 it
was only 11 percent.

CONCLUSION
In this section, we summarize our results and mention some areas
where we lack essential knowledge.
One important result is that some groups aged 65 and older have
low pensions and other low incomes compared to others the same age.
Women 65 and older on average have lower incomes and pensions than
men the same age. The main reason for this is that working-age women
have had a greater responsibility for unpaid housework than men. This
does not mean that all of them live in households with low incomes as
they get older. Many are married to men who have high pensions or
other forms of income, but older women are often single. Women live
longer than men, and women are on average younger than the men they
marry. This means that women are more likely to be widowed than men.
In addition, divorce is common, and pension wealth is not distributed in
full upon divorce. Many women thus become single with a low pension.
The long-run solution is a more equal division of labor between men
and women both in the household and in the market. However, it can
take a long time before such a change takes effect. Pensions are based
on earnings over a lifetime or for many years (some of the occupational
pensions). There are good reasons for reviewing the rules on pension
plans.
The foreign born are another group that on average has low pensions. This is because many have a weak labor market attachment and
many have lived for less than the 40 years in Sweden required at 65
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for a full guarantee pension. The long-term solution is a stronger labor
market attachment, but there are good reasons to review the rules for
pension plans, particularly the rule about the number of years of residence required for a full guarantee pension.
The self-employed is a third group that often has low pensions. One
explanation is that they have not paid for a pension corresponding to the
occupational pensions for employees; another is that many of the selfemployed have low incomes. A solution may be that more information
could be given about the pension plans for self-employed, but there
may be other ways of bringing this about.
A fourth group, which largely coincides with the three previously
mentioned, consists of those who for various reasons have had a weak
attachment to the labor market over a number of years. Also, after age
65 they usually have a weak attachment to the labor market, and they
receive a low social security income–based pension and a price-indexed
guarantee pension.
It is important to investigate different ways to improve the situation
for those four mentioned groups who often have low incomes and pensions after age 65, that is, to improve the conditions for women, foreign
born, self-employed, and those who for prolonged periods have had a
weak attachment to the labor market. Different types of solutions may
be required for the various groups.

Notes
We thank participants at the TrefF seminar in Oslo on May 31, 2012; the Swedish Fiscal
Policy Council conference in Stockholm on June 18, 2012; and the ENRSP Conference
in Poznan on September 13–14, 2012. We also thank Christer Gerdes for helpful comments on an earlier version.
1. See Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö (2011) for a more detailed presentation.
2. There is a gradual change from one system to another. For those who are born in
1938, 4 parts of 20 are calculated according to the new system (and 16 parts of 20
according to the old system). In 1944, 10 parts of 20 are calculated according to
the new system (and 10 parts of 20 according to the old system).
3. For a discussion of different measures of income inequality among pensioners, see
Johnson and Stears (1999).
4. van Vliet et al. (2011) use P80/P20 to measure the income distribution among
older people in 15 European countries. They find that the ratio is lowest in the
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four Nordic countries included in their study—Denmark, Finland, Norway, and
Sweden.
5. See also Sjöström and Örnhall Ljung (2011) and Klevmarken (2010) for an analysis of who is working after 65.
6. Retirement is defined here as the first-year pension income from social security
and occupational pension exceed labor income.
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5
The Reform of Social
Security Pensions in Portugal
A Critical Assessment
Maria Clara Murteira
University of Coimbra

This chapter provides a critical perspective on the policy direction followed in Portugal after the reform of social security pensions
in 2007. First, it examines and assesses the main legislative changes
introduced in that year by the former socialist government. The reform
has been presented to the public as unavoidable, intended to improve
financial sustainability while preserving the overall logic of the system.
The chapter argues that it did not have a limited impact in the structure
of the pension system, as it has introduced a fundamental change of
perspective regarding the objectives and principles of pension policy.
It also tries to show how the Portuguese process of reform has been
influenced by political decisions from the EU, by focusing on restrictive rules that guide economic policy and the EU strategy for pensions.
Economic policies inspired by the New Classical Economics paradigm
and an agenda for pensions aligned with supply-side oriented economic
policies have been important features in national pension policy. A
particular emphasis is attributed to the critical influence of economic
performance on pension systems’ budgetary equilibrium, arguing that
economic failures explain, to a great extent, much of the problems identified in Portugal.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the
main measures introduced by the reform program of the social security pension system introduced in 2007. The second section develops a
critical analysis of that reform. It examines its adverse effects regarding pensioners’ well-being and its methodological incoherence. Next, it
describes the path change introduced in the objectives and principles of
101
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policy, concluding that although pay-as-you-go financing has not been
replaced by funding, its overall logic has changed. The next section examines the influence of the EU on the Portuguese reform process. The
supply side–oriented economic policy paradigm, dominant at the EU,
helped create an economic environment since the early 1990s that has
favored the introduction of pension reforms. However, the social policy
agenda set at the EU aligned with that paradigm has also been an important element in the reform process. Finally, the last section emphasizes
the critical relevance of economic performance on social security budgetary equilibrium, arguing that the budgetary difficulties identified in
the present are mainly the result of restrictive macroeconomic policies
unfavorable to employment and growth. A paradigmatic change in economic policy is a necessary condition to allow a different orientation
for pension policy.

MAIN LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In Portugal, social security is financed by a total contribution rate
of 34.25 percent of earnings paid by the employee and employer. Out
of this total, employees pay 11 percent and employers pay 23.25 percent. These contributions finance old-age benefits (20.21 percent, since
2010), survivors’ benefits (2.44 percent), unemployment benefits (5.14
percent), and disability benefits (4.29 percent). The contributions also
finance sickness, parenthood, and occupational disease. The legal age
of retirement is 65, but benefits can be received at age 55 for workers with 30 years of contributions (with penalties for early retirement),
though the award of early retirement benefits has been temporarily suspended from 2012 through 2014, except for the long-term unemployed.
The social security pension plan in Portugal was reformed in 2007.1
This plan is mandatory for the employees and self-employed workers
in the private sector. Civil servants are covered by a separate plan.2
Other plans also exist but cover a limited percentage of the total active
population.
This reform introduced three important changes in regard to retirement benefits. First, a “sustainability coefficient” was introduced in the
formula for calculating pensions. This coefficient is a demographic ad-
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justment factor, which reduces pensions by a certain percentage as life
expectancy increases. It is equal to the ratio between life expectancy
in 2006 and life expectancy in the year preceding retirement. The level
of statutory pension is multiplied by the coefficient and is thus reduced
as life expectancy increases. The decrease in pensions may be partially
offset if workers decide to postpone retirement or if they increase their
voluntary contributions to a new complementary public plan of individual accounts.
Second, the formula for calculating pensions was changed. After
2007, pension levels are calculated taking into consideration the earnings of the entire working life. Since 1994, pension levels were calculated on the basis of the average earnings of the 10 best years of the
final 15.3 A 2002 law stated that the earnings of the entire career would
be taken into account for calculating the pension.4 However, it also defined a transitional period, 2002–2016, during which the most favorable
method of calculation—the former, the latter, or a weighted average
of both—could be applied in order to guarantee beneficiaries the most
favorable rule to determine the pension level. For that reason, the full
impact of the measure was not felt. During the transitional period, only
approximately 17.5 percent of pensions were calculated based on the
earnings of the entire career, the method that could guarantee the most
favorable pension amount (European Commission 2005, p. 2). The reform of 2007 accelerated the transition to the new method of calculation. The pension is determined by a weighted average of two terms:
one is based on the best 10 years of earnings of the final 15, the other
is based on the earnings of the whole career. The weight of each term
depends on the moment of retirement and the length of the contributory career up to a specified moment of reference. For those who retire
before 2016, the moment of reference is 2006; for those who retire after
2016, the moment of reference is 2001.
Third, new rules for indexing the benefits were approved, which
came into effect in 2007.5 The new method does not guarantee the
maintenance of the real value of all benefits. Higher benefits will be
indexed to prices only for higher rates of economic growth. In addition, the minimum wage is no longer used as reference for determining minimum pension levels. The process of gradual convergence of
the minimum level of pension with the national minimum wage started
almost 10 years before and was completed in 2005.6 In 2006, pension-
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ers with a career longer than 30 years were entitled to a pension equal
to the minimum wage (net of employee contributions), and those with
shorter careers were entitled to a certain percentage of the net minimum
wage. However, immediately after, there was a reversal of this policy.
A law published in the end of 2006 stated that thereafter the adjustment of the minimum levels of pensions should be dissociated from the
minimum wage.7 A new term of reference for calculating and adjusting
the benefits is used, the Indexante de Apoios Sociais (IAS), which is
defined every year by the government. As a consequence, the minimum
pension level started to diverge from the net minimum wage, as Table
5.1 shows.
The reform also introduced new rules to encourage older workers
to stay in the labor market such as higher penalties for early retirement
and incentives to extend working life.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PORTUGUESE
REFORM PROCESS
A Reform Focused on Cutting Spending
The reform was presented to the public as necessary to contain
pressures on the social security budget and guarantee its fiscal sustainability (Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity [MTSS] 2006a,b). The
policy solution chosen was based exclusively on the reduction of benefit levels.
The option of cutting pensions is particularly adverse in the Portuguese case because, at the time the reform was introduced, the retired
population had on average lower incomes and higher incidence of poverty than the rest of the population (Murteira 2008). This is explained
by the late development of the Portuguese public pension system and
by work histories characterized by low earnings and short contributory
periods. Table 5.2 shows that more than 80 percent of old-age pensioners were entitled to an amount of pension lower than the national minimum wage. Thus, the strategy followed has placed the burden of the
adjustment exclusively on pensioners, particularly on pensioners with
the lowest incomes.
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Table 5.1 Evolution of the Minimum Wage and the Minimum
Pension Level
Minimum penNet
sion level (caMinimum
minimum
reer > 30 years)
MPL/
Years
wage (euros) wage (euros)
(euros)
Net MW (%)
2006
385.90
343.45
343.45
100.00
2007
403.00
358.67
354.10
98.70
2008
426.00
379.14
363.81
96.00
2009
450.00
400.50
374.36
93.50
2010
475.00
422.75
379.04
89.70
2011
485.00
431.65
379.04
78.20
2012
485.00
431.65
379.04
78.20
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.

However, some analysts argue that the decrease in the benefit levels should not be a reason for concern because, up to 2007, the system
could guarantee high replacement rates. Thus, the system could be considered “generous.” This argument, although frequently mentioned, is
not strong. It is important to understand why replacement rates were
high while the majority of old-age pensioners received very low benefits. Analysis from previous research (Murteira 2008) helps to clarify
this question. The average gross replacement rates were broken down
by income quintile for several cohorts of men and women who retired
Table 5.2 Distribution of Old-Age Pensioners in 2005, by Pension Levels
Old-age pensioners
Level of pension (euros)
Number
%
<374.7
1,110,912
81.00
374.7–562.05
112,440
8.20
562.05–749.40
54,454
3.97
749.40–1124.1
53,094
3.87
1124.1–1873.5
29,553
2.15
1873.5–2997.6
8,521
0.62
frm 2997.6–3747.0
2,555
0.19
Total
1,371,529
100.00
SOURCE: Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (2006a).
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before the rule change. The disaggregate data on replacement rates
helps to explain the paradox. High replacement rates did not reflect the
generosity of the social security pension system. The highest replacement rates were those of pensioners, especially women, with very low
wage levels who were entitled to a minimum pension level. A high percentage of women had low incomes and short working careers. These
women were entitled to a minimum pension level that was higher (in
many cases much higher) than their previous wages. Thus, the fact that
replacement rates were high does not mean that the system provided
generous benefits. High replacement rates and low pension levels were
two faces of the same coin.
Moreover, the reform may also be criticized from a methodological
standpoint because it has focused on the means of policy (spending on
pensions) and neglected its ends (the social objectives). The objectives
to attain, in regard to income security, are not reported either in the text
of the law or in the document that reveals the strategic lines of the reform (MTSS 2006b). The State Budget Report (Ministry of Finance and
Public Administration [MFAP] 2006) presented the estimated effects
of the new rules regarding the future reduction of public spending on
pensions and the future decrease of real growth of average pension, as
Figure 5.1 shows. This outcome was considered positive.
This conclusion results from a biased perspective that consists of
assessing policy only by its budgetary consequences, ignoring the essential purpose of pension provision. The obsession with the means of
pension policy has led to the neglect of the ends. An appropriate assessment of pension policy should focus on its ends, looking at the means
in view of the ends. As the purpose of pension plans is to provide retirement income security, a consistent policy design requires a clear
specification of this aim. Spending on pensions should be seen as the
“constraint” to face, rather than the “objective,” as Barr and Diamond
(2008, p. 33) have observed.
The view that motivated the reform undertaken in the field of social
security pensions in Portugal, based on cutting benefits in order to alleviate fiscal problems, represents a way of approaching the welfare state
that has been deeply criticized by Atkinson. In particular, the author
underlined the tendency to look exclusively at costs without considering the benefits of the welfare state: “The whole purpose of welfare
state provision is missing from the theoretical model” (Atkinson 1999,
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Figure 5.1 Expected Real Growth Rate of Average Pension
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SOURCE: Ministry of Finance and Public Administration (2006).

p. 8). In the Portuguese debate the purpose of pensions was completely
absent. As a consequence, the level of benefits has been taken as the
adjustment variable in a policy aimed at containing spending.
The Structural Nature of the 2007 Reform
The reform was presented to the public as merely parametric,
aimed at improving financial sustainability while preserving the overall
logic of the system. However, there are sound reasons to argue that this
reform had an important impact in the structure of the social security
pension system. Thus, it might be better defined as structural.
The first reason is that it has produced a significant decline in the
level of benefits, for both present and future pensioners but mainly for
the latter. The three main measures introduced reduce the benefit levels
because they affect both the replacement rate and the earnings path in
the retirement period.
The replacement rate will decrease significantly over time because
of the introduction of the “sustainability factor.” According to the
OECD (2007, p. 68), future benefits are expected to decrease around
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20 percent as a result of the link to life expectancy. The replacement
rate also decreases due to the new way of determining the benefits that
are now based on the earnings of the entire career rather than the final
earnings. Since working careers generally present rising earnings in
later years, when pensions relate to the earnings of the entire career, the
replacement rate is lower. Historical experience has shown that when
pensions could be calculated according to the most favorable rule, between 2002 and 2004, only 17.5 percent of the new pensions were defined according to the new rule (European Commission 2005, p. 2). As
a consequence, with the new formula, the large majority of pensions
became more distant from the workers’ final earnings and from the level
of average earnings current in society at the time of retirement, meaning
that replacement rates were reduced.
Moreover, pensioners’ benefit levels over the retirement period will
continue to diverge from the overall earnings path in society due to the
unfavorable method of adjusting the benefits over time.
Thus far, the adverse effect of the reform on pensioners’ economic
well being has not been entirely felt: there is a transitional period for
the application of the new calculation rule; the influence of the sustainability coefficient will be felt more acutely over time; and the negative
effect of the new indexation rules is cumulative. The reduction of future
pensions will be significant. OECD (2007) has estimated that future
benefits will be more than 30 percent below the level pensioners would
have been entitled to before the reforms. However, the reduction of future pensions might be higher than expected because of the effect of the
new indexation rules, which is unpredictable.
The second reason for arguing that this reform was structural is
that, although not explicitly, a new perspective regarding pension policy objectives has been adopted. The objective is no longer to enable
people to maintain the previous living standards, but to provide a modest income protection.
A growing divergence between pension levels and wage levels was
implicitly accepted. First, the new calculation rule expresses a different
choice of objectives for pensions. When the objective is to safeguard
the previous living standards, the benefits should be related to the final
earnings. When pensions relate to the earnings of the entire career, they
will diverge from workers’ final earnings and from the average earnings current in society at the time of retirement. Second, the change in
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the way of adjusting pensions over time allows a growing divergence
between pensioners’ earnings path and the overall earnings path in the
society. Both the reduction of the replacement rates for the majority of
the retired population and the new rules of adjusting benefits over time
show that the objective of enabling people to maintain the previous living standards in retirement has been abandoned. The new objective is to
provide a modest income protection in retirement. A conception of social assistance, rather than what Myles has described as “contemporary
notions of social security” (Myles 2002, p. 158), inspired this move.
The strategy of lowering pensions occurred at the same time the
government declared the prevention of poverty among the elderly as
a political priority. However, instead of reinforcing minimum income
protection, the government has decided to dissociate the minimum pension levels from the minimum wage. At the same time, it has introduced
a new means-tested benefit intended to alleviate old-age poverty (complemento solidário para idosos).8 In the text of the law that introduced
this benefit it is stated that the previous policy of general increase in the
minimum levels of benefits was not sustainable and that it should be
replaced by the strategy of concentrating the benefits of those in need.
Thus, the right to a minimum pension of the earnings-related plan
has been questioned as a work-related right and started to be replaced
by national solidarity mechanisms justified in case of need.
Furthermore, another profound change has occurred: the nature of
pay-as-you-go (PAYG). The idea that it is possible to maintain in retirement the living standards achieved in the working period, which
inspired the previous policy, was questioned.
The initial PAYG plans organized a mechanism of solidarity through
work. Retirement pensions, like other social benefits, were guaranteed
by the collectivization of a share of the total wages. In such a plan, the
amount of contributions is immediately redistributed in the form of social benefits (pensions, unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, etc).
In the original conception, a PAYG plan is contributory—benefits are
defined on a commutative basis; since they are related to the employment status, their purpose is to replace earnings and require previous
contributions—but it may involve a certain degree of redistribution in
order to realize a set of social objectives. Therefore, benefits do not need
to be strictly linked to contributions. A PAYG plan may include redistributive mechanisms such as the rules that establish minimum pension
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levels, the rules that guarantee higher replacement rates for the lowest
incomes, or a calculation formula that takes into account the earnings
of the final working years instead of the earnings of the whole career.
When the purpose is to safeguard in retirement the living standards
achieved in the working period, pension levels should be close to the
final wages. In this case, the pension may be seen as a “continued salary” (Castel 2009a,b; Friot 2010). This logic requires high replacement
rates and indexation rules that guarantee a similar growth of pensions
and wages over time.
Recently, PAYG plans in some countries have abandoned the previous logic, which based the right to resources on work and made pension
levels dependent on the previous wage levels. In some cases, these plans
have moved to a savings logic. Accordingly, each individual should be
entitled to a sum of benefits closely related to what he has paid during
his working period. Thus, the link between lifetime contributions and
expected benefits should strengthen at the individual level. In this view,
pensions are justified by the existence of “previous savings” (the contributions) and seen as an individual deferred income (Castel 2009a,b;
Friot 2010).
In Portugal, the transition to a savings logic has already started. The
logic of work-related rights is vanishing as the link between pensions
and wages weakens. The reduction of the replacement rates, caused by
the new pension formula and the introduction of the sustainability coefficient, increases the gap between the first pension and the final wages.
These new rules contribute to strengthen the contributory nature of the
plan and, thus, to the gradual transition to the model of pensions as individual deferred income. Also the new rules for indexing the benefits
contribute to increase the gap between pensions and wages over the
retirement period. Moreover, the link between pensions and wages also
weakens due to the divergence of the minimum pension levels from the
minimum wage. The plan is still PAYG but has a changing nature: the
wage reference is disappearing, while the system moves from a workbased logic to a savings-based logic.
Thus, although the rule changes are parametric, the overall effect of
the reform is structural: the level of future benefits will decrease significantly, social objectives have changed from safeguarding the preretirement living standards to the guarantee of a modest income protection,
and a new logic is ruling PAYG.
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THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL RIGHTS
RETRENCHMENT IN PORTUGAL
The Portuguese social security pension system has been experiencing increasing political pressures. In recent years, we have identified a
two-stage strategy for social rights retrenchment. Each stage presents a
specific configuration.
In the first stage, marked by the 2007 reform conducted by a centerleft government, the pressures were intended to contain spending. However, as observed ealier, this reform introduced significant changes in
the structure of the social security pension system.
In the second stage, when a new right-wing government came into
power in June 2011, the strategy for social rights retrenchment assumed
a new configuration. The revenue side of social security budget has
come under growing pressure. The new government has introduced
several measures that reduce, directly or indirectly, the receipts from
contributions. All the variables that influence the receipts from contributions came under pressure: the wage, the level of employment, and
the contribution rate. In regard to the public sector, the government, in
agreement with the troika (the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), has decided to
reduce wages and employment. The private sector is recommended to
follow the same route of wage reduction. In any case, wage reduction
in the private sector is expected to occur as a consequence of massive
unemployment. The third variable, the rate of contribution (taxa social única), has also been under downward pressure. The government
has planned to reduce the employer contribution, arguing that it would
reduce labor costs and thus improve the level of employment and external competitiveness of the economy. But, in regard to the reduction
of the employer contribution, the government had to step back because
of strong political opposition. These measures were planned when the
social security budget was already extremely destabilized by the serious
recession and massive unemployment that followed Portugal’s bailout
in May 2011. Massive unemployment has caused a significant decrease
in receipts from contributions, an increase in spending on unemployment benefits, downward pressure on wages, and the growth of early
retirement.
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At the same time, a new political discourse has emerged. Invoking
the excessive economic burden of social security, the government has
introduced a new political speech on this subject intended to justify additional regressive reforms. The prime minister has announced that the
reform of 2007 is not enough to guarantee the financial sustainability
of the social security pension plan and that it is necessary to shift toward more funding and more private voluntary provision. Meanwhile,
in April 2012, the government suspended the access to early retirement
during the financial assistance period.9 The financial assistance provided to Portugal after May 2011 by the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, and the IMF was given on the basis of a policy
program that required economic policy conditions. Following the demands of austerity established in the Memorandum of Understanding
with the the troika, the new government has imposed deep cuts in expenditure, mainly in the wages of public servants and pensions, but also
in a set of other social benefits, health care, and education. In 2013,
after the periodical reviews of the troika for assessing the progression
made with respect to the policy criteria specified in the memorandum,
the government has accepted to impose additional cuts in expenditure.
The focus will be on major budjet items, particularly the government
wage bill and pension spending. A new reform of social security may
be announced at any time.
The Influence of the EU on the Portuguese Reform Process
To understand the Portuguese reform process, we should not analyze it in isolation because it was significantly influenced by European
prescriptions. The management of economic policy, imposing restrictive rules for the conduct of fiscal policy, and the social policy agenda
set at the EU were important elements in that process.
The 2007 reform pensions, as well as the agenda of the current government, can only be understood by taking into consideration the social
policy agenda set by the EU. The standpoint that has been adopted by
both the previous and the current government is in line with the social
policy paradigm dominant in the EU. This one is aligned with the paradigm that has guided economic policy, especially since the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992. In order to clarify this subject and understand how the
EU has influenced pension reforms in the member states, it is worth
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mentioning the pressures imposed by restrictive macroeconomic policy
and the influence of the European strategy for pensions.
The Economic Policy Paradigm Dominant in the EU
Especially since the Maastricht Treaty and the policy orientation
adopted for the introduction of the single currency, the macroeconomic
policy in the EU was defined in accordance to the prescriptions of the
New Classical Economics (NCE). The same occurred with labor market
and social protection policies.
The NCE defends monetary and fiscal policies based on rules rather
than discretionary decisions of governments (Creel 2011). As the latter
are considered to be moved by electoral purposes, rules are the only
way to assign credibility to economic policies, a fundamental condition
for guaranteeing its effectiveness. Therefore, economic policies should
be ruled by restrictions imposed on the objectives or on the means.
Monetary policy should be conducted by an independent central
bank and be committed to the objective of price stability. This commitment is fundamental in order to stabilize economic agents’ anticipations and keep labor costs under control. In regard to fiscal policy, it
should also be guided by strict rules. Two arguments justify it (Creel
2011). The first is the “Ricardian equivalence,” stated by Barro (1974),
according to which an expansionary fiscal policy has no effect on the
level of economic activity. The argument may be summarized as follows: If a government tries to stimulate demand by increasing spending,
the reduction of public savings will be offset by an increase of private
savings. As people make perfect predictions of the effects of economic
policy—assuming the rational expectations hypothesis—they will save
more in the present in order to afford the future tax increases that will be
necessary to pay off the increased debt. As a consequence, total spending will remain unchanged. Thus, demand-management intervention
by governments is ineffective. The second argument states that the increase of the public debt may lead the central bank to increase money
supply. According to the monetarist view, this will cause an increase in
the price level. Both the inefficiency of fiscal policy and the importance
of keeping price stability are arguments that justify the imposition of
strict limits to budgetary policy.
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Since Maastricht, EU countries have been submitted to a “culture of
discipline” in the rules that guide macroeconomic policy (Fitoussi and
Laurent 2009). According to the view that prevails in the EU, fiscal and
monetary policy should have a limited role in stabilizing economies.
The European Central Bank is responsible for guaranteeing the exclusive objective of monetary policy that is price stability. National fiscal
policies have also been severely restricted by the Stability and Growth
Pact and have been focused on the objective of balancing the budget.
According to the dominant view, the role of the state in economic activity should be reduced to improve the performance of the economy.
Therefore, it is essential to limit the growth of public expenditure. For
this reason, a clause that prevents the governments from appealing to
the European Central Bank to finance its deficits has been introduced.
As a consequence, the governments have become dependent on deregulated and globalized financial markets.
Policies for the Labor Market and Social Protection
According to the paradigm that inspires European economic policy,
growth and employment should not come through expansionary macroeconomic policies. These are replaced by the so-called structural reforms, such as the deregulation of the labor market or welfare retrenchment. Structural reforms in these two domains are recommended as a
way to avoid distortions in the functioning of the labor market, promoting efficiency, and preventing high levels of public deficits and debts.
Policies for the labor market and social protection have been conceived in articulation with the supply-side orientation of economic policies. In regard to the functioning of the labor market, in this perspective
unemployment is supposed to be caused by the malfunctioning of the
labor market. It is considered largely voluntary, occurring when wages
are above the level needed to clear the labor market. The source of massive unemployment is considered to be excessive regulation and high
labor costs. Thus, the recommended solution is to make labor markets
more flexible. Less regulation and the reduction of labor costs (wages
and social contributions) are advocated in order to promote employment and the external competitiveness of economies.
Social spending, in turn, is considered unfavorable to economic
growth. Social protection mechanisms are regarded as something that

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

The Reform of Social Security Pensions in Portugal 115

disturbs the market process. Welfare state programs, and social security
pension plans in particular, are accused of contributing to the increase
in the size of the government, causing inefficiency and originating huge
public deficits and debts. It is assumed that the provision of welfare
should not rely exclusively on public intervention. Instead, it should allow an increased role for the market, that is, private plans and voluntary
provision. Additionally, pension plans should contribute to improve labor market efficiency by promoting employment and competitiveness.
Thus, they should focus on containing labor costs and providing benefits that do not create disincentives.
Pressures Imposed by EU Macroeconomic Policy
The pressures for reforming social security pensions imposed by
economic policies in the EU have been underestimated in most of the
literature on the subject. In particular, the significant influence on pensions of the rules that guide fiscal and monetary policies in the EU
should be underlined.
Since the Stability and Growth Pact, governments have been directly pressured to tighten fiscal policies (Fitoussi 2002, 2004). The imperative of balancing the budget has led the governments to cut public
spending in general, and spending on pensions and other social transfer
programs in particular. This fact has led to an attentive supervision of
spending on pensions by the EU institutions charged with economic
and financial affairs.
The imposition of the Maastricht “culture of discipline” in macroeconomic management materialized into restrictive fiscal and monetary
policies (Fitoussi 2002, 2004). These policies have imposed indirect
pressures on social security budgets. As restrictive macroeconomic policies have depressed growth and employment, they have undermined
social security budgetary equilibrium. Under these circumstances, the
pressure to impose reforms in social security pension systems increases.
The European Strategy for Social Security Pensions
At the same time, EU institutions have built a common political
view about social security pensions, which is aligned with the mainstream in the international debate on pensions, inspired by the recommendations of the World Bank (1994) and the OECD (1996).
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In the EU, social security pension system reform has been included
in the political agenda after 1999. The effects of aging on pensions’
spending have been under attentive supervision by the EU institutions
charged with economic and financial affairs as a consequence of the
budgetary discipline imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The
member states were asked to adopt measures in order to guarantee the
financial “sustainability” of PAYG plans by containing future spending
and by encouraging the development of funded plans and voluntary
provision. During the 1990s, and following these recommendations,
many European countries have introduced reforms in social security
pension plans with the implicit or explicit aim of containing spending.
Since 2001, the strategy designed for the field of pensions was pursued through the open method of coordination (OMC), which aimed to
promote an increasing coordination of national reforms by building a
consensual perspective regarding pension policy. It has contributed to
define common principles and objectives, establish a common set of
indicators to assess national pension arrangements, and offer periodic
monitoring of progress made toward the common objectives. Although
it has not imposed the same orientation to all member states, the OMC
has been influential for decisions on national pension policy: it has contributed to build a shared view that has been translated into orientations
for pension reforms. Palier (2006) has described the OMC as “a new
form of intervention which is less aimed at institutional harmonisation
or legislation than at harmonising ideas, knowledge and norms of action, in order to have common policy goals converging towards ‘a common political vision’ . . . The aim here is to achieve a Europeanization
of social policy paradigm” (p. 8).
As mentioned earlier, the EU pension policy agenda is focused on
reducing spending and organizing the plans in order to strengthen the
“competitiveness” of national economies. First, it is assumed that the
provision of welfare should not rely exclusively on public intervention;
an increased role for the market should be allowed. Second, pension
policy orientations are configured to meet the requirements of economic policies supply-side oriented. This view emphasizes that both
contributions and benefits affect the functioning of labor markets. Pensions and other social benefits are analyzed in terms of their effects on
labor costs and the incentives they embed. First, as the contributions
required for financing pensions are a component of the labor costs, the

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

The Reform of Social Security Pensions in Portugal 117

contribution rate should be contained in order to avoid reducing labor
demand. Therefore, cuts in social contributions are advocated to improve the performance of the labor market by favoring employment and
the external competitiveness of economies. Second, generous pensions
disincentivize the labor supply of older workers. Thus, in order to improve the functioning of the labor market to promote employment and
competitiveness, pension policy should focus on containing the contribution rate to avoid the increase in labor costs, on providing benefits
that do not create disincentives, and on “activating” older workers (European Commission 2006, p. 18).
This shared view inspired the reform programs developed in many
member states, after 2003, like the one introduced in Portugal in 2007.
The analysis of the progress in reforming pension systems in these
countries, after the second round of the OMC (European Commission
2006), has identified common lines of reform. The conclusion was that,
since 2003, when the first comprehensive analysis of national strategies in the area of pensions was reported (European Commission 2003),
a general move has been observed in many member states regarding
some features that may be summarized as follows. First, many countries have introduced rule changes such as incentives to extend working
lives or disincentives to early retirement, the strengthening of the link
between contributions and benefits, and the inclusion of life expectancy
in pension formulas. Second, in many cases, the level of guaranteed
minimum pensions has been increased to prevent the risk of poverty.
Third, private provision has been promoted. It was recognized that, in
general, the reforms caused the decrease in social security pensions, but
it was admitted that it could be “compensated by longer working lives
as well as by higher personal savings” (European Commission 2006,
p. 3). Obviously, in Portugal these common lines of reform have been
replicated in 2007.

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PENSION POLICY: PENSION
POLICIES IN A CONTEXT OF INCREASING LONGEVITY
The increased pressures on public finances caused by an aging
population has prompted many authors and policymakers who criticize
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state intervention in this sphere to recommend that the governments
promote ambitious reforms of pension systems by means of rolling
back spending. The “unsustainability/roll back argument” (Barr 2000b,
p. 740) has been spread and consolidated as common sense.
Despite the recurrent use of this simple argument, it may be misleading because it neglects the decisive influence that economic performance has on the social security budget. The present difficulties in
pension system financing are, to a great extent, the consequence of the
economic dysfunctioning. Therefore, the analysis of pension policy
should not be dissociated from the debate on macroeconomic policies.
Economic Growth, a Fundamental Issue
The economics of pensions has shown the relevance of promoting economic growth in order to face population aging.10 Thompson
(1998) has shown that, from an aggregate and real perspective, the economic cost of retirement equals the consumption of goods and services
of the retired in relation to the total production of goods and services.
The economic cost of retirement may be represented by the following
expression:

CR
Y ,
where CR represents the consumption of retirees and Y represents total
income. The analysis of this simple expression allows us to take two
fundamental conclusions. First, retirement costs do not depend only on
the consumption of retirees, but also on the level of total income. Thus,
output is a central variable, as Barr (2001, 2004) and Barr and Diamond
(2008) have emphasized. Second, pensions represent a claim on the
output (Barr 2004).
Thus, the problem with pensions is essentially a distributive issue:
it is the question of defining the rule that specifies pensioners’ share in
total income. Pensioners’ income share depends on the distribution of
income between capital and labor and on the division of the labor income between workers and pensioners. Thus, the social bargaining that
leads to income distribution and so defines capital and labor shares and
the political decision regarding the way the latter is divided between
workers and pensioners are critical issues.
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To sum up, in society’s perspective, pensions represent a claim on
the output. If life expectancy increases, other things equal, pensioners’
share in spending will grow. At a given level of output, the adjustment
may be realized by increasing contributions (of the employer or the
employee), by reducing the benefits, or by increasing the legal age of
retirement in line with rising life expectancy to avert the growth of the
dependency ratio. However, in order to face rising life expectancy there
is also a fourth solution: to increase the supply of goods and services.
So, policies that promote economic growth are central. If the output
grows, the distributive problem will become easier. There are two basic
strategies for rising output: to increase labor productivity or to increase
the number of workers (by reducing unemployment, by increasing
women’s participation in the labor market, by rising the legal age of
retirement, or by immigration).
The public debate on the future of pensions has focused on two of
the possible options: reducing pensions or increasing the age of retirement. In both cases, the burden of the adjustment is placed on the elderly. The relevance of policies that promote economic growth and full
employment as a means to deal with future problems posed by demographic aging has been underestimated. However, a serious debate on
pension policy cannot be dissociated from the debate on the model of
macroeconomic regulation, income distribution in society, and the way
labor income is divided between workers and pensioners.
The problem posed by the change in the age structure of the population—an increasing share in spending—has to be faced independently
of the method of financing pensions. A shift toward funding would not
avoid it. As Barr (2004) has shown, PAYG and funded plans represent
two sorts of claims on future production, that is, two different ways of
claiming the share of pensioners in national output. In the first case,
the question is decided in the political process. In the second case, the
question is decided in the market sphere. If the role of private plans and
of voluntary provision increases, the pressures on public finances will
reduce—because the retirement costs will not burden the public budget—but the economic cost of retirement will rest unchanged, unless
it could be proved that a shift toward funding would lead to a higher
increase in output. It is often argued that funding increases savings and
hence will lead to higher productive investment and economic growth.
Although there is a vast economic literature on this subject, there is a
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great controversy regarding both the causal link between funding and
saving and the effect of saving on productive investment.11
Economic Policy and Pension Reforms in Portugal
The EU has declared concern for the future of pensions. However,
European macroeconomic policies followed in the last two decades,
inspired by the prescriptions of the New Classical Economics, have not
been conceived in order to promote growth and full employment. Instead, the restrictive rules that have guided macroeconomic policies, focused on restrictive fiscal policy, price stability, and a strong euro, have
depressed growth and employment, especially in peripheral countries
like Portugal. Economic policies have contributed to deepen the social
security budgetary problems and thus helped to present the reforms as
unavoidable. Moreover, in Portugal, as in many developed countries,
labor income share has decreased significantly in the last decades.
In Portugal, population aging has provided the argument to the former center-left government to restructure the system by reducing spending on pensions. In the years preceding the 2007 reform, social security
has been characterized by a significant financial destabilization. The
budgetary difficulties identified were, to a great extent, the outcome of
economic policies—restrictive fiscal policy, monetary policy focused
on price stability, and a strong euro in a context of external trade liberalization—that have depressed growth and employment. Since the introduction of the single currency, Portugal has experienced a decade of
low growth and increasing unemployment, as Table 5.3 shows.
A low rate of economic growth and unemployment are big threats to
the financial balance of social security. The official diagnosis mentions
it: “As a consequence of a set of negative factors, like the slowdown of
economic growth, a parallel increase in unemployment, the maturation
of the system and the consolidation of schemes of anticipation/flexible
age of reform, we have assisted, in the last five years, to an increased
deterioration of the financial balance of the social security system . . . ”
(MTSS 2006a, p. 14).
Unemployment leads to the decrease in contributions and to a
downward pressure on wages, which translates into lower contributions. Moreover, it causes an increase in spending on unemployment
benefits and favors early retirement. In this context, retirement may
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2008 2009 2010 2011
0.00 −2.90 1.40 −1.60
7.60 9.50 10.80 12.70
2007
2.40
8.00
2006
1.40
7.70
2005
0.50
7.60
SOURCE: Banco de Portugal.
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Table 5.3 Real Growth Rate of GDP and Unemployment Rate
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
GDP real growth rate (%) 3.40 1.70 0.80 −0.80 1.30
Unemployment rate (%)
3.90 4.00 5.00 6.30 6.70
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be the appropriate alternative for older workers facing the risk of unemployment. Early retirement becomes more frequent and creates additional financial pressures on pension systems. The budgetary problems identified were also conditioned by the increased maturity of the
system, mentioned in the same report. Furthermore, these difficulties
were aggravated by several measures of reduction or exoneration of
contributions, expanded after 1999 with the purpose of stimulating employment, based on the idea that high labor costs are the main cause of
unemployment. Population aging has also imposed financial pressures,
but at a slow and gradual rate.
Thus, economic policies have contributed to deepen the budgetary
problem and, as a result, to present the reform as unavoidable. At the
same time, the social security plan came under growing political pressure. In particular, the recommendations from the EU level, regarding
benefit retrenchment and the design of the plans, have been influential
for decisions on national pension policy.

THE PRESENT CRISIS
The present crisis has revealed the adverse effects of economic
policies oriented by the New Classical Economics in stabilizing economies with regard to growth, employment, and the external equilibrium
of several member states, particularly the peripheral nations. After the
global recession in 2008, some EU countries had to face problems of
public debt financing. However, in order to manage the crisis, the leaders of the EU have imposed budget austerity to these countries, thereby
contributing to deepen the recession and worsen the public finance crisis. The governments were asked to cut their deficits even when they
had to face serious recession.
According to the understanding of European leaders, the present
crisis is the consequence of the lack of rigor and effectiveness in the
governance of the euro zone. Thus, discretionary decisions of national
governments and parliaments with regard to fiscal policy should be
subject to additional constraints in order to enforce budget consolidation. The commitment to this view has been embodied in the fiscal pact
signed in March 2012 by European leaders. Expansionary fiscal policy
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is considered ineffective with regard to growth and responsible for increasing deficits and debts. The proposed solution to promote growth
is to deepen structural reforms, which should improve competitiveness at the national level. Inspired by this view, European leaders have
called for additional regressive reforms of the labor market and welfare
systems. Thus, a “race to the bottom” for wages and social benefits is
emerging.
As a consequence, welfare systems have been under growing
pressure. Restrictive rules on monetary and fiscal policies result in a
growth path that puts social protection systems under increasing stress
in times of recession, since the receipts from contributions decrease
while social expenditures are increasing. However, structural reforms
promoting labor market flexibility and welfare state downsizing have
not reduced massive unemployment in European countries, as predicted
by the New Classical Economics. Instead of acting in favor of growth
and employment, the decline in wages and social benefits has caused a
decrease in effective aggregate demand and thus contributed to deepen
the recession.

CONCLUSION
The 2007 reform of the social security pension system in Portugal
was presented to the public as fundamental to contain pressures on the
social security budget and guarantee its financial sustainability. The reform has been described as merely parametric, aimed at reducing the
level of benefits for improving financial sustainability while preserving
the overall logic of the system. However, it did not have a limited impact in the structure of the social security pension system. It might be
better described as structural.
This chapter has argued that the Portuguese process of pension reform was deeply influenced by European guidelines and policies. The
economic policy paradigm dominant in the EU helped to create an economic environment since the early 1990s that has favored the introduction of pension reforms. Since Maastricht, the imposition of restrictive
rules in macroeconomic management has contributed to impose pressures for reforming pensions. As the governments were recommended
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to cut spending on pensions and other social transfer programs, there
were direct pressures to lower public deficits and debts. There were also
indirect pressures, since restrictive rules on fiscal policy have caused the
slowdown of growth and the increase of unemployment, destabilizing
social security budgetary equilibrium. However, a European strategy
for the field of pensions, compatible with economic policies supplyside oriented, was designed in parallel. An open method of coordination was followed, which has been an important factor in the process of
reforming pensions in many member states. It has contributed to build
a common view on this subject and to define guidelines for policy that
have been translated into common trends in reforms. The Portuguese
reform in 2007 and the new political discourse that calls for an additional reform have been aligned with the EU orientation for pensions.
The chapter has also emphasized that the present difficulties in pension system financing are, to a great extent, the consequence of economic dysfunctioning. This fact, however, has been underestimated
in the public debate, which has been dominated by the argument that
spending on pensions will be unsustainably high because of population aging. The use of this simple argument may be misleading as it
underestimates the decisive influence that economic performance has
on pension systems budgetary equilibrium.
Economic growth is crucial, as the problem posed by the change
in the age structure of the population is one of an increasing share in
spending. If output grows, the distributive problem becomes easier.
However, economic policies inspired by the New Classical Economics
have had extremely adverse effects in stabilizing economies with regard
to growth, employment, and the external equilibrium of several Member States, particularly the peripheral nations. A paradigmatic change
in economic policy is fundamental to allow the appropriate policies for
growth.
Furthermore, the discussion on the future of social security pensions should not be dissociated from the debate on income distribution
in society. In a system financed on a PAYG basis, pensioners’ income
share depends on the distribution of income between capital and labor
and on the division of the labor share between workers and pensioners.
Ultimately, pension policy is about political choices.
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Notes
1. Law n.º 4/2007, January 16, and Decree-Law n.º 187/2007, May 9.
2. Significant measures intended to harmonize the public scheme with the scheme
that covers civil servants were introduced. See Law n.º 60/2005, December 29.
Notice that Decree-Law n.º 187/2007 also applies to the calculation of pensions
for civil servants whose working career started after September 1, 1993, in accordance with Decree-Law n.º 286/93.
3. Decree-Law n.º 329/93, September 25.
4. Decree-Law n.º 35/2002, February 19. See also DecreeLaw n.º 17/2000, August
8, art.º 57º3.
5. Law n.º 53-B/2006, December 29.
6. Ordinance n.º 1316/2005, December 22.
7. Ordinance n.º 1357/2006, November 30.
8. Decree-Law n.º 232/2005, December 29.
9. The official speech of the present government includes two policy orientations:
increasing the labor market participation of older workers and promoting complementary private retirement savings. These orientations seem to have been inspired
by the proposals of the EU social policy agenda defined in the Green Paper (European Commission 2010) and the White Paper (European Commission 2012).
10. See, for example, Barr (2001, 2004); Barr and Diamond (2008); and Thompson
(1998).
11. First, funding might not increase savings, since an increase in mandatory savings
can be offset by a reduction in voluntary savings. Second, increasing savings might
not increase productive investment. Savings do not convert automatically into productive investment. However, if there is a low rate of economic growth, increasing
savings may have a depressive effect on the level of economic activity, and thus
reduce productive investment. Third, an increase in productive investment might
not have a significant effect on growth. This is the reason why Barr (2004, p. 207)
argues that funding, as a mechanism intended to promote economic growth, is both
indirect and debatable. On the effects of pensions on saving and investment, see
Barr (2004), Barr and Diamond (2008), and Thompson (1998). The “myths” on
the advantages of funding have been examined by Barr (2000a, 2001, 2004); Barr
and Diamond (2008); Orszag and Stiglitz (2001); and Thompson (1998).
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6
The Norwegian Government
Pension Fund as an Investor
in Global Markets
Magdalena Mosionek-Schweda
University of Gdańsk

Because of population aging, many countries have established reserve funds to mitigate the effects of future deficits in their social security programs (Jarrett 2011). According to the OECD, in 2009, 17 of
34 member states had social security reserve funds. They have accumulated a total of $4.554 trillion, of which about $2.540 trillion belonged
to the U.S. Social Security Trust Fund (OECD 2011).
The purpose of this chapter is to describe a special reserve fund,
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund. Its uniqueness is reflected
in both its organizational structure and its principles of accumulation
and investment of resources. This fund consists of two parts: Pension
Fund-Global and Pension Fund–Norway. In view of a clearly defined
commitment to the social security program of the latter, and a general
commitment of the former, only the latter is recognized as a reserve
fund in the OECD statistics. This chapter, however, mainly focuses on
the Global Fund, which is one of the largest investors in the global financial market.
This chapter addresses issues related to the development and the
operation of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG),
which the Norwegian government uses to invest funds derived from
the extraction of oil. After 15 years of regular fuel revenue receipts
and through active investment policy, GPFG became the second-largest
pension fund in the world (after Japan) and the first in Europe, with assets of NOK 3.496 trillion ($626 billion, based on $1.00 = 5.58 kroner),
This chapter first provides an overview of Social Security programs
in Norway. It then discusses the Norwegian Government Pension Fund,
focusing on the Norwegian Pension Fund Global.
129
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ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
IN NORWAY
The involvement of the Norwegian government in the organization
of social protection of the population began in the late nineteenth century with the establishment of accident insurance for factory workers
in 1885. The start of the development of the social security program
took place in 1957, and 10 years later an additional mandatory retirement plan depending on the amount of remuneration of labor was implemented. In 1967, social benefits introduced for different groups prior
to the Second World War were integrated in a single National Security
program (Ambasada Norwegii w Polsce 2010). The current social security program consists of three components (Lovdata 1966, 1998, 2002;
Norwegian Labour and Welfare Organisation [NAV] 2012):
1) The National Insurance Scheme, under an act of February 28,
1997;
2) The Family Allowance Scheme, regulated by an act of March
8, 2002;
3) The Scheme for Cash Benefits for Families with Small Children, established by an act of June 26, 1998.
In 2006, the social security reform process began. One of the most
important changes was the establishment of a new institution, NAV.
This office started its operations on July 1, 2006, and replaced the two
previous institutions, Norwegian National Insurance (Trygdeetaten)
and the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (Aetat). NAV’s primary
objective is to create opportunities for employment, while at the same
time protecting the rights to social security benefits (NAV 2007–2009).
The organizational structure includes 457 local NAV offices. The first
offices were established in the autumn of 2006, while the target number
was reached in March 2011.
The social security program is financed by contributions from employees, the self-employed, and employers, and also from government
subsidies. The amount of the contribution is determined annually by the
Parliament (NAV 2012). In 2012, four rates applied:
1) 7.8 percent of income from employment, paid by workers;

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

The Norwegian Government Pension Fund 131

2) 11.0 percent of the income from the self-employed;
3) 14.1 percent of the gross payroll for employers (with no ceiling
on earnings);
4) 3.0 percent of other income (e.g. pensions).
The benefits of social security include old-age, survivor’s and disability pensions, temporary assistance grants for the chronically ill and
those recovering from accidents, care allowances for persons with disabilities, rehabilitation benefits, compensation for accidents at work,
benefits for single parents, unemployment, sickness and maternity benefits, medical sickness and maternity allowances, and funeral benefits
(NAV 2012).
The right to individual benefits usually depends on the length of
membership in the social security program. Most of the benefits, however, are calculated on the base rate, the G value (from grunnbeløp),
determined annually by the Parliament in May. Since May 1, 2011, this
rate amounts to NOK 79,216 (NAV 2011c) ($14,196).

THE PRINCIPLES OF FUNCTIONING AND THE REFORMS
OF THE NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
Norwegian authorities reformed the social security program, taking
effect starting January 1, 2011. The program is currently undergoing a
period of transition in which old and new rules operate simultaneously.
The most important aspects of the current system and the changes are
indicated below.
The Norwegian retirement system consists of three components referred to as pillars. The first pillar is the basic pension received from
the social security program (Folketrygden). The amount of the benefit
depends on the amount of income, the duration of membership in the
program and the contribution period, marital status, and whether the
spouse receives benefits from Folketrygden. The retirement pension
from this part of the system consists of the basic pension (grunnpensjon), the supplementary pension (tillegspensjon) and/or the extra allowance (særtillegg) and the care allowance for pensioners with dependent
children and/or a spouse (NAV 2012).
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The basic pension is granted to persons with at least three years of
membership in the program between the ages of 16 and 66. The amount
of the basic pension benefit is determined by the length of the insurance period and is independent of both the amount of income earned
during the activity period and the contributions paid into the system
during the activity period. A full basic pension is received by members
of Folketrygden after a minimum of 40 years. If the membership period
is shorter, the amount of benefits is reduced accordingly (NAV 2011a).
A full basic old-age pension is 100 percent of the base G rate (NOK
79,216 since May 1, 2011) (NAV 2011c).
The supplementary pension (tilleggspensjon) was introduced in
1967 with the purpose of maintaining a standard of living after retirement close to the level of the work period (NAV 2012). The amount of
the benefit is strictly dependent on income, measured by the average
number of pension points, and the qualifying years of contributions.
In order to obtain supplementary pension rights, the insured needs to
exceed the G rate of the pensionable salary for a period of at least three
years, with the G rate being the income threshold above which the pension points are counted. The part of income that exceeds the G rate is
divided by this rate. Thus, workers earning twice the G rate receive
one pension point. This rule applies to pension points calculated on the
basis of pensionable salary not exceeding 6G. For income between 6G
and 12G, only one-third is taken into account to calculate the number
of pension points. Income exceeding 12G is not taken into account. The
average final pension points for determining the supplementary pension
is calculated as the average of the 20 best years in terms of pension
points (NAV 2012).
The extra allowance (særtillegg) is granted to pensioners not entitled to a supplementary pension or if the supplementary pension is less
than the særtillegg. The right to the basic pension is necessary to obtain
the extra allowance. The amount of the allowance is decided by Parliament as a percentage of the basic G in two rates, normal, amounting to
94 percent of G and reduced, which is 74 percent of G (NAV 2010).
The age for receipt of social security benefits in Norway is 67 for
both men and women. Workers are allowed to continue work after benefit receipt until age 68 with full pension entitlement. At age 68, however, until age 70, if the annual income of the retired person exceeds
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twice the rate of G, the pension amount above this level is reduced by
40 percent (NAV 2011a).
The pension reform implemented on January 1, 2011, introduces
changes in the retirement age, the principles of calculation and payment
of benefits and the possibility of combining an old-age pension with
further work. The new, flexible, retirement program is primarily aimed
at providing the insured with the following (NAV 2012):
•

The ability to receive a retirement pension after age 62, if the
insured has acquired adequate pension rights. Everyone is still
entitled to receive benefits at age 67.

•

The selection of the “retirement standard”—the insured worker
decides whether to receive the full old age benefit from their
pension account, or a partial benefit: 20 percent, 40 percent, 50
percent, 60 percent, or 80 percent.

•

The right to change the “level of retirement” once a year.

•

The possibility of combining the entitlements and labor income
without reducing the received pension benefit.

In addition, those born after 1962 acquire pension rights according
to the following new rules (NAV 2012):
•

The amount of the old-age pension depends on all the years in
which the income accounting for pension points was obtained,
until age 75. Based on the new rules, the contributions of the
insured create a pension fund, and the amount of the benefit
depends on the accumulated capital value. According to the existing rules, the amount of pension was calculated on the basis
of the 20 best years of work and allowed full pension after 40
years of participation in the program.

•

The funds accumulated in the pension fund (a notional account,
rather than an invested account) are indexed annually by the
wages growth indicator for those before retirement, and by
that indicator decreased by 0.75 percent for persons receiving
a benefit;

•

The pension fund grows by 18.1 percent of the insured income
in excess of the equivalent of 7.1 G.
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Persons born between 1943 and 1953 acquire pension rights and
receive benefits in accordance with the existing terms and conditions.
Persons born between 1954 and 1962 acquire the rights based in part on
new and old rules.
The changes introduced in the Norwegian social security program
guarantee a greater freedom as to when, and to what extent, the insured
person starts drawing a pension. The changes also allow a person to
work and receive an unreduced pension, which helps to increase future
benefits by raising retirement savings. Despite the right to receive a
pension at age 62, the new rules for calculating entitlements encourage
prolonged years of work. The flexibility of pension savings withdrawal
also applies to persons born between 1943 and 1953, to whom the regulations from before the reform apply.
The effects of the implemented reforms were evident right when the
new regulations were enforced. In January 2011, 13,600 persons under
age 67 took the advantage of the possible pension savings withdrawal.
In total, in the first quarter of 2011, 17,834 people aged 62–66 opted to
receive benefits, of whom 83.5 percent were male (NAV 2011b). About
60 percent of this group remained in the labor market using the possibility of joining work with drawing pension benefits (NAV 2011e). In the
first quarter of 2011, NAV paid pensions to 685,226 people, an increase
of about 32,000 compared to the first quarter of 2010. In total, the participation of pensioners in the Norwegian community at that time was
13.88 percent (NAV 2011d).
In addition to the social security program, the second pillar, consisting of employee pension plans (Obligatorisk Tjenestepensjon [OTP]),
was introduced in 2006 as a part of the retirement system reform. The
Norwegian OTP is mandatory for both employees and employers. The
third pillar covers all additional, optional forms of benefits offered by
private pension funds and other financial institutions. The scope of its
organizational system, however, is not specified by the legislature.

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

The Norwegian Government Pension Fund 135

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORWEGIAN
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund has been operating in
its present form since January 1, 2006. Its origins, however, date back
to the 1960s. It consists of two separate funds: the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), which is the successor of the Government
Petroleum Fund, and the Government Pension Fund Norway (GPFN),
derived from the Social Insurance Fund. The Norwegian Government
Pension Fund is owned by the Norwegian Government and the Ministry
of Finance.
The current administration of GPFG and GPFN has been entrusted
to two institutions, a special unit operating in the National Bank of Norway called Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) and Folketrygdfondet (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2012). Each of these
funds was created at a different time and, although together forming the
Norwegian Pension Fund, are independent of each other, governed by
separate legislation and adopting different strategies.
The GPFN was established in 1967 under the Social Security Act
as the Social Insurance Fund (Lovdata 1966). As mentioned above, in
2006 it was converted into GPFN, managed by Folketrygdfondet, an
independent entity, under an act of June 29, 2007, fully owned by the
state (Lovdata 2007). The aim of GPFN is to accumulate and grow savings in the social security program for the purpose of payment of future
pension benefits. The initial capital of the GPFN derived from the surplus generated in the social security program since its establishment in
1967 until the late 1970s. Currently, the proceeds to the fund are profits
from its investment activities. The total net gains (net of management
costs) increase the GPFN assets and no transfers to the state budget
or payments of current benefits occur (Norwegian Ministry of Finance
2012). The value of assets held in the fund at the end of 2011 stood at
NOK 129.4 billion ($23.19 billion), of which NOK 78.3 billion ($14.0
billion) is in equity securities, and NOK 51.1 billion ($9.2 billion) is in
financial assets with fixed income (SSB 2012b). The investment portfolio of the fund shares included 48 Norwegian companies (with a total
value of NOK 60.4 billion) and 90 companies in other Nordic countries
(with a value of NOK 17.9 billion). Among the debt securities, almost
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70 percent were corporate bonds of Norwegian companies (worth NOK
35.5 billion); the fund also held government bonds worth NOK 6 billion and foreign debt securities worth NOK 9.6 billion (SSB 2012c).
In contrast to the GPFG, the GPFN investment activity is limited to
the Norwegian market and the regulated markets of Nordic countries
(Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, with the exception of Iceland). GPFG,
founded more than 30 years later than the GPFN, is the focus of the
remainder of the chapter.
The basis for its establishment was an act in June 1990 that created the Government Petroleum Fund (the Oil Fund) (Lovdata 1990).
Through this fund, the Norwegian government accumulated and invested the excess funds from the extraction of crude oil discovered at
the end of 1969. Until the establishment of the Oil Fund, the revenues
from extractive industries were used for about 20 years for current public expenditure and national debt redemption. In the 1970s, however,
it was evident that the revenues from the petroleum sector are indefinite as they relate to nonrenewable resources. To avoid overheating the
Norwegian economy and in view of the long-term use of oil wealth,
the Norwegian authorities decided to direct one-third of the net income
of the state generated by the oil production to a special fund. The first
transfer of funds, however, took place only in 1996; the fund received
approximately NOK 2 billion in 1996 (Norwegian Ministry of Finance
2012).
After 15 years of regular fuel revenue receipts and through an active investment policy, GPFG became the second-largest pension fund
in the world (after Japan) and the largest in Europe. The fund is also
the largest shareholder in the European capital market with about 1.8
percent of shares listed on stock exchanges in Europe and one of the
largest investors in the world, with approximately 1 percent share in the
global capital market (Towers Watson 2011). The value of assets held
in GPFG at the end of the first quarter of 2012 amounted to NOK 3,496
trillion ($627 billion). Figure 6.1 shows the market value of the fund on
a quarterly basis from 1998 to 2012.
As mentioned above, the predecessor of today’s GPFG was the Oil
Fund, transformed into GPFG in 2006. From that time, its purpose is
not only to support the government in the long-term, sustainable use of
revenues from the petroleum sector, but also to multiply these means in
order to finance future pension payments in the public social security
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Figure 6.1 Government Pension Fund Global Market Value, 2002–2012
(quarterly data in NOK billions)
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SOURCE: NBIM, Government Pension Fund Global first quarter 2012, Oslo
(2012b, p. 2).

system (OECD 2011). The fund, however, is an instrument for general
saving with undefined future liabilities to the social security program or
any other social or economic area. It is not an instrument of Norwegian
foreign policy, and is not used for the purpose of achieving political or
strategic objectives. The functioning of the GPFG (Statens pensjonsfond – Utland) is based on three basic principles (Ambasada Norwegii
w Polsce 2012):
1) Annual revenues of the fund are derived from the Norwegian
state oil production, financial operations associated with the extraction and profits generated by the fund.
2) The transfer of funds to the budget may not exceed an amount
equal to the expected rate of return on investment, set at 4 percent per year. With this principle, the government can only
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withdraw the profits earned by GPFG without diminishing its
capital. In addition, short-term fluctuations in oil and gas prices
do not impact the fiscal policy.
3) The fund’s assets are invested exclusively outside Norway.
This is to ensure the diversification of investments and the reduction of the adverse impact of fluctuations in oil prices on the
domestic economy.
Due to the lack of clearly defined social security pension liabilities
of the pension fund, as well as the lack of the connections between the
fund and the social security program (GPFG revenues are independent
of the contributions of the insured), it is not a typical social security
reserve fund established in some countries, such as the United States,
with the aim of securing future pension payments. As emphasized by
the Norwegian authorities, the idea of the GPFG is a long-term, rational
management of resources from the oil deposits to benefit both today’s
and future generations of the residents of Norway (Norwegian Ministry
of Finance 2012). According to the forecasts of the Ministry of Finance,
in 2020 the market value of the fund will amount to NOK 6.285 trillion ($1.126 trillion) (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2011). Assuming
that at that time Norway will be inhabited by about 5.5 million people (SSB 2012a), the amount per person will exceed NOK 1.1 million
($197,000). At the end of 2011, the fund’s value per capita amounted to
about NOK 670,000 ($120,000).

THE INVESTMENT STRATEGY OF THE GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL
GPFG is a unique investor considering not only its large asset
value, but also its lack of necessity of achieving short-term investment
objectives. Its investment policies are designed to take into account the
specific characteristics of the fund and the specificity of the markets in
which the assets are invested. For this reason, the Ministry of Finance
and the National Bank of Norway carry out a continuous review of the
fund’s investment strategy to develop it in the best direction to increase
funds accumulated in the fund and to achieve the desired rate of return
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at a moderate level of risk. It is the basic principle to be respected by
NBIM, the entity responsible for managing the assets of GPFG (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2010). The real average annual rate of return
of the fund for the period 1997–2011 was 2.7 percent and therefore
below the 4 percent estimated by the Ministry of Finance. The annual
performance of the GPFG is characterized by extremes, from a loss of
−23.3 percent to profits of 25.6 percent (Norwegian Ministry of Finance
2012). The Norwegian Government points out, however, that GPFG
is based on a long-term investment objective, and the loss-making assets in the investment portfolio have a great potential for growth in the
future.
GPFG investment policy has evolved with the growth of its assets (Table 6.1). The first transfers from the state budget to the fund
(then Statens petroleumsfond) were invested exclusively in government
bonds, in accordance with the investment policy of the Norwegian Central Bank. In 1998, NBIM was established—the body responsible for
the management of the investment policy of the fund in accordance
with the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance. In that year, it was decided to include stocks in the investment portfolio on the condition that
they not exceed 40 percent of the fund (Norwegian Ministry of Finance
2012). Nine years later, this limit was raised to 60 percent, and in the
subsequent year the Ministry decided to permit real estate investments
limited to 5 percent of the portfolio (Norwegian Ministry of Finance
2010).
The diversification of the GPFG portfolio pertains to different categories of investments, as well as geographical dispersion. For the purpose of the investment policy of the fund, the following three regions
were determined: Europe, America/Africa, and Asia/Oceania, with the
investment limits within each of these regions defined separately for
investments in equity and debt securities. So far, they were established,
respectively, as 50 percent, 35 percent, and 15 percent for equities,
and 60 percent, 35 percent, and 5 percent for investments in fixed income securities (NBIM 2012a). This indicates that more than half of
the GPFG assets were located in securities and real estate in Europe.
The current financial crisis not only shook the capital markets, but also
revealed a number of anomalies and problems in the public finances of
certain European countries. The changes observed in global finance in
2008–2010 contributed to the GPFG management decision to change
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Table 6.1 Stages of Development of the Government Pension Fund
Global Investment Policy
Year
Events
1969 The discovery of oil in the North Sea—extraction since 1971.
1990 The decision of the Norwegian Parliament to set up the Government
Petroleum Fund for long-term management of revenues from oil
sales.
1996 The first transfer of funds to the Fund in the amount of
approximately NOK 2 billion.
1997 The decision of the Ministry of Finance to start investing in equity
funds—the fund previously invested only in government bonds.
1998 January 1—the NBIM commencement—NBIM manages the fund
on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. The change in the structure
of the investment portfolio of the fund—40 percent of the portfolio
conversed from debt to equity instruments.
2000 Five emerging markets added to benchmark index.
2002 Corporate bonds included in debt instruments benchmark index.
2004 The establishment of ethical guidelines for the fund’s investment
plan.
2006 Name changed to: Government Pension Fund Global.
2007 The decision of the Ministry of Finance to increase the limit
of investment in equities from 40 percent to 60 percent and the
inclusion of small and medium-sized enterprises to the portfolio.
2008 The decision to start investing in real estate to a maximum of 5
percent of the fund’s assets. The inclusion of all emerging markets
in benchmark index.
2009 Evaluation of ethical guidelines. The share of stocks in the portfolio
of the fund has reached the limit of 60 percent in June. The fund
reached a record rate of return, 25.6 percent.
2010 Rules for investing in real estate adopted.
2011 The first investments in real estate (located in London and Paris).
2012 A new benchmark for investments in debt instruments. New rules of
geographic diversification of investments in equity.
SOURCE: Author’s study based on Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2012, pp. 13–39).
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the geographical spread of the fund investments by reducing the share
of European investment in the fund and increasing its commitment
to emerging markets. The category of emerging markets includes 23
countries, among others: Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Russia, and Hungary (NBIM 2012a). The new rules of
geographical diversification were introduced progressively since 2012,
and this process is expected to take about six years.
In addition to the investment guidelines of the Ministry of Finance,
the fund management is obliged to comply with the rules developed by
the Council of Ethics. The council, operating since 2004, is preparing
recommendations for the Ministry of Finance on exclusion from GPFG
portfolio of companies operating in the production of weapons, destroying the environment, disrespecting ethical standards, and violating
human rights. By the end of 2011, based on council recommendations,
a total of 55 companies were excluded, among others: British American
Tobacco Plc., Philip Morris International Inc., and Japan Tobacco Inc.
(the tobacco industry); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (human rights violations);
Alliant Techsystems Inc., General Dynamics Corp., and Hanwha Corp.
(cluster weapons); and Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd. (landmines) (Council on Ethics 2012).

THE INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO OF THE GOVERNMENT
PENSION FUND GLOBAL IN 2011
In 2011, GPFG assets increased by approximately NOK 234 billion, and at the end of this period, their value amounted to NOK 3.312
trillion. As a result of persisting high oil prices on the world markets,
the government receipts transferred to the fund were the highest since
2008 and amounted to NOK 271 billion (SSB 2012b). Table 6.2 presents the basic information on the investment portfolio and the financial
performance of GPFG between 2006 and 2011 (since the transformation of the Oil Fund into the Pension Fund).
In 2011, the value of the fund’s assets was almost two times higher
than in 2006. This value is dependent on transfers from the state budget, rates of return on investments, and changes due to fluctuations in
the Norwegian krone (all GPFG investments are made outside Nor-
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Table 6.2 Government Pension Fund Global Market Value, Annual
Results, and Cash Flows from the State Budget, 2006–2011
(NOK billion)
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
Equity instruments
1,945 1,891 1,644 1,129
958
726
Fixed-income
1,356 1,186
996 1,146 1,061 1,058
instruments
Real estate investments
11
0
0
0
0
0
Transfer of funds from
271
182
169
384
314
288
the budget
Generated profit/loss
−86
264
613 −633
504
124
Change due to
49
−8 −418
506 −154
−28
fluctuations in krone
Total net change
234
437
365
257
235
384
Total GPFG value
3,312 3,077 2,640 2,275 2,019 1,784
SOURCE: Author’s study based on NBIM, Government Pension Fund Global Annual
Report 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011.

way). In the analysed period, the worst result from investing activities
was achieved in 2008—the rate of return was −23.3 percent (in international currency) and it was the weakest result since the establishment
of the fund.1 The loss of NOK 633 billion, however, was compensated
by record transfers from the state budget (NOK 384 billion) and the
weakening of the Norwegian krone against the currencies in which the
fund invests (NBIM 2009). At the end of 2011 the loss amounted to
NOK 86 billion. With funds from the state budget and the depreciation
of NOK the assets increased eventually by NOK 234 billion, but this
was the lowest figure since 2005.2 A negative rate of return in 2011
(−2.5 percent in international currency) was the consequence of negative results from investments in equity; the declines in stock markets in
Asia, the United States and Europe generated the loss of −8.8 percent.
The rising prices of debt instruments, however, resulted in a 7 percent
return on investment in this type of GPFG securities. Comparing these
figures with their reference indexes (the FTSE Global for shares, the
index prepared by Barclays Capital for bonds) shows that the rate of
return on investment in shares is 0.48 percentage points lower than its
benchmark, while in the case of bonds, the result is 0.52 percentage
points higher (NBIM 2012a).
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Based on these figures, the changes to the investment policy of
GPFG can be observed in the structure of the investment portfolio, i.e.,
a gradual increase in the share of stocks. As a result, starting from 2009,
the shares occupy a dominant position in the structure of the investment. At the end of 2011, GPFG held shares of a market value of about
NOK 1.945 trillion (an increase of NOK 54 billion compared to 2010),
which accounted for 58.7 percent of total assets, slightly below the
permissible limit of 60 percent of the investment in such instruments
(see Figure 6.2). At the same time, 41 percent of the GPFG assets were
invested in the fixed income securities, significantly exceeding the 35
percent limit adopted for the strategic investment portfolio. The market
value of debt instruments has increased over 2011 by NOK 170 billion
to the level of NOK 1.356 billion (NBIM 2012a).
In 2011, the GPFG investment portfolio included the first real estate investment. In April 2011, the management of the fund finalized
Figure 6.2 Strategic and Actual Structure of the Government Pension
Fund Global Investment Portfolio, 2011 (%)
0.3
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SOURCE: Author’s study based on NBIM (2012a, p, 14).
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the purchase of a 25 percent stake in the Crown Estate’s Regent Street
in London, with a value of NOK 4.2 billion (approximately GBP 452
million). Three months later, the fund acquired a 50 percent interest in
7 properties located in Paris and the surrounding area with a total value
of NOK 5.5 billion (EUR 702.5 million). By the end of the year, the
involvement in real estate had increased by another 2 buildings located
in London at the Regent Street and three in Paris. In total, GPFG held
shares in 13 buildings (114 premises), primarily office and retail space.
The total market value of these investments at the end of 2011 was approximately NOK 11 billion, which accounted for only 0.3 percent of
the value of the investment portfolio with an acceptable level of 5 percent. Due to the transaction costs, the return on investment in real estate
in 2011 was negative and amounted to −0.79 percent (−4.37 percent in
international currencies) (NBIM 2012a).
The Ministry of Finance plans to gradually increase the fund’s involvement in the real estate market to reach the 5 percent threshold in
2020. Given the projections on the value of the fund’s assets (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2011), about NOK 250–300 billion of GPFG
assets is expected to be invested in the European real estate market in
the target year.
At the end of 2011, GPFG held stocks, bonds, and real estate shares
registered in 68 countries (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 2011).
Table 6.3 shows the capital structure of the GPFG investment portfolio
in terms of geographic diversification in 2011. About 50 percent of its
shares were listed on the European markets, 35 percent on the markets
in the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East, and 15 percent in Asia and
Oceania. The rates of return on investments in these regions (measured
in international currency) were, respectively, −12.1 percent, −2.4 percent, and 15.5 percent.
Analysing the fund’s commitment to national stock markets of individual countries (Table 6.3), the largest share (30.3 percent) of the
GPFG investment portfolio was placed in the securities listed on the
markets in the United States (2,041 investments with a total value of
more than NOK 588.4 billion), followed by the British market (16.3 percent of the GPFG portfolio, 397 investments worth NOK 317.7 billion),
France (6.9 percent), Switzerland (6.3 percent), Germany (5.8 percent),
and Japan (5.6 percent). The investments in securities of Japanese companies accounted for 40 percent of the total value of shares purchased
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in the Asia-Pacific (NBIM 2012c). As a result of the earthquake and
tsunami that hit Japan in March 2011, their value has decreased by 18.7
percent. More negative returns were received on investments made in
the four countries considered to be the largest emerging markets, i.e.,
India (−34.4 percent), China (−21.8 percent), Russia (−19.5 percent),
and Brazil (−10,1 percent) (NBIM 2012a).
At the end of 2011, the fund held securities issued by 8,005 companies, while in the previous year this number was equal to 8,496. According to the investment policy of the Ministry of Finance, the fund
is not allowed to exceed 10 percent of the shareholding of one company. In the analysed period, the highest share was recorded in the Irish
company Smurfit Kappa Group, in which the fund held 9.6 percent of
shares worth NOK 773 million. In total, the participation of the fund
exceeded 5 percent in 53 companies (17 companies in 2010). The 10
largest investments in equity securities included companies from Switzerland, the UK and the United States (see Table 6.4) with an oil sector
company, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, on the top of the ranking, as GPFG
acquired 2.2 percent of its shares worth nearly NOK 31 billion (NBIM
2012a).
The fund’s investments in fixed income securities include bonds,
inflation-indexed bonds, corporate bonds, securitized debt instruments
and bonds issued by public entities such as regional authorities or stateowned enterprises. The GPFG debt investment portfolio in 2011 was
dominated by government bonds (46 percent), followed by securitized
debt instruments (18 percent) and corporate bonds (14 percent). The
fund had a total of 5,215 series of debt securities issued by 1,404 entities, while in the previous year it was a series of 8,659 issued by 1,686
entities. Ninety-four percent of these investments were denominated in
Euros, U.S. dollars, British pounds, and Japanese yen (NBIM 2012a).

CONCLUSION
GPFG is one of the largest investors in the global capital market. A
characteristic feature of its investment activity is a long-term approach
to investment. The main idea of the fund’s management is growing the
GPFG assets for future generations. Such an investment objective en-
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Number
89
31
1
57
3,481
1,016
327
120
15
1,267
3
79
26
102
92
401
33
174
98
1
33

Job Name:

Investment value
(NOK million)
9,564
750
33
8,781
244,624
27,235
26,030
10,365
4,427
109,633
174
5,993
1,619
7,243
28,856
19,554
3,495
41,881
33,308
10.5
3,141
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Table 6.3 GPFG Investments in Equity in the Global Capital Market, 2011
Investment value
Region/country
(NOK million)
Number
Region/country
Europe
966,343
1,567
Africa
Austria
6,119
28
Egypt
Belgium
16,505
44
Morocco
Cyprus
111.6
3
South Africa
Czech Republic
903
4
Asia
Denmark
18,300
36
China
Faeroe Islands
8.9
1
Hong Kong
Finland
15,688
44
India
France
136,215
162
Indonesia
Georgia
56,646
1
Japan
Germany
112,797
140
Kazakhstan
Greece
2,066
29
Malaysia
Guernsey
280
5
Philippines
Hungary
1,407
6
Singapore
Ireland
4,509
25
South Korea
Italy
34,941
118
Taiwan
Jersey
34.9
1
Thailand
Lithuania
1.6
1
Latin America
Luxembourg
431
3
Brazil
The Netherlands
37,745
56
Cayman Islands
Poland
5,844
48
Chile

6,681
25,246
45,077
48,714
121,811
6,936
152.8
317,758
641,671
56
53,151
588,464

23
69
75
85
103
57
3
397
2,333
2
290
2041

367.7
4,754
10
290.1
4,005
454
3,342
209.1
32,646
31,830
815.4

8
30
1
3
73
1
65
7
288
269
19
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SOURCE: Author’s own study based on NBIM (2012c, pp. 1–46).

Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Middle East
Bahrain
Israel
United Arab Emirates
Oceania
Australia
New Zealand
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Russia
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Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukraine
Great Britain
North America
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Table 6.4 The Largest GPFG Investments in Equity Securities, 20011
Value of shares held
Issuing entity
Country
(NOK billion)
Royal Dutch Shell Plc
Great Britain
30.983
Nestlé SA
Switzerland
25.346
HSBC Holdings Plc
Great Britain
19.583
Novartis AG
Switzerland
19.281
Vodafone Group Plc
Great Britain
18.858
BP Plc
Great Britain
17.277
Exxon Mobil Corp
United States
16.901
Roche Holding AG
Switzerland
16.279
Apple Inc
United States
16.027
GlaxoSmithKline Plc
Great Britain
15.775
SOURCE: Author’s own study based on NBIM (2012a, p. 43).

ables the fund management to focus on prospective investments with
above-average returns in the future instead of achieving short-term results. The current financial crisis and the collapse of the capital markets
resulted in impairment of investments for many investors. At the same
time, GPFG consistently implemented its investment objective by acquiring low-priced shares with a potential for growth in a long-term
perspective. For instance, in the second half of 2011, GPFG allocated
NOK 150 billion to the purchase of shares in the European market.
Establishing the Government Petroleum Fund and then converting
it into a Pension Fund is a testimony to the rational management of
Norwegian wealth. Although GPFG has no clearly defined obligations
to the social security program, it is stressed in any document governing
the operation that it was founded for the benefit of future generations. It
is undoubtedly a financial, as well as social, success.
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Notes
1. The GPFG investments in international securities are not converted into kroner
in connection with financial reporting and are not hedged against moves in the
krone. Changes in the krone exchange rate do not affect the fund’s international
purchasing power. Consequently, the return is generally measured in international
currency, a weighted combination of the currencies in the fund’s benchmark
indices for equities and bonds. This is known as the fund’s currency basket and
consisted of 35 currencies at the end of the first quarter of 2012 (NBIM 2012b).
2. In 2011, the Norwegian krone weakened by 1.9 percent against the British pound,
2.7 percent against the U.S. dollar, 8.2 percent against the Japanese yen, and
strengthened by 0.7 percent against the euro. The fund held 83 percent of the
investments in these currencies.
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7
Pension Reforms in Central
and Eastern European
Countries, 1998–2012
Maciej Żukowski
Poznań University of Economics

Since the end of the 1990s, a number of countries in Central and
Eastern Europe carried out structural pension reforms, including the
introduction of a privately managed pension system, the so-called
second-pillar pension system. The reforms were clearly influenced by
the book Averting the Old Age Crisis, published in 1994 by the World
Bank. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that implemented this type of pension system include Hungary (1998), Poland
(1999), Latvia (2001), Bulgaria (2002), Croatia (2002), Estonia (2002),
the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia (2003), Slovakia
(2005), and Romania (2008).
This chapter covers a wide topic: social security pension reform in
Central and Eastern Europe. The chapter surveys the main tendencies
and discusses the reforms in the region in general terms, with a more
detailed discussion about Poland, which was one of the forerunners of
both the structural reforms in the late 1990s and the reforms at the time
of crisis. The chapter concentrates on structures and types of mandatory general pension systems without going into details of the systems’
design.
The chapter starts with a brief description of the heritage of communism in pension systems and the early transition. The next section
deals with the structural pension reforms in the late 1990s and early
2000s. The following section presents basic differences between countries, concerning solutions within pension systems and their situation.
The next section is devoted to the impact of crisis on pension systems
and the resulting “second wave of reforms.” Conclusions follow.
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HERITAGE OF COMMUNISM AND EARLY TRANSITION
When the CEE countries started their transition from communism
to democracy and from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, the heritage of communism was largely negative. However, in the
pension area, contrary to many others, the countries inherited existing
and functioning institutions.
The pension systems in the CEE countries had many similar characteristics in the early 1990s (Barr and Rutkowski 2005; Hirose 2011):
•

Social security pension systems, financed on a PAYG basis,
were the only source of income in old age, as occupational or
individual pension plans did not exist.

•

The systems were fragmented, with privileges for some groups,
such as lower retirement age or more generous benefit formulas.

•

Access to pensions was easy: the normal retirement age was
low, there were many early retirement possibilities, and disability pensions were granted relatively easily.

•

Even if pensions were financed by contributions (the “Bismarck” approach), the entire contribution was paid by the
employer and pensions were only partly related to contributions, due to many redistributive aspects in the benefit formulas.

•

There were no records of contributions at an individual level
and no clear lines of demarcation between the state budget and
the budgets of the social security systems.

At the same time, there were also differences between CEE countries concerning solutions in the pension system or generosity of
pensions. CEE countries entered the transition to the market economy
with inherited pension systems that had been adjusted to the circumstances of a centrally planned economy. In the early transition, some
changes were introduced that made the pension systems compatible with
a market economy (Barr and Rutkowski 2005), including
•

indexing pensions to cope with high inflation;

•

improving incentives, such as through increasing the number of
years used to calculate a pension; and

•

strengthening administration.
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Poland, like most other CEE countries, has a long tradition of social
insurance that was still present under communism, although with some
important elements of a state redistribution system. The Polish pension
system was in a sense between the traditions of “Bismarck” and “Beveridge” (Żukowski 1994).
The transformation process influenced the Polish pension system:
the number of contributors fell and the number of pensioners rose, partly
as a result of special early retirement plans connected with unemployment. This, together with an increase in pension levels, led to a financial
crisis. These were costs of a successful policy protecting incomes of
retirees in the difficult time of an economic and social transformation.
Several reform plans met with political resistance, and changes
introduced affected only some parameters of the system, without a
structural reform (Żukowski 1996). Unlike many other areas of the
economy, the pension system was reformed only in the “second wave”
of the reforms.
There are several reasons why the pension reform was made only
10 years after the beginning of transformation. First, Poland had inherited from the communist era an old-age security system that was able
to function under the changed circumstances, unlike many other areas
that had to be built from the beginning, such as taxes, banks, capital
market or—in the social policy area—labor market policy. Second, for
exactly the above reasons, at the beginning of the transformation some
important preconditions for functioning of pension funds, which were
an element of almost every reform concept, were absent (capital market, banks, insurance). Third, a political consensus necessary for such
a deep reform was absent in Poland for a longer period. Still, however,
with time, the understanding of the problem, especially of the systematic burden of the system, has been growing.

STRUCTURAL PENSION REFORMS
Many CEE countries introduced structural social security pension
reforms in a second wave of reforms. These reforms created “multitier
pension systems” (Żukowski 1997), with a mandatory second tier (or
pillar) of privately managed pension funds. As these new second pil-
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lars replaced a part of the previous social security PAYG systems, the
structural reforms were also described as (partial) privatization of oldage security. These pension reforms in CEE countries were influenced
by the World Bank report (1994) and followed the examples of some
countries in Latin America (Müller 2003).
The first two CEE countries to introduce such a reform were Hungary (1998) and Poland (1999). Several other countries followed: Latvia
(2001), Bulgaria (2002), Croatia (2002), Estonia (2002), the FYR of
Macedonia (2003), Slovakia (2005), and Romania (2008).
As a result of these structural pension reforms, the new EU member
states are a majority of countries within the EU with a mandatory second
tier (Table 7.1). The exceptions were the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and
Lithuania, which preserved their “Bismarckian” PAYG systems with
no mandatory pension funds.
Apart from the common feature of replacing a portion of the PAYG
plan with a fully funded plan, the exact reform patterns in these countries differed in many respects. In the PAYG social security systems
(now called the first-pillar pension systems), some countries (such as
Poland and Latvia) introduced notional defined contribution accounts,
while the others kept the defined benefit formula, but often reformed
through, for example, the extension of the qualifying period in terms of
years of work needed to receive a benefit. Also, the second-pillar pension systems differed in terms of contribution rate, administration, and
coverage.
There are various explanations of the structural pension reforms in
CEE countries. The role of international organizations, especially the
World Bank, was stressed, especially in relation to the high foreign debt
of the countries involved (Müller 1999, 2003). It was shown that the reforms were fostered by a transnational advocacy campaign (Orenstein
2008).
Economic objectives, such as accumulation of capital and economic growth, played a crucial role. The pension reforms were treated
as a vehicle of modernization to accelerate the development of market
economies. The reforms were introduced in specific circumstances of
transition: “extraordinary” conditions of a transformation of almost all
economic, social, and political institutions. In this situation, the political will to enact deep reforms was stronger than the political resistance
to change.
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Table 7.1 Types of Old-Age Security Systems in the EU-27
General state pension system (first tier)
Pensions
Based on:
Earnings- Insurance/earnings (defined
related benefit)

Flat-rate

Insurance/contributions
(notional defined
contribution)
Insurance (paying
contributions)
Residence

Supplementary pension plans
(second and third tiers)
Voluntary
Obligatory
Austria
Germany France (o)
Luxembourg Belgium
Hungary (i)
Greece
Portugal
Estonia (i)
Spain
Slovenia
Slovakia (i)
Lithuania
Cyprus
Bulgaria (i)
Czech Rep.
Malta
Romania (i)
Finland
Italy
Latvia (i)
Poland (i)
Sweden (i)
Ireland
UK (s, o, or i)
Denmark (o)
Netherlands (o)

NOTE: s = state; o = occupational; i = individual.

In Poland, after several years of discussions on pension reform, the
reform concept “Security through Diversity” (Office of the Government
Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform 1997) was to a large extent
implemented. The new system took effect on January 1, 1999. Three factors enabled such a structural change in the old-age security system:
1) the critique of the old system, 2) the reform concept, and 3) an appropriate organization of the work on the reform, including political
consensus.
The main objectives of the reform were both microeconomic and
macroeconomic. The first microeconomic concern was to create a tighter
link between contributions and pensions, thus strengthening the incentive
to work and the disincentive to evade making contributions. The other
microeconomic objective was to lower—in the longer term—social insurance contributions paid by the employer in order to reduce labor costs and
to increase employment. The key macroeconomic aim was to lower the
level of public expenditures on pensions, as a proportion of gross domestic product, to relieve public finance for other aims toward growth. The
other aim was to induce people to save more voluntarily.
The new old-age pension system covered younger insured workers
(under age 30) in full. Those aged 30–50 were given the option until the
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end of 1999 to participate (and split pension contributions accordingly)
in both new pillars (PAYG and funded) or to stay in the new PAYG one
with the entire contribution. The insured who were older than age 50
were not covered by the reform—they will retire according to the old
rules.
The pension reform in Poland replaced a one-pillar system with a
multipillar one. The new system consists of two obligatory parts: the
first is pay as you go, which is administered by Social Insurance Institution (ZUS), and the second one is fully funded and privately managed.
Between 1999 and 2011, these plans had contribution rates of 12.22
percent and 7.30 percent, respectively. Additional sources of income
security, among them occupational pension plans, constitute the third,
voluntary pillar.
Pensions from the first pillar will be based on the principle of
notional defined contributions, whereas the old pensions have been
defined benefit pensions. The new pension formula includes only two
components: the sum of indexed contributions paid, divided by average
life expectancy at retirement age in the calendar year of retirement. For
persons born after December 31, 1948, who had been insured in social
insurance before January 1, 1999, a “starting capital” according to the
old pension rules will be assessed and recorded on the individual account in ZUS.
The same defined contribution formula (with real capital) will also
be used in the second pillar. The newly created open-ended pension
funds are administered by private pension fund societies, organized as
joint stock companies. The insured may choose a fund and change the
choice. The funds are supervised by a state agency, and there are strict
regulations concerning functioning of the funds. A multistep procedure
is foreseen in case of fund insolvency until another pension fund society
overtakes a fund management. Every fund has to achieve a minimum
rate of return, relative to the results of all funds.
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IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CRISIS ON PENSION SYSTEMS—
SECOND WAVE OF REFORMS
When the global financial crisis disrupted financial markets in
2008, the rate of return on investments from pension funds dropped
dramatically. Moreover, the difficult state of public finances started
to make further financing of the reform’s transitional period increasingly difficult. This led to a discussion on “reforming the reform” in
many countries. Extreme measures were taken in Hungary where the
second pillar was renationalized in 2010. Poland, which pioneered the
structural reforms with Hungary in the late 1990s, reacted also, but differently, reducing the contribution rate to the second pillar (Fultz 2012).
A similar strategy to scale back the privatized pension systems, rather
than to eliminate them, was developed in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Estonia, and Latvia (Hirose 2011; Orenstein 2011).
The crisis has also facilitated some pension system reforms to
address both the current financial problems and future challenges,
especially related to demographic developments. For example, later
retirement has been legislated in several countries, including Poland
(Hirose 2011).
In Poland, the pension system remained relatively stable in the
2000s. The reform debates concerned the “completing” of the reform
started in 1999, and some issues have remained open until now (Golinowska and Żukowski 2011). In 2008, the issue of early retirement
finally was solved, giving some restricted categories of workers who
have worked under special (difficult) conditions bridging pensions
starting in 2009.
The financial markets crisis revealed the weaknesses of the pension reform, which started in 1999. It was the reform itself that led to
worsening of the financial situation of the Social Insurance Fund, and
especially of its part related to old-age pensions. The reform created a
large funded tier out of a part of a previously entirely PAYG system,
which created a big deficit for the expenditure on current pensions. The
financial markets crisis, which started in 2008, led to a further deterioration of old-age insurance finances: increasing subsidies to the social
security system contributed to a growing deficit of the government
budget. This provoked debates on introducing changes to the pension
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system, including the withdrawal of crucial structural elements of the
new system.
A debate started in 2010 on a reduction of the contribution rate
to the funded second pillar, with the money going to the notional defined contribution part, in order to lower the budget subsidies to the
social security pension system and thus to lower the public debt. The
discussions continued in 2011 with clear polarization of positions. Most
economists criticized the proposal, claiming it was rescuing the present
public finances at the cost of future generations (or at least governments) and dismantling the pension system and pension reform that had
started in 1999. The government was successful in passing the law in
Parliament. Beginning May 1, 2011, the contribution rate to the second
pillar was reduced from 7.3 percent to 2.3 percent.
Another structural change that had not been tackled for political
reasons was increasing the retirement age. Again, the financial markets crisis facilitated the reform. After the Parliamentary elections in
October 2011, the new government, backed by the same Parliamentary coalition and led by the same prime minister, announced plans to
increase the statutory retirement age. Starting in 2013, the statutory retirement age was raised by three months every year, reaching age 67
for both genders, in 2020 for men and in 2040 for women. After a short
but intensive debate, the change was legislated in May 2012 and implemented in January 2013.

CONCLUSION
Most CEE countries introduced structural pension reforms as part
of the transformation of their socioeconomic systems following the end
of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Modernization may thus
be seen as the main objective in the first wave of pension reforms.
The second wave of pension reforms was closely related to the
financial crisis that revealed problems of the pension systems and facilitated changes. However, contrary to some comments, no “death of
pension privatization” occurred (Orenstein 2011). The second wave of
pension reforms in CEE countries may be seen as an adjustment of pension systems to the circumstances.
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There have been differences between the countries in terms of solutions and pension systems. In the first wave, most CEE countries opted
for the introduction of the second pillar of privately managed pension
funds. However, both the solutions in the main public PAYG systems
differed, and the patterns of the second pillars were different. In the
second wave, the countries again reacted differently.

References
Barr, Nicholas, and Michał Rutkowski. 2005. “Pensions.” In Labor Markets
and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Accession and Beyond, Nicholas Barr, ed. Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 135–170.
Fultz, Elaine. 2012. “The Retrenchment of Second-Tier Pensions in Hungary
and Poland: A Precautionary Tale.” International Social Security Review
65(3): 1–25.
Golinowska, Stanisława, and Maciej Żukowski. 2011. “The Impact of the Economic and Financial Crisis on the Polish Pension System.” Journal of Social Policy Research 57(3): 267–285.
Hirose, Kenichi. 2011. “Trends and Key Issues of the Pension Reform in Central and Eastern Europe—A Comparative Overview.” In Pension Reform
in Central and Eastern Europe in times of Crisis, Austerity and Beyond,
Kenichi Hirose, ed. Budapest: International Labour Organization, Decent
Work Technical Support Team for Central and Eastern Europe, pp. 3–71.
Müller, Katharina. 1999. The Political Economy of Pension Reform in CentralEastern Europe. Cheltenham, UK, and Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
———. 2003. Privatising Old-Age Security. Latin America and Eastern Europe Compared. Cheltenham, Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform. 1997.
Security through Diversity: Reform of the Pension System in Poland. Warsaw: Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform.
Orenstein, Mitchell, A. 2008. Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
———. 2011. “Pension Privatization in Crisis.” International Social Security
Review 64(3): 65–80.
World Bank. 1994. Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and
Promote Growth. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Żukowski, Maciej. 1994. “Pensions Policy in Poland after 1945: Between
‘Bismarck’ and ‘Beveridge’ Traditions.” In Beveridge and Social Security:

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

162 Żukowski
An International Retrospective, John Hills, John Ditch, and Howard Glennerster, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 154–170.
———. 1996. “Das Alterssicherungssystem in Polen–Geschichte, gegenwärtige Lage, Umgestaltung. Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales
Arbeits- und Sozialrecht 10(2): 97–141.
———. 1997. Wielostopniowe systemy zabezpieczenia emerytalnego w Unii
Europejskiej i w Polsce. Między państwem a rynkiem [Multitier old age
security systems in the European Union and Poland. Between state and
market] Poznań: Poznań University of Economics.

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

8
Pension Reform and the
Measurement of Risk in
Occupational Pension
Plans in Poland
Marek Szczepański
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Poland belongs to a relatively small group of European countries
that, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, introduced comprehensive,
structural reforms, changing the whole structure of their pension systems. Earlier structural pension reforms had been introduced in Sweden
(1998) and Hungary (1998). In Poland, this took place in 1999, and it
was followed by Bulgaria (2000), Latvia (2001), Croatia (2002), and
Estonia (2002). Recommendations contained in a World Bank report
(1994) have had a significant impact on the shape of structural pension reforms. A representative of the World Bank in Poland was even
directly involved in introducing the pension reform. The basic element
of structural pension reform was the introduction of a capital-financed
segment into social security systems (privately managed individual accounts), which in effect meant the partial privatization of the pension
system (Żukowski 2006).
Despite the similarities between these structural reforms, there were
also significant differences. One of them was the underdevelopment of
the third-pillar, employer-provided supplementary pension systems in
all the reformed pension systems of the postsocialist countries. In this
respect they differ, for example, from the Swedish model. In Sweden,
occupational pension plans play an important role in securing the fi-
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nances of future retirees, covering the majority of employees due to
widespread collective bargaining agreements.
In 2011, Poland made a partial reversal from the original reform
that involved the diversification of risk between the PAYG and the fully
funded segments. Funded second-pillar pension plans are mandatory in
Poland, following the original reform, and cover nearly the entire labor
force. Since June 2011, the mandatory second-pillar pension funds—
the individual account pension funds, managed by private financial
institutions—have been funded with contributions of only 2.3 percent
of wages. Previously, the fully funded segment had received contributions of 7.3 percent. In 2013, the 2.3 percent was raised to 2.8 percent.
The total mandatory pension contributions is 19.55 percent of pension
of wages, which was not changed. The difference between 2.3 or 2.8
percent and 7.3 percent is transferred to the Polish Social Security fund
(ZUS), which provides social security benefits through a notional defined contribution plan.
While the reform of the public pension system in Poland since 1999
has been the subject of many studies in Poland and abroad (see Góra
[2009] and Góra and Palmer [2004]), the operation of supplementary
pension systems, and especially the still underdeveloped voluntary
employer-provided occupational pension system, has not received such
interest, with a few exceptions (see Szczepański [2011]). Only a few
researchers have tried to explain why the potential hidden within the
occupational pension plans has not been utilized in Poland.
With these plans, benefits cannot be taken before retirement age.
Contributions are made on an after-tax basis. The plan must be offered
to more than 50 percent of the employees of the company. The employer is required to contribute to the plan, with a maximum employer
contribution of 7 percent of the employee’s wages. Employees can
voluntarily contribute. Voluntary employer-provided pensions cover
only a small percentage of the labor force. This chapter attempts to
explain why. It focuses on the conceptual and empirical identification
of different types of risk involved in employer-provided individual account (defined contribution) pension plans. It examines the state of risk
awareness on behalf of the employer-sponsors related to the investment
of funds accumulated in occupational pension plans. It compares the
investment performance of Employees’ Pension Funds investment with
the results of other types of investment funds operating on the Polish
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financial market, and uses risk as an explanation for why most of Polish
employers have not adopted pension plans for their employees.

RISK CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL
PENSION PLANS
The economic literature defines risk, for which there are many
types, as an event with the possibility of different results achieved
with a certain probability. Risk is most broadly classified depending
on the outcome of an event (Fabozzi and Modigliani 2009, pp. 23–31;
Monkiewicz and Gąsiorkiewicz 2010, p. 35): pure risk refers to situations in which a random event occurs and results in loss or no loss, and
speculative risk exists when the result of an event is a loss or gain in
relation to initially assumed expected outcome.
Operation of occupational pension plans is subject to risk of
bankruptcy, break of contract, or an event insured within Employees’
Pension-Insurance Fund (such as occupational disease or accident).
Such funds operate in many countries (such as the United States and
Germany), but not in Poland. More speculative risk factors of occupational pension plans include, for example, the risk of political and legal
regulations, investment risk, and financial or business risk.
The classification of risk factors into systematic and specific ones
remains important from the point of view of risk management (Fabozzi
and Drake 2009, pp. 555–574; Monkiewicz and Gąsiorkiewicz 2010,
p. 36). Systematic risk concerns events a company cannot alter because
they result from the macro environment. In the case of an occupational
pension plan, these factors include
•

demographic risk, especially the longevity of employees in a
company pension plan;

•

political risk due to legal regulations and their frequent changes
to which pension institutions have to adapt;

•

interest rate risk affects investment performance;

•

currency risk, which affects the results of foreign investments
and revenues of an enterprise importing or exporting goods;
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•

risk of market valuation of asset class and the associated economic risks;

•

risk of purchasing power due to the uncertain future rate of
inflation;

•

risk related to market liquidity of assets; and

•

risk related to market conditions for reinvestment (market reinvestment risk).

Table 8.1 summarizes the systematic (macroeconomic) and specific
(microeconomic) business risks of occupational pension plans according to their operational and financial-investment activity.
Specific risk concerns a single occupational pension plan and is
thus called micro risk here. The following factors of this risk have been
distinguished:
•

Business risk, including market-demand risk of business activity of an enterprise with a pension system and an entity that
manages it.

•

Management risk, which is conditioned by an improper management of an enterprise and its pension system and capital.
This risk can be limited by public supervision of pension
institutions.

•

Breach of contract risk—the source of its origin is the failure
to meet conditions agreed between the parties to the transaction
and written in the contract.

•

Risk of insurance event regarding participants in the occupational pension plan in the form of life insurance.

•

Liquidity of assets risk results from the investment strategy,
just as other factors.

•

Risk of the investment preferences of participants regards an
approved return rate and its term structure tailored to the age
of the insured.

•

Risk of a financial instrument valuation is a problem with
risky investment efficiency in terms of the ratio of expected
return and its volatility measured with, for example, standard
deviation.
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Table 8.1 Risk Classification of Occupational Pension Plans
Business risk
Operating risk

Systematic risk
(macroeconomic)
Demographic (especially
longevity)
Political

Risk of financial Interest rate
and investment Currency
activities
Market conditions on asset class
Inflation and purchasing power
Market liquidity of assets
Conditions for reinvestment

Specific risk
(microeconomic)
Business
Management
Breach of contract
Insured event
Liquidity of assets
Investment preferences of
beneficiaries
Valuation of financial instruments
(investment efficiency)
Financial (financial status)
Bankruptcy
Reinvestment strategy

SOURCE: Authors’ study based on Fabozzi and Drake (2009, pp. 555–574)

•

Market reinvestment risk due to assets durability and time horizon of portfolio of given fund.

•

Financial risk associated with interest and repayment of borrowed foreign capital and its liabilities, which in the case of
occupational pension plans relates to pension disbursement.

•

Risk of bankruptcy. It may result in a company’s bankruptcy
caused by two previously described types of risk, the risk of
contract breach and the financial risk.

A SURVEY ASSESSING OCCUPATIONAL PENSION PLAN
RISK IN POLAND
The risk of occupational pension plans is a complex concept, which
consists of all the previously mentioned factors. Occupational pension
plans in Poland have operated since 1999, which is a relatively short
time period (the tradition of employer sponsored plans, which is longer
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than that of social security, reaches the era of industrial revolution).
Most of the employers do not have enough experience with investments
of pension funds and do not understand all aspects of risk connected
with pension savings. Lack of experience and knowledge about risk
management of pension plans has a significant impact on whether employers introduce such a plan. Of course, there are also other important
reasons why there are very few occupational pension plans in Poland
(for example, complicated registration procedures, not enough tax incentives for pension plans’ sponsors, and situation on labor market).
The Financial Supervision Commission is obligatorily provided
by occupational pension plans with information on such risk factors,
such as the rate of return. Others, such as currency risk, depend on the
investment strategy of the fund. Yet other factors, such as business risk
or the risk of the investment preferences of participants, can be judged
best by business enterprises providing occupational pension plans to
their employees.
For this reason, an indirect risk assessment has been chosen in the
form of a survey of company representatives providing occupational
pension plans. In February 2011, 1,099 companies were running occupational pension plans. The survey included 100 companies that were
selected using stratified random sampling. There were three strata of
pension plans concerning different legal forms (capital fund, capitalinsurance fund, employees financial program). The strata fraction in the
sample was proportionate to the fraction in the population. The survey
was done by telephone, with an answer rate of about 90 percent.
Responses were measured using the following scales:
•

Binomial scale—yes/no in order to assess the most important
risk factors and recommendations for regulators.

•

Ordinal scale to assess the level of risk (rating scale: low, medium, high, and hard to tell).

•

Ordinal scale to assess communication, risk reduction tools,
and system design (rating scale: definitely yes, probably yes,
it’s hard to say, probably not, definitely not).

•

Nominal scale to assess appropriate strategies for investors
with different preferences toward risk (rating scale: the level of
risk and income corresponding to the majority of participants,
etc.).
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The most important risk factors are listed in Table 8.1. Figure 8.1
shows the proportion of respondents that recognized the individual
risk factors as the most important. This is a multiple-choice question
in which one can indicate any number of factors as the most important:
it can be one, several, or all of the risk factors. Only 17 percent of respondents indicated one most important factor, which indicates high
importance of several factors. Among other respondents, the most numerous group was the one that indicated two most important factors (31
percent), while 17 percent marked three factors. Four and five factors
were selected by 13 percent of respondents; more factors were selected
by the remaining 9 percent of respondents.
Investment risk was recognized as the most important factor for
most (63 percent of respondents). It is understood as an uncertainty
of the rate of return. Sixty-two percent of respondents indicated the
macroeconomic risk of the situation on the financial markets and the
economy as a whole, while 41 percent of respondents indicated a microeconomic risk of an enterprise’s activity.
Fig. 8.1 Respondents’ Percentage Indicating Importance of Chosen
Factors of Risk
Investing
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institution error
Currency rate
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Risk-free
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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A significant proportion of the companies surveyed (as many as 56
percent) pointed to the importance of legal-political risk. About onethird of all companies considered inflation and financial institutions
settling accounts of occupational pension plans as important risk factors. Thus, they referred to external risk management. Only 12 percent
of the surveyed companies confirmed that foreign exchange risk poses
a threat to pension plans, and only 2 percent indicated other important
risk factors and mentioned manipulation and the lack of knowledge.
Because the representatives of companies identified investment
risk as the greatest source of risk, another question regarded the assessment of its level in the financial market and in pension plans. Figure 8.2
shows that the risk of financial markets is rated as average for more than
half of the respondents and high for the remaining 40 percent. Twentyfour percent of respondents indicated a high level of risk in financial
markets, noting that it has been higher after the crisis, while 16 percent
of respondents said that although this risk is high, it has not increased
as a result of the crisis. However, the perceived level of risk of occuFigure 8.2 Assessment of Investment Risk Level of the Occupational
Plans and Whole Capital Market (% of Positive Answers)
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pational pension plans is lower than the risk of the financial market.
Eighty percent of respondents believe that it is of an average level, and
12 percent believe that it is actually low.
The risk of the investment preferences of pension participants covers a mismatch between the level of risk aversion of the pension plan
and its participants due to a single investment pool. In Poland, participants of occupational pension plans can choose one of the investment
funds offered by the financial institution that manages their pension
plan (for example, fund investing in securities or treasury bonds). They
have the right to move their assets from one fund to another.
With the exception of one form of pension plan (the occupational
pension fund, which does not have to be managed by an external financial institution), workers do not have any influence on investment
strategy of a given pension fund. Therefore, we asked representatives of
employers offering pension plans about how they select plan risk preferences (see Figure 8.3). Most respondents chose strategies accepted
by a company’s management in consultation with representatives (34
percent) or strategies that were the most popular among participants.
Both of those choices are irrational because they lack finance and investment education and experience—some people’s preferences even
appeared to resemble gambling, which was observed during the stock
market boom (Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 2003). That means that
plans should take into account the risk of mismatch and irrational prefFigure 8.3 Risk-Return Preferences in Occupational Pension Plans
20

28

The most popular preferences
of members
Chosen by a company
management and employees'
representation
Chosen by a financial
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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erences. The most rational preference strategy is that recommended
by an independent consultant (chosen by 28 percent of enterprises).
The least frequently chosen option was the risk-return strategy recommended by the financial institution managing the occupational pension
plan (18 percent). Once again, results suggest a lack of confidence by
employers in financial institutions as agents of the occupational pension
plan (principal-agent conflict). Risk preferences should be matched to
the diverse age structure of participants and its dynamics in time.
We now evaluate the management of occupational pension plans
regarding the information provided to participants about the risks and
protection against them, as well as the principles of the design of occupational pension plans. Figure 8.4 shows consecutive percentage stakes
regarding the distribution of responses by the representatives of employers to the following six questions:
1) Do you believe that employees/participants of the program
and their employers are aware of all the risks associated with
a given pension plan? Most of the companies and their insured
employees are informed about the risks, according to the representatives of the employers. Only 20 percent believe that
communication from occupational pension plans or their managing institutions remains insufficient.
2) Does the current pension plan structure provide their participants with adequate protection against the risk of investment
and other risks associated with the financial market? Most companies indicate very little protection against such risks.
3) Occupational pension plans in Poland are defined contribution plans. All the risks rest on the participants. Is this the right
solution?
4) Defined benefit pension plans predetermine pension amounts in
proportion to wages. If such occupational pension plans were
available in Poland, would you be willing to offer them to your
employees, being aware of the additional financial obligations?
5) In mixed (hybrid) programs, part of the investment risk is assumed by the employer, and the employee also bears some of
it (i.e., a program with a defined contribution but a guaranteed
minimum benefit). If such occupational pension plans were
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available in Poland, would you be willing to offer them to your
employees, being aware of the additional financial obligations?
6) Do we need to introduce a pension guarantee fund?
Replies for questions 3–6 are shown in Figure 8.4 and indicate that
the majority of companies involved in occupational pension plans in
Poland consider the plans with a defined contribution as imperfect, but
they are not willing to accept plans where the risk is carried onto them.
They do call for the introduction of a pension guarantee fund, which
would take over the obligations of an occupational pension plan if the
company went bankrupt. In another question, respondents indicated
that the guarantee fund should be financed jointly by employers and the
state (38 percent), employers and employees (36 percent), employers
only (13 percent), the Treasury (9 percent), or only by the workers (4
percent).
For questions about changes in regulation of occupational pension
plans, the majority of business representatives surveyed did not support
any changes, including an increase in the Financial Supervision Commission’s control over occupational pension plans, an implementation
Figure 8.4 Respondents’ Opinions on Risk Management and Plan
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of pension plan design choice, or an increase in the role of employers and employees in the investment strategy (see Figure 8.5). Almost
50 percent of business representatives noted the need for regulation by
obliging an agent managing an occupational pension plan to provide
information more frequently.

INVESTMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF OCCUPATIONAL
PENSION PLANS IN POLAND
Efficiency refers to the results-to-effort ratio. Converted into percentage it becomes the rate of return. In the case of an investment
activity, the rate of return itself is not an appropriate indicator of performance because it does not include effort in the form of volatility risk
valuation of a financial instrument or its stock market price. Valuation
risk of a financial instrument is related to operational and financial risk
of an issuer (and, in the case of the stock exchange instruments, of liFigure 8.5 Respondents’ Recommendations for System and Regulation
of Pension Occupational Plans (%)
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quidity risk and the situation on the capital market). Therefore, the rate
of return of a fund is calculated per unit of measure of risk and compared to this ratio value calculated for the Polish financial market. The
risk of actively managed portfolios is measured in one way (the classic
measure is the standard deviation of the rate of return), and in another
for passively managed portfolios, which eliminates the specific risk.
There are also a few methods to conduct a comparison with market
effectiveness.
A number of performance measures of capital investment have
been developed, and we will briefly describe the three most versatile
and widely used ones. Each ratio has its own interpretation, as well as
pros and cons. These ratios assume the calculation of efficiency under conditions of multiple market valuation of financial instruments or
other investment assets, which is usually satisfied in the case of instruments listed on a stock exchange or other regulated markets.1
1) The Sharpe ratio is the average rate of return attributable to one
percentage point of the variation of the rate of return, measured
by standard deviation (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009,
pp. 162, 191]; Ostrowska [2007, p. 252]). An investment that
obtains the highest value of this ratio is considered the most efficient strategy. The construction of this index assumes that the
portfolio rate of return exceeds the risk-free rate of return. Otherwise, the index loses its ability to assess the efficiency of the
portfolio (see Brzęczek [2004, p. 7]; Węgrzyn [2006 p. 11]).
2) The Treynor ratio determines the rate of return for taking the
average market risk (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, pp.
157, 191]; Ostrowska [2007, p. 249]). Portfolio bonus for the
risk taken (excess portfolio return over the risk-free rate) is divided by its market risk measure/coefficient β (see Fabozzi and
Modigliani [2009, p. 195]). The Treynor ratio calculated for
the evaluated portfolio is compared to the surplus market rate
of return. As in the previous case, the higher the ratio, the more
efficient the portfolio. This ratio takes into account only the
market risk of the portfolio, so it is useful for the assessment of
well-diversified portfolios. Like the Sharpe ratio, it can be used
if the bonus for portfolio risk remains positive.
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3) Jensen’s Index, or Jensen’s alpha, refers to the rate of portfolio return relative to the market risk taken, as well as to the
market return rate (see Fabozzi and Modigliani [2009, p. 203];
Ostrowska [2007, p. 249]). The efficiency of investment is
evaluated by comparing the index to zero. Positive values indicate that the fund is performing better than the market, and
negative values indicate a weaker result than the market average. Generally, the higher the ratio, the better the portfolio’s
management.
The Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen ratios cannot be compared because the first two convert surplus return per unit of risk of different
type, and the third compares it to the market rate of return.
Table 8.2 lists two groups of institutions. Occupational pension
plans in the form of Employees’ Pension Funds are separate funds managed by enterprises; financial institutions are only agents for them. The
second group, mutual open pension funds, is only financed by enterprises, but is fully managed by investment fund corporations, including
insurance management companies. Therefore, the evaluation of the efficiency of investments was made separately in both groups. An average
monthly rate of return from employee and mutual pension funds was
calculated along with its standard deviation for the years 2009–2011.
The risk-free monthly rate of return was calculated on the basis of the
interest rates on three-year retail Treasury bonds during the analyzed
period per month (6.35 percent / 12 = 0.53 percent). On this basis, the
Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen ratios were determined. The results are
presented in Table 8.3.
The monthly rate of return for employee pension plans is 0.55 percent and is only slightly higher than the interest rate of Treasury bonds.
The rate of return from the WIG index (the index of broad market of basic shares of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in Poland) was much higher,
and the highest rate of return was achieved by investment fund corporations. However, the analyzed period begins after the slump of 2008,
which significantly improves the performance of risky assets funds.
The second difference is the level of risk for strategies listed in Table
8.3. Total risk measured with standard deviation from the rate of return
is far smaller for occupational pension plans than for mutual pension
funds and WIG index. Similar proportions are maintained between the
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Table 8.2 Authorities Managing the Occupational Pension Plans
Grouped by Form of a Plan
Management entity
Inter-Company Employee Pension Institution PZU SA
Employee Pension Institution NESTLE SA POLAND
Employee Pension Institution “New World” SA
Employee Pension Institution of Polish Telecom
Employee Pension Institution UNILEVER POLAND SA
Investment Fund Institution BPH
BZ WBK AIB SA Investment Fund Corporation
Aviva Investors SA Investment Fund Corporations
Investors SA Investment Fund Corporation
ING SA Investment Fund Corporation
KBC SA Investment Fund Corporation
Legg Mason SA Investment Fund Corporation
Pioneer Pekao SA Investment Fund Corporation
PKO SA Investment Fund Corporation
TREASURY SA Investment Fund Corporation
Allianz Polska SA Investment Fund Corporation
PZU SA Investment Fund Corporation
Spółdzielcze Kasy Oszczędnościowo-Kredytowe S.A.
Investment Fund Corporation
Union Investment SA Investment Fund Corporations
Aviva SA Life Insurance Company
Generali Życie SA Insurance Company
Nordea Poland SA Life Insurance Company
Pierwsze Amerykańsko-Polskie Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń
na Życie i Reasekuracji Amplico Life S.A.
PZU SA Life Insurance Company
Sopot Life Insurance Company Ergo Hestia SA
Allianz SA Life Insurance Company
Warta SA Life Insurance Company
Total

Number of occupational
pension plans managed
1
6
19
3
7
16
2
10
8
62
3
40
7
7
3
4
104
24
1
133
36
3
41
472
1
99
4
1,116

SOURCE: Financial Supervisory Commission reports, accessed November 20, 2012.
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Table 8.3 Investment Efficiency of Employee Pension Plans, 2009–2011
(per month)
Measure
Average rate of return (%)c
Standard deviation of
return (%)
Sharpe Ratio
Coefficient ß
Treynor ratio (%)
Jensen index (%)

Occupational
pension fundsa
0.55
2.15
0.01
0.30
0.07
−0.16

Asset management Capital Market
Benchmark
company associated
WIG index
within IZFiAb
1.35
1.13
2.95
6.96
0.28
0.37
2.25
0.01

0.09
1.00
0.60
0.00

The monthly rate of return and performance indicators were calculated on the basis of
valuation of shares of all five employee pension funds (source: Financial Supervision
Authority and the Warsaw Stock Exchange Bulletins 2012, 2011, 2010).
b
The calculations for investment funds are based on their net assets and managed capital flows (source: Statistics of IZFiA–Chamber of Fund and Asset Management).
c
Average rate of return of the analyzed group of entities, in the case of employee pension funds is not a weighted value of the assets of entities (the results would seek one
pension fund with by far the largest assets), while in the case of investment funds, the
weighted value of assets.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
a

amounts of market risk measured by the beta coefficient. Calculating
the rate of return on its percentage point variation (Sharpe ratio), employee pension funds turn out to be less efficient than the Polish capital
market represented by the WIG index. Mutual pension funds appear to
be much more efficient than the market.
In conclusion, employee pension funds are characterized by low
risk but do not offer a higher rate of return than Treasury bonds. This
suggests that the continued operation of this form makes sense only in
the form of bond funds. An alternative is to transfer these funds to mutual funds, which are much better prepared for global investing.

CONCLUSION
Four general conclusions can be drawn from the replies of employers offering employee pension plans in Poland:
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1) Respondents point to investment performance and economic
conditions as the most important risk factors for occupational
pension plans. They note, however, other important political
and business risk factors for the sponsors of employee pension
funds.
2) The perceived risk of financial markets is high, while the investment risk of employee pension plans regarding their
investments remains on an average level. Replies suggest the
existence of the agent-principal problem (the so-called theory of
agency costs). Only 20 percent of enterprises with occupational
pension plans chose an investment strategy recommended by
financial agents of the program. The respondents note a significant risk of error of an agent.
3) The current design of occupational pension plans is not considered optimal by the majority of respondents. In their opinion,
the only major change needed is the introduction of a guarantee fund. The vast majority of respondents are in favor of a
guarantee fund for the payment of benefits under occupational
pension plans, as is the case in Germany (the fund protects
against the risk of insolvency of the employer-sponsor of the
program). In Germany both defined benefit and defined contribution plan types are found, as well as hybrid types, although
even defined contribution plans are legally required to have
some sort of guarantee to workers, such as return of contributions. Such a solution could be implemented in Poland, where
all occupational pension plans are defined contribution plans.
From the other side, the same guarantees, if they were implemented, could be treated as another obligation for employers
and stop at least some of them from creating pension plans
in their companies. It is always easier to declare some safety
measures than finance them. And such a guarantee fund most
likely would be financed by employers and not the state. There
is also a need to better inform both employers—the sponsors—
and employees (participants of pension plans) on the level of
risk associated with the investment strategies used by financial
institutions managing a program (i.e., selected to support the
investment fund companies, life insurance companies, or em-
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ployee pension funds). This confirms the previously indicated
agent-principal problems.
4) Employee pension funds are characterized by low risk but do
not offer a higher rate of return than Treasury bonds. This suggests that the continued operation of this form makes sense
only in the form of bond funds. An alternative is to transfer
these funds to investment funds, which are more prepared for
global investment and as a sector have been more effective than
the Polish capital market. This shows that there are benefits to
large-scale investments, which are not available for employee
pension funds.
These findings may constitute a starting point for discussion on the
institutional framework to reduce the risk for employee pension plan
participants, but also for the companies that offer such programs to their
employees.

Note
1. The selected set of performance indexes was considered sufficient. For specific
purposes other indexes are used: information, Sortino, M2, etc. (see Węgrzyn
[2006, pp. 53–62]).
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Australian Pensions
An Equitable Solution in a Postcrisis World?
Ross Clare
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia

PROVIDING SUPPORT FOR RETIREMENT IN AUSTRALIA
Australia has a classic three-pillar retirement system:
1) A mandatory contribution, generally to an individual account
defined contribution plan, (made by employers) which is currently 9 percent of wages, increasing to 9.25 percent from July
2013 and then currently legislated to gradually increase to 12
percent by July 2019.
2) Voluntary contributions to pensions, primarily to defined contribution plans, many of which attract tax concessions.
3) A government means-tested pension, called the Age Pension,
commencing at age 65 for males and (currently) 64 for females
but increasing to age 67 over the next decade. Veterans (pensioners who have been in the armed services) receive identical
benefits but receive them five years earlier than civilians. The
Age Pension is not earnings related, It is paid at a higher rate to
low-income persons due to the operation of a means test but is
received by most retirees.
All elements have been subject to changes for fiscal and other
reasons.
The voluntary contributions are from a number of sources:
• Employers (usually large companies and governments) that pay
a higher rate than the law requires for mandatory pensions.

185
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• Members paying pretax contributions from their salary package.
The limit of tax-preferenced contributions has fallen significantly in recent years.
• Members paying after-tax contributions, which are subject to a
contribution cap of $A150,000 a year or $A450,000 in a threeyear period. (In early 2013, U.S.$1.00 = A $0.96. Currency conversion rates vary over time.)
• The government cocontribution, which matches after-tax contributions up to an amount which is currently A$500.00 a year for
low-income earners.
The taxation structure for pensions is relatively complicated, but
in broad terms most members of defined contribution funds are taxed
concessionally (at a reduced and flat rate) in regard to contributions and
investment earnings. Benefits, both lump sum and in income stream
form, are tax free when received at age 60 and over. Thus, with T representing taxed, t representing concessionally taxed, and E representing
exempt from tax, this system can be characterized as ttE. By comparison, the U.S. tax arrangement for most types of pensions is EET.
Despite the regular changes that governments have made for fiscal
or equity reasons, the broad structure is robust and is supported by voters, politicians, and industry.
A critical element of Australia’s retirement system, including the
government mandated private pensions, is that members generally carry
all the investment risks themselves because their pensions generally are
defined contribution plans. While around 10 percent of employees are
in defined benefit plans, most of these are closed to new members. In
the long term, almost all members will have defined contribution pensions. However, there will be at least some defined benefit pensioners
in the system for many decades to come.
Also important for the living standards of retirees are
• a high level of home ownership among retirees, and
• government funding on a means-tested basis of residential aged
care and some other aged care.
The focus of this chapter is on mandatory and voluntary pensions
and the means-tested Age Pension.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUPERANNUATION (PENSIONS)
IN AUSTRALIA
Occupational superannuation in Australia first emerged in midnineteenth century. The term superannuation was in common usage in the
early nineteenth century to refer to the pension received after retirement
from the former employer. In most other countries, the term “private
pensions” tends to be used to describe what is known as superannuation
in Australia. While it is not entirely clear why the term superannuation is used in Australia, it does provide a clear distinction for private
arrangements from the government-provided Age Pension. It also is
more consistent with the availability of lump sum benefits from pensions in Australia, which are taken by a substantial number of retirees.
From its earliest days in Australia (with the establishment of a pension fund for its staff by the Bank of Australasia in October 1842) up to
the 1940s, pensions were only available to a select, mostly male, group
of salaried employees in the public sector and some large companies.
Employer-supported pensions for wage staff tended to be less generous,
with smaller benefits and smaller employer contributions in plans that
were noncompulsory.
By 1974, 32.2 percent of wage and salary earners were covered
by pensions, made up of 40.8 percent of male wage and salary earners
but only 16.5 percent of females. Most pension assets were in defined
benefit plans.
In 1983, the newly elected Labor Government expressed support
for the principles of employee pensions and initiated discussions with
the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) on the possibility of
broadening access to pensions as part of the Government’s Prices and
Incomes Accord with the trade unions.
The process of making employee pensions a more or less universal
entitlement began in September 1985 when, with the support of the
government, the ACTU sought a 3 percent pensions contribution to
be paid by employers to industry funds specified in relevant industrial
labor agreements, which set the minimum wages and conditions for
many but not all employees in Australia.
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This submission was supported by arguments addressed to
• the implications arising from the trend towards an aging of the
population including the workforce;
• the effects of the trend for earlier retirement;
• the existing dependency on Age Pensions and the projected significant increase in the dependency of the aged on the working
population with an explosion of Age Pension costs; and
• the fact that a large percentage of the workforce was not covered by existing pension plans and that wide disparities existed
in coverage according to sex, industry, occupation and income
levels. In particular, it was submitted that women, manual workers and those in the lower income level were less adequately
covered than others.
As new labor agreements were progressively negotiated according
to the guidelines in the national wage case decision, pension coverage
increased rapidly. In the four years after the introduction of employer
contributions linked to labor agreements, employee coverage grew
from around 40 percent to 79 percent. In the private sector, coverage
grew from 32 percent in 1987 to 68 percent in 1991.
This was a major achievement for collectively bargained pensions,
but more was needed in terms of coverage and rate of contributions.
Accordingly, the government at the time announced in the 1991–1992
budget that it would introduce a mandatory pension system through
the implementation of the Superannuation Guarantee. The Superannuation Guarantee pension system is based on using the taxation power
of the Australian government to provide a very powerful incentive for
employers to make pension contributions of the required amount. The
guarantee part of the superannuation guarantee is about a requirement
for contributions being made rather than a guarantee of investment
earnings or eventual retirement income.
The Superannuation Guarantee system—the mandatory pension
system—came into effect on July 1, 1992, starting at a minimum contribution level of 3 percent. A schedule of future increases in the rate of
the Superannuation Guarantee contributions was also set, with a contribution rate for all employees of 9 percent of earnings. Employers
already making contributions that met the requirements of the Superan-

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

Australian Pensions 189

nuation Guarantee were not required to make additional contributions.
Employees now generally are able to choose the fund to which they
want to contribute, but many employees have contributions made to
the fund that their employers have selected as the default fund or that is
specified as a default fund in an industrial award. There are hundreds of
corporate, retail, industry, and public sector funds and nearly 500,000
small Self-Managed Superannuation Funds.
While there has been growth in the number of self-managed superannuation funds, the numbers of the other types of funds have decreased
over time. Self-managed superannuation funds are funds where each
member is also a trustee of the fund. There is a general prohibition on
membership of such funds by someone who is an employee of another
member of the fund. The result is that a small business owner cannot
include his or her employees in the self-managed superannuation fund
of which the business owner is a member. They have less than five
members each, and they differ from the various individually managed
accounts in other countries in that they are a private trust arrangement
that does not require a financial institution to be involved as a provider.
The coverage of the system was very broad, using wide definitions
for employer and employee. However, there were some exceptions,
chiefly those earning less than A$450 per calendar month, part-time
employees aged under 18, and those over 65. As well, the Superannuation Guarantee does not apply to the self-employed (other than to
owner-managers who receive wages and technically are employees of a
company they control). Around 30 percent of the self-employed make
voluntary contributions, partly driven by the tax concessions available for this. Some self-employed persons will have a private pension
because of previous periods when they have been an employee. Some
contractors who might be regarded as self-employed by other legal provisions are also covered in the compulsory system through an extended
definition of employee.
In May 2010, the Australian Treasurer announced that compulsory
employer pension contributions were to increase to 12 percent by July
2019. The increase in mandatory Superannuation Guarantee contributions is a gradual process, starting with 0.25 percent in the 2013–2014
financial year, and then a 0.25 percent increase in 2014–2015. For the
following five years after the 2015 financial year, the Superannuation
Guarantee rate will increase by 0.5 percent until it reaches 12 percent
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by July 2019. A new government was elected in September 2013 and as
part of its election policies indicated an intention to legislate a two year
pause in the phased increase in the rate of contributions.

THE AGE PENSION NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE
The Age Pension—the means-tested pension—is funded out of
general tax revenue by the Australian government. It does not require
either a history of social security contributions by the person or a history of work; rather, receipt is determined by reaching the eligibility
age, being a resident in Australia for 20 years, and qualifying under the
applicable asset and income tests. The maximum benefit provided by
the Age Pension as of September 1, 2012, is A$20,142 for a single person and A$30,368 for a couple. The Age Pension is taxable, but due to
a variety of rebates, those receiving the maximum benefit generally do
not pay any income tax. People with higher income and assets in retirement receive a reduced Age Pension. Many people receive a partial Age
Pension, but persons at the top of the income distribution do not receive
any benefit from the Age Pension.
Table 9.1 shows budget standards for a modest and comfortable
lifestyle as indicated by the Association of Superannuation Funds of
Australia (ASFA) retirement standard. These budget standards are
based on a typical retiree at age 65 and are widely used in Australia as
an indicator of adequacy of retirement income. They are updated regularly on the ASFA Web site (www.superannuation.asn.au). ASFA is a
private-sector, not-for-profit organization whose members are pension
funds and service providers to pension funds.
While these values do not reflect the situation of every retiree, they
allow us to gauge the average needs for different lifestyle expectations
given cost of living in Australia as of December 2012. These are compared with the maximum annual benefit of the Age Pension as of September 2012.
It is clear that the Age Pension is close to meeting the modest lifestyle needs of retirees. As the benefit is linked to national average wages
and the modest lifestyle is linked to prices, the Age Pension will gradually close in on the modest lifestyle for at least a period of some years.
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Table 9.1 The Age Pension Compared to the ASFA Retirement Standards
Modest
Modest
Comfortable Comfortable
lifestyle
lifestyle
lifestyle
lifestyle
single
couple
single
couple
Yearly total ($)
Age Pension ($)
Difference from
Age Pension ($)

22,585
20,142
2,443

32,555
30,368
2,187

41,186
20,142
21,044

56,339
30,368
25,971

NOTE: All values in Australian dollars.
SOURCE: ASFA (2013).

The ASFA retirement standard is adjusted for changes in prices every
quarter, but every four or five years it is adjusted more substantively for
changes in the pattern of expenditure by retirees and for increases in the
general living standard of the community. For a comfortable lifestyle,
retirees need to build their own pension savings, as the Age Pension by
itself will be inadequate.

THE FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE AGE PENSION
Australia is unusual in that the future financial impact of programs
such as the Age Pension is required to be assessed on a regular basis in
what is known as the Intergenerational Report (IGR) which is prepared
by the Australian Treasury. The IGR came to life as a key requirement
of the 1998 Charter of Budget Honesty Act. The charter requires an
intergenerational report to assess the long-term sustainability of policies over the 40 years following the release of the report, including the
impacts of demographic change. The IGR has played a major role in
raising community awareness of long-term fiscal challenges and, in so
doing, placed greater focus on government decisions with long-term
consequences.
For instance, in the fiscal year 2009–2010 budget, the government
announced increases to Age Pension benefits, particularly for single
persons, following an inquiry process that indicated the desirability
of increasing such payments. These increases were introduced along
with a suite of budget-saving measures designed to offset their long-
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term costs. The budget-saving measures included a gradual rise in the
qualifying age for the Age Pension (to be phased in from 2017 to 2023),
means testing of the private health insurance rebate, as well as reforms
to family payments and pensions. The package of changes was projected to be budget neutral by 2021–2022 and through to 2049–2050 as
a result of the effect of the expenditure saving measures offsetting the
increase in the costs of he Age Pension.
Australia was relatively unusual in the international community in
that it weathered the global financial crisis without significant impacts
on economic activity, unemployment, or fiscal outcomes. While the
current budgetary situation is not without challenges, with the then government recently formally announcing that a target of a budget surplus
in 2012–2013 would not be met, the budgetary situation has been sufficiently robust to support both the increase in the Age Pension benefits
and the increased tax expenditures associated with higher compulsory
contributions to pensions. In regard to the latter, there was an explicit
linking of the introduction of a new resources rent tax associated with
certain mining activities with the legislation increasing the Superannuation Guarantee contribution rate. The legislation increasing the Superannuation Guarantee contribution reduced income tax receipts due to
the reduction in net wages, which is only partially offset by the tax
on contributions, while the resources rent tax provided an offsetting
increase in taxes. As noted earlier, the government elected in September
2013 proposes a two-year pause to the increase in the rate of compulsory contributions.
However, over a longer time period, aging of the population will
still contribute to pressure on government spending and fiscal sustainability. The Intergenerational Report (IGR) prepared by the Australian
Treasury projects total spending to increase to 27.1 percent of GDP in
2049–2050, around 4.75 percentage points higher than its projected low
point in 2015–2016. In today’s terms, that is the equivalent of adding
around $A60 billion a year to government spending.
Around two-thirds of the projected increase in spending over the
next 40 years is related to health, reflecting pressures from aging,
increased community expectations, and the funding of new technologies. Growth in spending on age-related pensions and aged care is also
significant, both as a proportion of GDP and in real spending per person. Currently, about a quarter of Australian government spending is

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

Australian Pensions 193

on health, age-related pensions, and aged care. The Intergenerational
Report projects that Australian government spending on these functions
will increase significantly over the next 40 years, pushing their share of
spending to almost one-half.
As a proportion of GDP, spending on health is projected to rise from
4.0 percent to 7.1 percent. Age-related pensions and aged care are projected to rise from 2.7 percent and 0.8 percent of GDP to 3.9 percent
and 1.8 percent, respectively, in 2049–2050. Figure 9.1 provides further
details by each major expenditure category.
Excluding public debt interest, the Intergenerational Report projects a fiscal gap of 2.75 percent of GDP (or around $A30 billion in
today’s dollars) by 2049–2050.
Much of the increase in government expenditure on Age Pensions is
due to population aging. Unlike some countries, such as Japan, the Australian population will continue to grow, as annual rates of population
Figure 9.1 Projected Expenditure by Major Category
8
7

2009–2010
2049–2050

Percent of GDP

6
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SOURCE: Australian Treasury (2010).
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growth are projected to slow gradually, from 2.1 percent in 2008–2009
to 0.9 percent in 2049–2050. Australia’s population is projected to grow
from around 22 million people to 35.9 million people in 2050.
As well, average Australian mortality rates have fallen significantly,
with life expectancies rising for both men and women. These changes
have added to population growth and the proportion of older people in
the Australian population. As a result, the number of Australians aged
65 and over is projected to grow from around 3 million in 2010 to 8.1
million by 2050, from 2.1 percent of the population to 5.1 percent. As a
result, the number of people of eligible age for the Age Pension is projected to increase by around 150 percent by 2049–2050.
There are other factors that affect the projections of age-related pension spending:
• A decline in the proportion of pensioners receiving a full Age
Pension, because of the increased value of individuals’ mandatory pension and other private assets and income.
• The proportion of people with a partial Age Pension is projected
to increase significantly while the proportion of the eligible age
group not receiving any Age Pension is projected to rise slightly.
• As noted earlier, the increase in the level of the Age Pension
benefits has been largely offset by other policy measures, such
as raising the eligibility age.
When the next Intergenerational Report is prepared in or before
2015, it can be expected to take into account the phased increase in
compulsory pension contributions from 9 percent to 12 percent. This
will further moderate the increase in age-related pension spending, particularly toward the end of the projection period.
Of course, there are consequences flowing from compulsory pension contributions for the public sector’s contribution to private (and
therefore national) saving as a result of the compulsory pension system.
This public sector contribution arises from the tax-preferred status of
compulsory pension contributions and the assumption by the Australian Treasury that other expenditures are cut back to allow for this tax
expenditure. The public sector’s contribution is estimated to be about
0.4 percent of GDP currently, rising gradually to nearly 0.7 percent of
GDP by the end of the decade, and then staying around that level to the
middle of the century.
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The estimated net fiscal cost to the government budget is smaller
than the public sector’s contribution to private saving, because budget savings arising from the compulsory pension system reduce the
net fiscal cost of compulsory pensions. This is because growth in net
wages is less than it would otherwise be because of the increase in pension contributions, leading to increases in expenditure on Age Pension
and other government payments indexed to movements in average net
wages being less than they would otherwise be.
Equity clearly is a key issue in the debate about pension and retirement income reform. There is strong government and community concern that the assistance provided to retirement income should be spread
fairly according to need. There also is a strong tradition in Australia of
support for what we colloquially call a “fair go.” In the context of pensions, this means that no groups should face barriers to participation in
the retirement income system.
One statistic that gained some currency in public debate in Australia was that 5 percent of individuals account for 37 percent of taxpreferenced pension contributions. However, that is no longer the case
and is now something of an urban myth—that figure, calculated by the
Treasury, related to 2005–2006, when pension policy settings were significantly different than they are now. For instance, in 2005–2006, a
maximum deductible contribution limit of $A100,587 applied for each
employee aged 50 and over and for the self-employed aged 50 and over.
For those aged 35–49 the figure was $A40,560 a year.
By fiscal year 2009–2010, a new set of tax-preferenced contribution caps was in force (after a number of variants along the way).
These caps permitted annual contributions of no more than $A25,000
a year for those under age 50 and $A50,000 a year for those aged 50
and over. However, the $A50,000 a year cap was a transitional one and
expired on June 30, 2012. The government has announced its intention
to replace these caps with a general cap of $A25,000 a year except for
those aged 50 and over with less than $A500,000 in pension savings,
where a $A50,000 a year cap would apply. However, the introduction
of this higher cap for those aged 50 and over has been delayed due to
budgetary reasons.
Tax-preferenced contributions include employer contributions
(including contributions made under a salary sacrifice arrangement
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where wages are traded for extra contributions), and personal contributions claimed as a tax deduction by a self-employed person.
Tax Assistance for Pensions after the New Tax-Preferenced
Contribution Caps
Clear empirical evidence indicates that the contribution caps have
reduced the tax-preferenced pension contributions made by upperincome earners. This is reflected in Table 9.2, which sets out estimates of
the proportion of tax-preferenced pension contributions made on behalf
of wage earners in the various marginal income tax bands applying
in 2009–2010. These estimates are based on data especially extracted
for ASFA from a large scale survey of Australian households, namely
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
Survey.
These estimates of employer contributions are consistent in broad
terms and produce overall results consistent with aggregate pension
contributions as reported by the Australian Prudential Regulatory
Authority (APRA), which is one of the government regulators of the
financial services industry (including pensions), and Australian Taxation Office statistical publications.
As is clear from the table, pension contributions are not spread
entirely evenly across all taxpayers or income ranges. This is because
one of the basic characteristics of pensions is that contributions are
linked to employment, particularly full-time employment. Those taxpayers on very low incomes are not receiving pension contributions
made by their employers or are receiving the benefit of only relatively
small contribution amounts.
Individuals on a low income in any given year will not necessarily be on a low taxable income for all of their lives. Many individuals who have low taxable incomes from employment are undertaking
part-time employment when they are studying or when they also have
family responsibilities that prevent them from undertaking full-time
work. However, over their lifetime they will have many years, usually
decades, of full-time work. As well, wages often increase in real terms
over the course of a career. The distribution of taxable incomes and tax
concessions for pension contributions in any given year is not a good
indicator of assistance delivered over a lifetime.
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Table 9.2 Employer Contributions by Income Range, 2009–2010
Value of
Marginal
employer
% of
Taxable income income tax
% of wage contributionsa employer
range ($A)
rate (%)
earners
$A million contributionsa
0–6,000
0
5.4
54
0.1
6,001–37,000
15
31.5
4,255
7.9
37,001–80,000
30
42.7
23,120
43.0
80,001–180,000
38
18.0
20,280
37.7
180,001+
47
2.4
6,050
11.3
Based on data extracted for ASFA from Wave 10 of the HILDA survey.
SOURCE: Clare (2012a).
a

However, even in regard to a single year, as indicated by Table 9.2,
around 90 percent of employer contributions relate to individuals on
less than the top marginal tax rate, with over 50 percent of contributions
relating to individuals on a marginal income tax rate of 30 percent or
less.
The top 5 percent of employees (in terms of income) accounted for
less than 20 percent of the total pension contributions in 2009–2010.
While upper-income earners typically have more pension contributions than lower-income earners, the amount related to upper income
earners is now much lower than it was previously. While a higher figure
may have applied back in 2005–2006, the impact of the contribution
caps has been considerable. The various changes that have been made
to the pension tax rules also may have affected confidence in contributing to pensions also leading to lower discretionary contributions.
Table 9.3 provides estimates of the amount of tax concession by
personal income tax rate. It also factors in the receipt of the cocontribution (government matching contribution), which is only available to
low-income earners making personal contributions.
Table 9.3 indicates that in recent times less than 15 percent of the
government assistance for pension contributions flows to those on the
top marginal rate. This compares to the around 30 percent of aggregate
personal income tax collections that is paid by that group of taxpayers. While upper-income earners do receive assistance for their pension
contributions, the overall personal tax system imposes a substantially
higher tax burden on upper-income earners compared to those earning
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Value of tax
concession and
cocontribution
$A, millions
192
1,068
4,662
4,968
1,905
12,795

198

% of total tax
concession and
cocontributionb
1.5
8.3
36.4
38.8
14.9
100.0

Takes into account the Medicare levy, the phasing out of the Low Income Tax Offset, and the phasing in of the Medicare liability.
Column does not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012a).

a

b
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Table 9.3 Employee Tax Concessions by Income Range, 2009–2010
% of total tax
Value of tax
concession
Taxable income
Marginal income
concessiona
for employer
range ($A)
tax rate (%)
$A, millions
contributions
0–6,000
0
−8
−0.1
6,001–37,000
15
68
0.6
37,001–80,000
30
4,462
39.2
80,001–180,000
38
4,968
43.6
180,001+
47
1,906
16.7
All employees
11,396
100.0
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lower incomes. It could be argued that the general tax and transfer system in Australia should and does do most of the “heavy lifting” in terms
of improving vertical equity.
Table 9.3 also indicates that the bulk of government assistance for
pensions flows to those on either the 30 percent or 38 percent tax rates.
Such taxpayers make up a very large part of the full-time workforce
in Australia. Providing the bulk of tax assistance to this group makes
sense from a public policy point of view. In contrast to very low-income
earners and those who never have significant wage incomes during their
lives, they have the potential to finance through savings significant
income in retirement.
For those on the top marginal tax rate, achievement of significant
savings in the form of pension savings has the potential to make them
totally self-funded in retirement, with no reliance on the governmentprovided Age Pension.
The Australian government has also legislated to provide a new
matching contribution of up to $A500 annually for eligible low-income
earners from the 2012–2013 income year. The payment will be 15 percent of the eligible tax-preferenced contributions (including employer
contributions) made by or for individuals with adjusted taxable incomes
of up to $A37,000. Individuals will also need to meet a test where at
least 10 percent of their incomes must be from employment or business
sources and they are a resident of Australia or New Zealand. Individuals
also can benefit from the cocontribution in regard to personal contributions that are not tax-preferenced.
By its very nature, new matching contributions will only provide
assistance to low-income earners on either the 0 or 15 percent tax rate.
However, the government elected in September 2013 has indicated
its intention to abolish this government contribution for low income
earners.
As well, the phased increase in the rate of compulsory contributions
to 12 percent will have its greatest impact on low- and middle-income
earners, given that those earning higher incomes commonly already
receive the benefit of contributions in excess of 9 percent of wages
and/or will adjust voluntary salary sacrifice contributions if there is an
increase in compulsory contributions.
Table 9.4 compares the distribution of government tax relief and
contribution assistance for pensions in 2009–2010 for employees on
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Marginal income
tax rate (%)
0
15
30
38
47

Takes into account the Medicare levy, the phasing out of the Low Income Tax Offset, and the phasing in of the Medicare liability. Based
on 2009–2010 tax rates.
b
Column does not sum to 100 because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
a
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Taxable income
range ($A)
0—6,000
6,001–37,000
37,001–80,000
80,001–180,000
180,001+
All employees

Value of proposed
Current value of
total tax concession % of proposed
tax concession and % of current total
and government total tax concession
cocontributiona tax concession and
contributionsa
and government
($A, millions)
cocontributionb
($A, millions)
contributions
192
1.5
210
1.4
1,068
8.3
1,640
11.0
4,662
36.4
5,732
38.3
4,968
38.8
5,465
36.6
1,905
14.9
1,905
12.7
12,795
100.0
14,952
100.0
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the basis of current policy settings and what it would have been if a 12
percent mandatory contribution rate, the low income matching contribution payment and the current rate of cocontribution had all applied in
that year. While it will be some years before all the measures are fully in
place this approach illustrates what the eventual impact on the distribution of government assistance by income level will be.
The combined effect of the government proposed measures would
have, if they had applied in 2009–2010, increased the total assistance
for retirement saving for employees earning less than $A80,000 a year
from $A5,920 million to around $A7,580 million. Expressed as a percentage of total government assistance, the share of those earning less
than $A80,000 a year would have increased from 46.2 percent to 50.2
percent. Clearly, the measures strongly favor those on lower incomes.

GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR BOTH MANDATORY
PENSIONS AND THE AGE PENSION
There is also a direct link between the level of retirement savings
and the subsequent reduction in the government Age Pension. In considering the equity of government assistance for retirement income, it
also is necessary to take into account the amount of the Age Pension
that will eventually be provided on average to persons on various levels
of earnings and pension contributions during their working life.
This was done in research conducted in 2009 by George Rothman
of the Australian Treasury Retirement & Intergenerational Modelling
& Analysis Unit. This research places emphasis on a “whole of life”
or life cycle perspective where Age Pension benefits in the retirement
phase are included. The cost to government of its retirement income
policies as a whole is modelled using the Treasury’s comprehensive
RIMGROUP model.
The base case for this analysis is the retirement income framework
following the 2009 government budget. Significant changes in that budget included
• a significant increase in Age Pension payments of $A32.49 a
week for single pensioners and $A10.14 a week combined for
couple pensioners, together with changes to the income test,
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whereby the pension taper rate for new pensioners, which reduces the Age Pension for persons receiving higher levels of income, is 50 percent rather than 40 percent;
• a gradual increase in the age for eligibility for an Age Pension
beginning in 2017 so that this age reaches 67 in 2023; and
• a reduction in the annual cap on tax-preferenced pension contributions from $A50,000 to $A25,000 for those younger than 50
and the transitional cap for those in their 50s from $A100,000 to
$A50,000. This limit applies to the combined compulsory and
salary sacrifice contributions. Individuals generally will not exceed this limit as the result of compulsory contributions alone
given there is a cap on compulsory contributions per job that is
below the tax-preferenced cap.
The analysis in the Treasury paper indicates that these measures
have added considerably to the equity of Australia’s retirement income
system, both by gender and income. The tax-preferenced contribution
caps budget measure also was found to add even more vertical equity
to the system with the saving to government revenue impacting mostly
on the top two deciles of the income distribution for both men and
women.
Table 9.5 Net Present Value of Cost to Government of Retirement
Income System by Income Level ($A, millions)
Decile
NPV1-women
NPV1-men
NPV1-both
1
1,750
1,600
3,350
2
1,700
1,600
3,350
3
1,650
1,600
3,300
4
1,650
1,600
3,300
5
1,650
1,600
3,200
6
1,650
1,750
3,400
7
1,900
1,800
3,700
8
1,850
1,950
3,800
9
1,850
2,050
3,950
10
1,800
2,450
4,250
All
17,500
18,050
35,550
NOTE: Columns do not precisely add up to the totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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The research also indicates that the total amount of government
support does not vary much across the income deciles or by gender.
Table 9.5 sets out the Treasury forecasts of government assistance for
those born in 1960 and retiring in 2027. The proportion of assistance
provided in the form of tax expenditures on pensions increases with
higher income with a more or less equivalent decrease in the value of
Age Pension expenditures.
Overall government support for the Age Pension was found to
account for 82 percent of the government assistance to women for their
retirement and 68 percent of the assistance provided to men.
One group that receives above average assistance is men in the top
income decile. For the other income deciles, the withdrawal of the Age
Pension largely matches the assistance given to higher pension contributions. However, this became irrelevant for those who are not entitled
to even a partial Age Pension. Limiting the tax-preferenced contribution cap to $A25,000 a year for those aged 50 and over with more than
$A500,000 in pension is a policy response to this distributional finding.

THE REAL EQUITY CHALLENGE
The real issue in regard to equity is that too many Australians have
too little in retirement savings rather than too much. While much public
debate has focused on the top 1 percent or 5 percent of income earners,
there has been little or no debate on how to advance outcomes for the
other 99 percent or 95 percent.
If excessive government assistance is a problem, it is restricted to a
very small number of individuals. This is particularly the case since the
introduction of progressively tighter caps on both tax-preferenced and
non-tax-preferenced contributions. When properly measured, the total
government assistance for retirement income in the form of both the
Age Pension and tax concessions for pensions is broadly even across
the entire income distribution.
After the recent contribution cap and rebate changes to private pensions, 87.3 percent of the tax concessions for pensions will flow to individuals on less than the top marginal tax rate, up from the around 85
percent, which applied before the changes. The share of total conces-
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sions flowing to individuals on the top marginal tax rate was around
50 percent in 2007–2008, with the reduction in the share since then
due to the introduction of contribution caps and higher rates of tax on
the contributions of certain upper-income earners, together with the top
marginal rate applying to a smaller proportion of taxpayers.

ASSISTING THOSE WHO REALLY NEED ASSISTANCE
Evidence from surveys of pension account balances held by individuals indicates that compulsory pensions have been very effective in
lifting coverage rates and average pension account balances (Table 9.6).
The increase in the mandatory Superannuation Guarantee contribution rate to 12 percent will further improve pension balances at retirement, but it will be 40 or 50 years before the system is fully mature,
meaning that all workers will be under that regime for their full careers.
However, voluntary contributions have remained flat in recent years
in response to both tax changes and investment return developments. In
particular, contribution caps and other changes to pensions are limiting the amount of voluntary salary sacrifice contributions, including by
individuals seeking to catch up on contributions late in their careers.
Salary sacrifice contributions are made when an individual trades part
of his salary for additional employer contributions.
Longitudinal data indicate that a significant proportion of the population have higher incomes (with associated capacity to make higher
contributions) for a relatively limited portion of their working careers.
A higher contribution cap generally, or at least for those aged 50 and
over, would assist those who need to catch up and have a capacity to
do so.
While the pension cocontribution (matching contribution) made by
the government has been effective in lifting personal contributions of
low-income individuals, the design parameters of the cocontribution
and recent cutbacks to them have made the cocontribution less effective
than it could be. There is a case for both a higher maximum cocontribution and a lower matching rate in order to encourage greater additional
contributions.
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Table 9.6 Pension Coverage and Pension Holdings of Men And Women Who Were Not Yet Retired, by Annual
Salary Income, 2006 and 2010
2006
2010
Pension balance of
Pension balance of
those with super ($)
those with super ($)
Annual wage and
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
salary income ($) % with pension
% with pension
Men
< 28,000
75.1
37,312
5,700
79.9
43,553
5,000
28,000 – < 58,000
96.7
70,698
30,000
96.8
62,853
25,000
58,000 – < 80,000
98.1
134,981
65,000
98.7
108,092
50,000
80,000+
97.8
207,801
110,000
98.6
212,025
110,000
Total
91.4
99,506
35,000
93.9
109,609
40,000
Women
< 28,000
80.7
32,807
9,000
80.9
37,622
8,500
28,000 – < 58,000
96.8
56,253
25,000
96.6
52,885
29,000
58,000 – < 80,000
98.6
102,844
55,000
98.2
98,071
50,000
80,000+
97.7
158,652
88,000
98.9
142,855
75,000
Total
89.4
55,433
21,000
90.9
63,412
26,000
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The $A450 a Month Threshold for the Superannuation Guarantee
Mandatory Contributions
While there may have been a rationale for the income threshold
below which contributions are not required when the mandatory Superannuation Guarantee pension system was first introduced, it would make
sense to remove it now given that nearly all employees have a pension
account, and processes for making contributions are now more efficient. Around 250,000 individuals, the majority of whom are women,
would benefit from removal of the threshold through higher eventual
retirement savings. The cost to both employers and to the Australian
budget from removing the threshold would be very modest.
The Self-Employed
Nearly 10 percent of the labor force are self-employed. While tax
concessions have led to some self-employed persons saving for retirement through pensions, average balances and coverage have remained
relatively low. Around 29 percent of the self-employed have no pension
savings (this is more common for males than females). There is a strong
case to extend compulsory pensions to include the self-employed.
Individuals on Paid Parental Leave
Paid parental leave is considered by the government to be equivalent to wages in terms of income tax and other treatment of individuals.
Consistent with this, it would be appropriate for the Superannuation
Guarantee mandatory pension contributions to apply to such payments,
which it does not currently do.
One of the reasons that the average pension balance of women is
lower than that of men is time out of the paid workforce for parental
reasons. Paying Superannuation Guarantee mandatory contributions on
parental leave payments would help reduce this difference in entitlements. The effects of compound interest also would be very favorable
in regard to pension contributions made on behalf of women who take
parental leave, mostly in their 20s and 30s. The cost to the Australian
government budget would be just over $A20 million a year.
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Indigenous Australians
Indigenous Australians have lower coverage and lower balances on
average than the general population, again largely related to differences
in paid labor force experience. Pension coverage for indigenous Australians is about 70 percent for men and 60 percent for women, compared
to rates of 85 percent for men and 80 percent for women for the population more generally. Average (mean) balances are also lower than for
the equivalent Australian population as a whole (Table 9.7).
Increases in the pension coverage and average pension balances of
indigenous Australians will clearly be associated with improvements in
involvement in paid work and in wages. Labor market measures rather
than pension policies drive labor market outcomes.
However, current pension arrangements and administrative requirements do not always mesh well with the circumstances and needs of
indigenous Australians, particularly those in remote areas who may
have difficulty communicating with their pension fund administrators
and in claiming benefits or identifying lost accounts.
There is scope for the pension industry and the regulators to work
toward a regulatory framework and administrative arrangements that
can better cope with the special needs of indigenous Australians. Such
arrangements also would be likely to benefit many other Australians.
Table 9.7 Pension Coverage And Pension Holdings of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Men and Women Who Were Not Yet
Retired, 2006 and 2010
2006
2010
Pension balance of
Pension balance of
% with those with super ($A)
% with those with super ($A)
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
pension
pension
Men
68.3
49,589
9,000
70.7
55,743
14,000
Women
52.1
42,109
10,000
60.6
39,909
15,000
Persons
59.5
46,069
10,000
65.3
47,863
15,000
NOTE: Population weighted results. Not enough cases to break down by age.
SOURCE: Clare (2012b).
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Recently Divorced Men and Women
Survey data indicate that the distribution of pensions is now much
more even for those who have recently divorced compared to when
amendments were made in 2002 to the Family Law Act to allow the
splitting of pension account balances. The extent of disparities in particular decreased between 2006 and 2010. While a number of factors
would have contributed to this, the growing maturity of the compulsory
pension system leading to higher average account balances for both
men and women would have played a role, along with more women
having pensions in their own right. The figures also are consistent with
the parties in a marriage making more use of the splitting arrangements.
Exposure to Investment Risk
Currently in Australia, around 90 percent of individuals in the preretirement phase who have a pension, and around 75 percent of those
recently retired with a pension, are exposed to investment risk. The proportion is higher in the preretirement phase given that the newer and
younger fund members have been predominantly enrolled in defined
contribution arrangements.
As shown in Table 9.8, investment returns in Australia, as in many
other countries, have not been favorable in recent years. The global
financial crisis had a significant impact, particularly given the 65–70
percent exposure on average of most funds to equities.
Investment returns in 2012–2013 were relatively high, with preliminary estimates indicating an average rate of return for default members
of funds of over 15 percent.
The rationale for relatively high levels of exposure to equities in
defined contribution plans (accumulation funds) is that this will generally lead to higher retirement benefits for members. Most individuals
will be a member of a pension fund for a period of 40 years or more.
Subject of course to individual decisions regarding exposure to investment risk and volatility, there is an argument that such exposure should
be sustained throughout a member’s career.
However, market volatility means that at least some members will
wish to shift assets into cash over the five years before retirement. This
will allow them to cater for any required lump sum benefit and their
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Table 9.8 Average Annual Fund Investment Returns to June 30, 2012
Year
Real returns (%)
1
0.3
5
−0.7
10
5.2
15
5.5
20
7.0
25
7.2
30
10.0
35
10.8
40
9.9
50
9.9
SOURCE: Annual survey published by ASFA.

initial pension drawdowns. Life cycle investment options can provide
such an investment strategy. However, while they are suitable for some
individuals, they may not be suitable for others.
Historical analysis also indicates that a typical life cycle fund would
have delivered poorer outcomes for most members over most periods in
Australia, such as 1900–1970, 1970–1999, and 1900–1999. Now is also
not a good time to switch allocations from equities to bonds as returns
to bonds are at historical lows and recent returns from equities, especially Australian equities, have been relatively strong, with double-digit
returns in calendar 2012, particularly the second half of 2012.
While consumer satisfaction with pensions tends to follow with a
lag in developments in investment returns, there has been little pressure
in Australia for the government to cover any investment losses faced
by fund members due to general developments in investment markets.
The only policy response to the global financial crisis was to reduce
the minimum drawdown factor for individuals who have an individual account–based (defined contribution) income stream in retirement.
There are compensation arrangements that can be called upon in the
case of members suffering loss due to fraud or theft in a regulated fund,
but fortunately fraud or theft are relatively rare in the regulated pension
funds. Compensation in these cases is effectively funded by members
of other regulated pension funds through special levies struck by the
government in such cases.
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INCOME STREAMS IN RETIREMENT
In an ideal world, the objective of pensions should be focused on the
provision of income during the whole of retirement. However, there are
a number of reasons why it is difficult to structure the Australian system
around regular reliable pension payments. These include the following:
• When pension contributions began to be included in labor agreements in 1986 as deferred pay (in lieu of a possible productivity
wage rise), it was promoted to members as an addition to the Age
Pension. The Superannuation Guarantee pension has increased
the value of contributions, but the message has not changed—
members consider that the private pension account balance is
their own money and they expect flexibility of payments.
• The government allows all members above age 60 to retire and
draw a tax-free lump sum or pension. Most older Australians
also are subject to low or nil rates of personal income tax given
low average incomes and various tax rebates. As a result, there
is only a limited incentive for individuals to leave money in the
system during retirement.
• There are no longer maximum withdrawal factors on accountbased defined contribution pensions, so nobody is forced to draw
their benefits over time.
• Members can buy lifetime annuities from the private sector
(albeit from a small number of suppliers), but current sales are
well under 100 a year in total. Consumer research indicates that
most Australians are unrealistic about the pricing of an indexed
lifetime annuity and expect much more than fair value. Without compulsion or incentives, most members will not buy these
products.
• Many members retire with small benefits, and they appear comfortable with leaving the money in an interest-bearing bank account rather than in a pension. This may be influenced by their
perception of safety in the bank or by a short time horizon where
they do not value higher (but uncertain) returns. They may also
value instant access to their funds.
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• Many people today retire with some debt (including mortgages)
or the need to carry out home repairs or consumer durable purchases, and it is a rational decision to take a pension lump sum to
clear all such expenses or debts before retiring.
• Around a third of total pension savings and around half of postretirement pension balances are held in Self-Managed Superannuation Funds, which have less than five members and where
each member is also a trustee of the fund. Such fund members
generally value control highly and are wary of purchasing an income stream from a third party such as a life insurance company
or managed fund.
The above situation has made the provision of income streams,
particularly those that protect members from their longevity risk, difficult. In addition, transitional arrangements, especially if compulsion is
involved, can be problematic due to the plans made by those approaching retirement.
That said, the evidence available indicates that many Australians do
take an income stream from their pension in retirement, albeit one that
is account based, where the individual can access the entire account
balance should they choose to do so. This is particularly the case when
larger amounts are involved.
As shown in Table 9.9, around 70 percent of males aged 60–64 who
have recently retired have a pension with an average balance of around
$A380,000. This is a drop in coverage of around 20 percentage points
compared to those who are in the same age group who have not retired.
The average balance is also higher than for those not retired, which
suggests that those with lower balances are more likely to cash out and
invest (or spend) elsewhere.
For women, the drop in coverage is greater, at around 30 percentage
points. Again, the average balances for those retaining retirement savings in a pension, at around $A255,000, is higher than for those in the
same age group who have not retired.
These figures strongly suggest that the great bulk of recent retirees
keep their retirement savings primarily in a pension account and draw
down an income stream. Those retirees who take their retirement savings out of the pension system are a minority. However, even for this
minority there is no evidence that the pension savings are used pri-
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Table 9.9 Pension Coverage and Pension Holdings of Men and Women
Who Were Recently Retired, 2006 and 2010
2006
2010
Pension balance of
Pension balance of
Age
% with those with super ($A)
% with those with super ($A)
Mean
Median
Mean
Median
group
pension
pension
Men
<60
70.2
283,430 200,000
89.8
528,105 386,000
60–64
76.7
573,228 500,000
68.8
381,703 250,000
65–69
48.1
421,618 200,000
65.7
299,161 164,000
70+
41.6
283,938a 162,000a
32.3
273,218a 90,000a
Total
60.7
419,841 280,000
60.8
367,336 245,000
Women
<60
62.1
322,945 100,000
63.7
135,501
53,000
60–64
53.1
273,135 195,000
58.6
255,485 120,000
65–69
46.4
129,491
90,000
41.7
205,855
70,000
70+
41.6a
48,358a 15,000a
7.1a
184,000a 184,000a
Total
54.5
254,647 100,000
53.0
191,474 102,000
Estimate not reliable.
NOTE: Population weighted results. “Recently retired” if “currently retired and observed
not retired (i.e., employed) at some stage in the last three years.”
SOURCE: HILDA data.
a

marily for immediate consumption purposes, such as an overseas trip.
While some commentators claim that that frequently happens, such
assertions are more in the line of urban myths than being supported
by any objective research. However, in the past it is likely that the rate
of taking lump sums was higher, in part due to account balances of
those in defined contribution pension schemes being relatively low. For
lower account balances, the tax benefits of remaining within the private
pension system are not large. Elderly Australians, particularly elderly
women, commonly have low or no private pension account balance
because they either never had pension contributions in the first place or
they have exhausted their pension account balances.
However, clearly there is scope for more retirement benefits to be
taken in income stream form.
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Designing better postretirement arrangements
The primary purpose of pensions is to provide financial security in
retirement. This purpose is not currently being achieved as much as it
could be in Australia, as there are many potential leakages that are at
a cost to the system’s integrity and the taxation concessions provided.
These potential leakages include
• using pension benefits too fast, which manifests in several ways,
such as having insufficient longevity protection and excessively
running down retirement savings to either fund excessive consumption and/or debts that were built up in the lead up to retirement in the knowledge that a lump sum would be available; and
• using pension benefits too slowly (i.e., poor lifestyle in retirement) and leaving these benefits for others in the estate.
While the evidence available indicates that most retirees make
sensible decisions regarding the investment of their retirement savings, there is scope to strengthen arrangements in advice, defaults, and
compulsion.
The ASFA currently has a major project under way with the aim
of facilitating or requiring the better provision of retirement income
streams. This work is well under way but is not yet complete.
The following 11 guiding principles have influenced ASFA’s
thinking:
1) The main focus of pensions should be on income streams in
retirement, as opposed to lump sums or estate planning. Pensions in the postretirement phase should be designed to ensure
that pension income streams, in conjunction with full or partial
Age Pension payments, provide income and dignity in retirement until death.
2) The retirement income system (including both tax concessions
and Age Pension payments) must be perceived to be fair, when
assessed across all components of the system and across the
lifetime of individuals, including both the pre- and postretirement phases.
3) Changes should not undermine confidence in the system; that
is, in terms of both the changes made and the need for long
lead times.
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4) The system must be comprehensive, covering people in different types of employment structures, such as employees, contractors, and the self-employed.
5) The retirement income system needs to be flexible, recognizing the need to take into account the varying patterns of work
and lifetime income that exist. Phased retirement should also
be encouraged as a means of helping people stay in the workforce longer, not as a tax evasion mechanism.
6) The retirement income system should be robust and able to
withstand a range of reasonable economic conditions without significantly reducing the expectations of the individuals
involved.
7) The means test for the Age Pension has an important role to
play in determining the amount of government assistance that
retirees receive. In particular, those individuals or family units
who earn below average wages, or who spend time out of the
workforce (e.g., to raise a family or because they cannot get a
job) should receive substantial support from the government
to achieve a basic income in retirement. On the other hand,
individuals and couples who continue in paid employment past
customary retirement age and/or who have substantial pension
and other assets that support a lifestyle in retirement more substantial than that described in the ASFA Retirement Standard at
the comfortable level should receive little or no Age Pension.
8) The mandatory pension system needs to have a relatively high
degree of guidance and constraints (including good default
systems) in order to protect people from unwise or excessively
short-term actions. For example, it needs to
• require long-term savings with restricted access prior to
retirement,
• provide income in retirement, and
• reduce risks during both the accumulation and retirement
phases.
9) There needs to be access to deferred annuities, the purchase
of which could start in either the accumulation or drawdown
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stage. This will necessitate the removal of prudential supervision and tax regulatory roadblocks in order to allow the offering of deferred annuities in either the accumulation or drawdown phase.
10) Incentives and default settings should be the initial approach
to obtaining the desired outcomes. However, if such arrangements are not effective in producing desired outcomes, then
consideration may need to be given to introducing a degree
of compulsion with respect to the taking of income streams in
retirement. For instance, this could be achieved through the
application of tax penalties with respect to taking benefits in
any one of the following:
• as a lump sum,
• in the form of a noncomplying income stream, or
• if there is noncompliance with either the minimum or
maximum drawdown factor of a complying account based
income stream.
11) The requirements should apply to all pension structures,
including self-managed superannuation funds, which are small
plans, where provisions are relevant.

CONCLUSION
The Australian pensions system is not without its shortcomings.
Among other things it is too complex, particularly in regard to the taxation of contributions and fund earnings, it is not yet mature enough to
deliver for most a comfortable standard of living in retirement, and it
does not deal well with the financial consequences of longevity for the
large majority of members who are in defined contribution schemes.
However, compared to systems in most other countries, the Australian pensions system is sustainable, in that the respective burdens on
governments, employers and individuals are manageable both now and
in the future. It is comprehensive, in that all Australians benefit from
an Age Pension from the government, which keeps individuals from

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

216 Clare

poverty in retirement with near universal coverage of private pensions
of employees and substantial coverage of the self employed. It is equitable, in that when all the elements of the system are looked at together,
the amount of government assistance is broadly comparable across the
income distribution. Finally, the Australian pension system helps to
strengthen the financial system, in that assets in the pension system are
invested in the real economy rather in notional securities issued by a
central government.
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China has one-fifth of the world’s population aged 60 and older
(United Nations 2007). Thus, social security old-age benefits programs
in China play an important role in the worldwide context of providing
benefits for older persons.1 Also adding to the importance of understanding China’s retirement income system, China is undergoing a
period of important changes in its provision of old-age benefits. At the
start of 2009, less than 30 percent of its adult population was covered
by a social security old-age benefits program, but in 2012 that had increased to 55 percent (Economist 2012). Chinese government data for
the end of 2011 indicated that 241.1 million people were contributing to
the new rural social security pension system, with 85.3 million people
receiving benefits (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security
2012). Another important development due to the one-child policy, and
reflecting changes in the age distribution of workers compared to retired persons in China, is that in 2012 for the first time the Chinese labor
force decreased, with decreases expected to continue for a number of
years (Thai News Service 2013).
As in many countries around the world, until recently rural workers in China generally did not participate in a social security program
providing old-age benefits. Traditionally, older persons worked as long
as they were able. After that, they lived with their children or received
financial support from their children, with the support in China traditionally coming primarily from their sons.
In countries such as China, however, where birth rates have fallen
rapidly and where many adult children in rural areas are moving to
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urban areas to work, the traditional support system for older persons is
weakening. As evidence of this, one study finds that families in rural
China with fewer children and with fewer sons tend to save more for
their retirement (Ebenstein and Leung 2010). These changes increase
the need for extending social security coverage to workers in rural areas.
Because most workers in middle- and lower-income countries generally do not participate in social security, extending social security or
pension coverage to rural and informal sector workers is arguably the
most important problem facing social security programs around the
world (Gillion et al. 2000). Worldwide, only 26 percent of the working population is effectively covered by social security old-age benefits
programs (ILO 2010). Extending coverage to rural areas and the informal sector is difficult, however, because generally these workers have
low and variable cash incomes. For these reasons, they cannot make
regular contributions and are limited in the amount they can contribute.
At the same time, the transaction costs for contributors, and the transaction and administrative costs for the government, may be sufficiently
high to make small contributions economically infeasible.

SOCIAL SECURITY OLD-AGE BENEFITS PROGRAMS
IN CHINA
In China, all persons are registered as either urban or rural residents. This classification system (called the hukuo system), which is
unique to China, is important in the provision of social security old-age
benefits. When rural residents move to cities, they retain their registration as rural residents, which affects their access to social security
programs in urban areas.
China has three major social security old-age benefits programs,
covering three different groups of people: urban areas have two old-age
benefits programs, and there is a separate program for rural workers.
The central government is considering rules permitting transfer of contributions for workers between the three programs, so that workers who
have contributed to more than one program can combine their contributions into one program and receive benefits solely from that program
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(China Daily 2012). The current pension arrangements make it difficult
for workers to move to different areas in China.
Urban Employees’ Pension Program
The Urban Employees’ Pension Program, established in 1997, is for
employed workers in urban areas. It is a two-pillar mandatory program
and the only one of the three major programs that is mandatory.
Coverage. In 2010, 36 percent of China’s total workforce (urban
and rural), or about 264 million workers, was participating in a social
security pension plan. One of the reasons for the low coverage rate may
be that workers in urban areas cannot afford the required contribution.
Complicated procedures for enrolling and lack of trust in the systems
may be other explanations (Zheng 2012). Another factor contributing
to low coverage rates in urban areas is that rural workers are typically
excluded (Oksanen 2012).
Contribution rate. The contribution rate for the Urban Employees’
Pension Program is 28 percent, of which the employee contributes 8
percent to an individual account and the employer contributes 20 percent to the social account for the basic pension or social pension, which
is a traditional pay-as-you-go defined benefit program.
By 2006, individual accounts programs were established in 10
provinces, but the extension to other provinces stagnated (Zheng 2012).
However, government policy of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security at the end of 2005 mandated the extension of the program, with the
8 percent contribution rate, to all provinces, which now has occurred.
The government has not segregated the money in the individual
accounts from other social security funds, and has spent much of that
money, now in essence converting those accounts to notional accounts
to which interest is credited to notional account balances (Economist
2012).
Benefits. The Urban Employees’ Pension Program provides two
benefits: one comes from the individual account, which depends on the
contribution level of the individual and the rate of return received on
the contribution; and the second comes from the social account, which

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

220 Chen and Turner

is a pay-as-you-go defined benefit. All participants must contribute to
this program for at least 15 years and arrive at the retirement age before
they can apply for the old-age benefit from this program. The average
benefit level of this program is 1,721 yuan per month by the end of the
year 2012, which is adjusted according to the inflation rate.
Regional variation. The contribution rates of 8 percent plus 20
percent are set by the central government as guidelines, but the exact
contribution rate for the social pension can be decided by local government, and can be higher or lower. The contribution rate of Guangzhou
City is 12 percent for the social account. Guangzhou has a considerably
lower contribution rate for the social account because many younger
migrants live in the city, so population aging is not a serious problem.
The contribution rate for the social account is 20 percent in Beijing
and 22 percent in Shanghai. Shanghai faces serious population aging.
The 8 percent contribution rate that workers make for the individual
account does not vary across provinces because the account is linked
to the individual participant and is not affected by the age structure in
the province.
China has 33 provincial-level governments. Beijing, Shanghai,
Chongqing, and Tianjin are four municipalities that are treated as
provinces. Besides, two Special Administrative Regions—Hong
Kong and Macao—are treated as provincial governments. Also, the
contribution responsibility is divided among provincial, municipal, and
county governments, and the exact proportion shared by different levels
of local governments varies in different provinces.
The management of social security funds is fragmented, even within
provinces. Only four provinces, two of which are Beijing and Shanghai,
have pooled the social security funds. There are more than 2,000 social
security funds managed by different government entities (Zheng 2012).
The fragmentation of the system has historic origins. In 1949, soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, a national pension
system was established, but trade unions at the local level were given
responsibility for administering it. In 1969, during the Cultural Revolution, trade unions were abolished, and state-owned enterprises were
given responsibility for managing the pension system (Oksanen 2012).
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Urban Residents’ Pension Program
Coverage. The Urban Residents’ Pension Program, started in 2011,
is a voluntary program for urban residents who do not have jobs, are
self-employed, work for small businesses, or are migrants from rural
areas. It is similar to the National Rural Pension Plan, described later.
Contribution rate. Participants can choose the level of contributions they wish to make within a set range. The central government
suggests a contribution range of 100–1,000 yuan per year, which
is divided into 10 levels, in 100 yuan increments. But as the Urban
Residents’ Pension Program is managed by the county or municipal
government, the range of contribution levels differs among areas.
Local governments subsidize the contributions of those urban
residents who participate in the program through a matching contribution, which varies across provinces. The lowest matching contribution,
set by the central government, is 30 yuan per participant per year. Thus,
on the minimum contribution of 100 yuan a year, this provides a 30
percent match rate, which, of course, is lower for higher contributions.
Local governments, however, can raise the match rate according to the
financial ability of the government.
Benefits. The Urban Residents’ Pension Program provides two
benefits. One comes from the individual account, which depends on the
contribution level of the individual, the government matching contribution, and the rate of return received on those contributions. The second
benefit is entirely financed by the local governments and is not based on
the contributions of participants, other than that they must contribute a
minimum of 15 years in order to qualify for it. That benefit is 55 yuan
per month, but local governments in high-income provinces can raise
this benefit level according to the financial ability of the government.
The governments pay the cost of the noncontributory basic benefit.
In the wealthier and eastern provinces of China, the central government
subsidizes 50 percent, and the local governments pay the remaining 50
percent of the noncontributory benefit. In the poor middle and western
provinces, the central government pays 100 percent of the benefit, and
the local governments do not pay for the noncontributory benefit.
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National Rural Pension Plan
Out of a population aged 60 and older of 150 million in China, 100
million live in rural areas (China News 2009). Thus, 14 percent of the
world’s population aged 60 and older is covered by China’s National
Rural Pension Plan.
Coverage
In 2008, only 12 percent of China’s rural population was participating in a social security pension system (Oksanen 2012). The voluntary
social security pension for rural residents that preceded the new National Rural Pension Plan had contribution and benefit levels that were
low, and the program was not subsidized by the government.
Because most rural workers in China were not participating in a
social security old-age benefits program, beginning in late 2009, China
established the National Rural Pension Plan. It started by extending the
program to more than 300 counties on a pilot basis and reached 23
percent of counties by the end of 2010 (Mu 2010). By the end of 2011
it was extended to 60 percent of counties, and it is expected to be in
all counties by the end of 2012 (Yang 2012). The launch of the new
program was preceded by a period during which different pension arrangements were tried on a pilot basis in different parts of the country
to see which arrangement would work best (Cai et al. 2012).
All rural residents aged 16 and older who are not students and who
are not enrolled in another pension plan can voluntarily participate in
the rural plan. They can participate whether they work in a rural or
urban area, whether they are employed or self-employed, and whether
they work for pay or do not work for pay. The program is not earningsrelated in that anyone meeting the age requirements can contribute to it
regardless of earnings, and the amount of the individual’s contributions
is not related to his or her earnings.
Rural migrants to the city can participate in the Urban Employees’
Pension Program if their employers contribute for them. If their employers do not contribute for them, they can choose to participate in the
rural pension plan. Because of the high contribution rates, most employers are unwilling to make pension contributions for rural workers
who migrate to urban areas. About one-third of the residents in urban

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

Social Security Reform in China 223

areas are migrants from rural workers who do not have full rights to
participate in the urban pension systems (Oksanen 2012).
Contributions
The central government has established minimum standards for
contributions. The lowest minimum contribution is 100 yuan a year and
the lowest maximum contribution is 500 yuan a year (about U.S.$80),
with only 5 percent of participants contributing that amount (Dorfman
et al. 2013).
While most small counties use the government minimum standards, variation above those standards is permitted and occurs in some
places that have a higher standard of living. Wuhan and Shanghai are
examples of regional variation in contribution levels. In Wuhan, the
minimum contribution is 200 yuan a year and the maximum contribution is 1,200 yuan a year, while in Shanghai the minimum is 500 yuan a
year and the maximum is 1,300 yuan a year. In both Wuhan and Shanghai, contributions are permissible between the minimum and maximum
in 200 yuan increments. In some prosperous provinces, contributions of
up to 2,500 yuan are allowed (Cai et al. 2012). These levels of contributions will be adjusted upward over time to reflect increases in income.
An important feature of this program is that the contribution rate is
much lower than in the program for urban workers, where the rate is 28
percent of pay. The contributions to this program are made by individuals and government, with no contribution by employers.
Matching contributions
China provides a matching contribution to encourage rural residents to participate in the National Rural Pension Plan. Because rural
residents do not pay income taxes, the lack of a tax incentive for rural
residents to participate may explain in part the matching contribution.
The subsidy, which is provided by the local government, is 30 yuan a
year, where the minimum contribution by the participant is 100 yuan a
year (about U.S.$16).
The matching contribution varies in different areas. For example,
in Xian City, the matching amount varies from 30 yuan for a contribution of 100 or 200 yuan, to 40 yuan for a contribution of 300 yuan,
to 45 yuan for a contribution of 400 yuan, and to 50 yuan for a con-

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

224 Chen and Turner

tribution of 500 yuan. Thus, for contributions above 300 yuan there
is an additional government match of 5 yuan for every additional 100
yuan contributed by the participant. In Guangzhou City, which is one
of the most developed cities in China, the annual contribution levels
(and its matching contribution) are divided into 120 (180) yuan; 360
(420) yuan; 600 (600) yuan, 840 (720) yuan; 1,080 (840) yuan; 1,320
(900) yuan; and 1,560 (960) yuan. The matching contribution is higher
than the worker’s contribution at the two lowest contribution levels.
The subsidy level in Guangzhou is higher than in other cities.
Some commentators have argued that the matching contribution is
low (Cai et al. 2012), but experience seems to indicate that it and the
other incentives to participate may be adequate. Nearly half of participants make the minimum contribution (Dorfman et al. 2013), which
generally provides the highest match rate. The government matching
contribution is paid into the person’s individual account.
Administrative rules for making contributions
Chinese residents who choose to participate in the rural pension
plan have different contribution options, depending on where they live.
In some areas, they must make the entire contribution for the year as
a single payment in January. In Beijing, however, they can make the
contribution between January 1 and December 20. They register to participate with the village government, which is at the lowest level of the
hierarchy of government. They must contribute in cash. To be specific,
they take cash to the government department in their village to make
their annual contribution.
At the end of the contribution period, the village government aggregates all the contributions and sends them to the township government,
which then sends the contributions of all the villages to the county government. The rural pension fund is generally managed by the county
government, but in some cities, depending on local regulation, the municipal government manages the fund, which is deposited into banks.
The central government intends for the funds to eventually be managed
by the provincial governments (Cai et al. 2012).
Local governments pay the administrative expenses for the plan,
which is a form of subsidy for the program. Those expenses thus are
not taken out of the contributions, which would reduce the amount of
benefits.
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Benefits
While the National Rural Pension Plan is structured as one plan, it
provides benefits to two different groups under different but related arrangements. The first is a contributory plan, to which participants must
contribute in order to receive benefits when they reach age 60. The second is a noncontributory plan for people who are 60 and older. The
relationship between the two parts of the rural plan is explained below.
Participants must contribute for 15 years in order to be eligible to
receive benefits. For participants older than age 45 at the start of the
system, to qualify for benefits they will need to contribute every year
up to age 60 and then make a lump sum payment to cover the shortfall
in years of contributions (Cai et al. 2012). It appears, however, that
few workers are making lump sum contributions. Workers who are 60
and older can qualify to apply for the noncontributory benefit, which is
currently 55 yuan per month in most of the counties in China.
The benefits for participants who have contributed a minimum of
15 years or who have contributed a lump sum equivalent to 15 years of
payments have two components. The basic benefit currently is 55 yuan
a month. This amount equals one-tenth of the average monthly wage in
rural areas in 2011 (Wang and Qing 2012).
That benefit is payable at age 60 to both men and women in most
of China. However, the benefit eligibility age varies to some extent,
with, for example, women being able to receive the benefit at age 55 in
Beijing. The benefit is not means tested, and workers are not required to
stop working to receive it. By contrast, for the urban pension men can
receive the benefit at age 60, while women can receive it at age 50, or
if they are classified as cadres, meaning that they have a management
position in their company, the age for benefit receipt is 55. These ages
for benefit receipt also are mandatory retirement ages for most urban
workers. A small percentage of urban workers, such as some university
professors, are exempt from these requirements. In addition, workers in
hazardous or dangerous occupations can qualify up to five years earlier
than these ages. That exception for hazardous or dangerous occupations
is not part of the rural pension system. One study finds an average retirement age in urban areas of 53 (Sin 2005). The benefit eligibility age
in the rural pension system, and presumably actual retirement ages, are
thus considerably higher than in the urban pension system.
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Unlike most social security programs around the world, in China
the social security benefit financing differs by region and also involves
financing in part by local governments. The basic benefit is financed by
the central government in the central and western parts of the country,
but in the more prosperous eastern provinces it is financed half by the
central government and half by the local governments (Lei, Zhang, and
Zhao 2011). Localities can increase the benefit amount above 55 yuan a
month if they have the financial resources to do so. The average benefit
received by beneficiaries is 74 yuan a month (Yang 2012), which is not
financed by the contributions of participants. This benefit represents the
first time that the Chinese government has made a major financial commitment to a rural pension system (Shen and Williamson 2010).
In addition, a defined contribution benefit is provided based on the
accumulation in the participant’s individual account from the participant’s contributions, government matching contributions, and accrued
investment returns. That benefit is paid monthly and equals the individual account at age 60 divided by 139, which is the same factor used for
calculating monthly pensions from the individual accounts in the urban
plans. The divisor depends on the age at which the person collects benefits, with it being higher at lower ages. It is 195 for a woman retiring
at age 50 and 170 for a woman retiring at age 55 in the urban pension
system. Generally, men cannot collect retirement benefits at those ages.
Individuals do not need to stop working to receive this benefit from the
rural pension plan.
The benefit payment is not limited to the amount in the individual
account, but it is guaranteed by the government for life and thus is paid
as an annuity. If a person dies before receiving the full amount in his
or her personal account, the spouse receives the remaining amount, and
if the spouse is not surviving then the children. Otherwise, the system
does not provide a benefit to a surviving spouse.
Noncontributory benefit
Persons aged 60 and older who have not qualified for another pension can receive the basic benefit of 55 yuan a month if all their children
are contributing to the rural pension, regardless of whether the children
are working. The benefits will be adjusted for inflation, but the exact
adjustment mechanism has not yet been determined (Cai et al. 2012).
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This requirement on the adult children is called “family binding.”
The incentive may work particularly well in China, which has a strong
tradition of adult children taking care of their older parents. If the older
persons do not have children, they automatically qualify. The central
government requires that all the recipients’ children contribute, but the
enforcement is done at the local level. At the local level, however, the
incentive to receive the central government subsidy for benefits for
people aged 60 and older works against the strict enforcement of this
requirement, so that some local governments may qualify all persons
aged 60 and older.
Regional variations
China has a number of levels in the hierarchy of government. From
lowest to highest, they are village, township, county or district, municipal, provincial, and central. The National Rural Pension Plan is
sponsored by the central government and run by the county or municipal government, with oversight from the Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security.
The central government provides guidelines for the pension systems in China, but for the rural pension system, the details, including
contribution rates, are determined at the level of the county or district
government. It is called the county government in rural areas and the
district government in urban areas. In some areas, the county or district
government has established the system exactly according to the central
government guidelines, while in other areas the systems vary. Thus, the
systems may vary within provinces.
Combined Urban and Rural Programs
Some cities, such as Wuhan, did not establish the Urban Residents’
Pension Program. Instead in 2011, Wuhan established a unified Pension
Plan for Rural and Urban Residents. The plan covers those who live in
urban areas and do not have jobs and all those in the rural areas. Neither
group can get contributions from employers, but they do receive the
government matching contribution. This is a reform trend for counties
and cities to establish a unified pension program for both urban and
rural residents who do not have formal jobs in China.
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Government Employees’ Pensions
Government employees and employees in government-owned enterprises in China are covered by a separate pension system, paid for
out of general revenues. That system costs 0.7 percent of GDP per year.
About 8 percent of covered participants are in that system. In addition
to these programs, hundreds of thousands of plans have been established by local municipalities to meet the needs of migrant workers
from rural areas or of particular industrial zones (Zheng 2012).
Hong Kong’s Mandatory Provident Fund
Hong Kong has a separate old-age benefits system. All workers
are required to join the Mandatory Provident Fund, which is a system
of defined contribution plans. Employees earning between HK$6,500
(U.S.$839) and HK$25,000 (U.S.$3,226) monthly (in 2012) pay 5
percent of their earnings, with employers also paying 5 percent (U.S.
Social Security Administration 2012).2 The contributions go to a financial service provider chosen by the employer. As of November 2012,
employees can choose the service provider for their contributions.
Workers receive benefits as a lump sum. Because of savings accumulated through this program, Hong Kong has a high ratio of pension assets
to GDP of 32.5 percent, which compares to a simple average for OECD
countries of 33.9 percent (OECD 2012).

FINANCING ISSUES
Individual Account Benefits
Concerning the financing of the individual account benefit, the divisor of 139 for benefits received at age 60 is the key parameter in
determining the generosity of the individual account benefit. Thus, in
assessing the financing of those benefits, it is important to determine
whether that divisor provides benefits that are adequately financed, or
alternatively, whether the benefits are overly generous. When financial
planners in the United States advise individual account holders about
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the sustainable amount that a retiree can withdraw from an account
without overly risking that they will run out of money, they often advise that a retiree can withdraw 4 percent of the initial account balance,
adjusted for inflation, each year (McKenzie and Turner 2012). The 4
percent amount is designed to provide an inflation-indexed withdrawal.
That advice depends on the life expectancy of the individual and the
expected rate of return received on the account. It would be a higher
percentage for a shorter life expectancy and a higher expected rate of
return. If the amount were used instead to purchase an annuity, which is
a better comparison, it would be equivalent to a withdrawal of 5.7 percent, based on male annuity rates, no inflation adjustment of benefits,
and the low interest rates available in 2013. The withdrawal rate would
be lower than 5.7 percent for a benefit that was adjusted for inflation.
The divisor of 139 for monthly benefits is equivalent to withdrawing 8.6 percent of the initial account balance each year. Thus, it appears
that the benefit divisor of 139 should be increased if the goal is to have
a system that is financed primarily by the contributions of participants.
That change would result in lower benefits, but it would be more consistent with a sustainable, self-funding pension system. By one analysis,
county governments will be liable for 40 percent of the payments from
the individual account pensions (Herd, Wu, and Koen 2010).
The Overall Expense of Pensions
In 2011, 61 percent of the revenues for the rural pension system
overall came from government subsidies (Wang and Qing 2012). The
individual pays for none of the basic benefit for parents and for none of
his or her own basic benefit. The cost to the central government of providing the noncontributory benefit to all the 100 million rural persons
currently aged 60 and older would be about 2 percent of the government
budget (Shen and Williamson 2010). The government also subsidizes a
substantial portion of the individual account benefit. This cost is borne
by local governments. Overall, the individuals will only pay at most 18
percent of the cost of their pensions, with the government paying the
rest (Herd, Wu, and Koen 2010).
The government is thus incurring what appear to be substantial
unfunded liabilities for the social security pension systems (Reuters
2012). Most countries have pay-as-you-go social security systems with
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unfunded liabilities, thus unfunded liabilities are a common feature.
China, however, differs from many countries in that it has a very high
savings rate. Thus, there may be more justification for unfunded liabilities in China than in other countries. In addition, the central government
has large nonpension reserves that could be used in the future to help
pay for these liabilities (Economist 2012).
In comparison to programs in other countries, the total cost of the
rural pension program in China is relatively low at 0.22 percent of
GDP. This compares, for example, to 0.38 percent of GDP for a meanstested program in Chile (Herd, Wu, and Koen 2010). Thus, the program
combines a relative low cost, due to low benefits, and a high degree of
government subsidy, due to the relatively small amount contributed by
participants.
Investment Policy Issues
In China, the rate of return on provincial urban pension funds has
averaged 2 percent over the last 10 years, which is less than the rate
of inflation over that period. However, in 2012 the national government announced a pilot program that would permit the 13 provinces
that manage pension funds for individual accounts to invest in domestic
equities. The council that manages the National Social Security Fund,
which is China’s public pension reserve fund, will act as the trustee and
principal investor of each of these funds. The amount invested this way
could be as much as 360 billion yuan (U.S.$57 billion), roughly 20 percent of the funds’ combined total assets under management (U.S. Social
Security Administration 2012).
The National Social Security Fund (NSFF) was established in 2000
to support China’s future social security expenditures. The NSSF receives money from government allocations from a government lottery
and from the sale of state-owned enterprises. It is a strategic reserve
fund designed to help pay for future social security expenditures during
future periods of rapid aging.
Since 2006, the NSSF has managed the investments of the individual account funds of nine provinces, municipalities, and autonomous
regions. As of December 31, 2011, the NSSF had net assets of 838.6
billion yuan. Included in that, the value of the individual account funds
managed by the NSSF is 65.8 billion yuan. Domestic fixed income
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investments accounted for 51 percent of the investments (National
Council for Social Security Fund 2012). That percentage is relatively
high for a fund of this type.

CONCLUSION
While social security old-age benefit programs around the world
generally are uniform national programs, at least for the group of
workers they cover, the three main programs in China have regional
variations that make the program more complex, but that also relate to
the regional differences in standard of living in the country. The financing of the programs varies across regions, with the central government
providing all of the financing for the basic benefit in the central and
western parts of the country, but half of the financing, with the local
government providing the other half, in the more prosperous eastern
provinces. The level of contributions by participants and the level of
benefits they receive also vary across regions.
China has a program for rural workers that has features that may
provide lessons for other countries wishing to extend pension coverage to the rural and informal sectors. It is a voluntary program, but by
providing substantial government subsidies, it encourages coverage of
workers who do not pay income taxes and thus have no tax incentive to
participate. As a further incentive, old-age benefits are provided to the
parents of participants who contribute when all the adult children in a
family are participating in the program. Only a single contribution per
year is required, and participants can choose from a range of contribution levels.
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Notes
We have received helpful comments from Heikki Oksanen and David Rajnes. In this
chapter, we follow the western convention of listing Chinese family names as the
second name, with the given name the first name. The official name of China is the
People’s Republic of China.
1. The official name of Chinese currency is renminbi (RMB). The basic unit of the
currency is yuan, which are the units used in this chapter. Hong Kong uses a
different currency.
2. The dollar limits are adjusted upward over time.
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Social Security and
Pensions in East Africa
John A. Turner

Pension Policy Center

Five countries in East Africa have formed the East African Community (EAC)—Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.
These countries include both Anglophone and Francophone Africa,
though English is the official language of the EAC. They have a total
population of more than 140 million, which is more than one-tenth of
the population of Africa. The EAC, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania,
was formed in 2000 with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; Rwanda and
Burundi joined in 2007. South Sudan, Sudan, Zambia, Malawi, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo have indicated an interest in joining. While the EAC is already an important regional organization, if
these countries join, the EAC would include more than one-fifth of the
population of Africa.
The EAC is seeking greater integration of the five countries in order
to facilitate the development of a prosperous and peaceful East Africa.
Integration goals include facilitating the movement of workers, capital,
and commerce across countries, including developing a free trade zone.
Facilitating the movement of workers raises issues of pension and social security portability across countries. It also involves harmonizing
the social security and pension systems and laws in the five countries.
The EAC has a committee responsible for these issues, the Capital Markets, Insurance and Pensions Committee.
In 2010, the EAC established the Common Market Protocol as a
step toward greater economic integration, including the free movement
of workers. The citizens of any of the five countries can work or live in
any of the other countries and participate in the social security program
of the new country of residence. The academic and professional qualifi-
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cations of any country in the EAC are recognized in the other countries
(Ministry of East African Community Affairs 2011).
The EAC countries have the stated goal of adopting a common currency, and in 2012 they are considering a policy that would set them on
the path to having a common currency within 10 years. They eventually
may even form a federation as a single country in order to facilitate
their development through greater economies of scale and a larger freetrade area. The development of funded pensions can aid in the development of capital markets in the region, providing a source of funds for
investments in government debt and corporate debt and equity.
This chapter discusses the pension and social security old-age benefit systems in the EAC, including discussing areas in need of reform. It
first discusses mandatory social security systems, and then various aspects of employer-provided pensions, including pension regulators, the
tax treatment of pensions, the types of pensions provided in the private
sector, and pensions for public sector workers. It discusses attempts to
extend coverage to more workers.

SOCIAL SECURITY
Overview
All the mandatory social security programs in the region are called
the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) (Table 11.1). Social security
pensions in East Africa cover only a small percentage of the workforce,
mainly those in government employment. Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda,
and Burundi cover less than 10 percent of their populations, while Kenya
Table 11.1 Name of Primary Social Security Fund, 2012
Country
Name of plan
Burundi
National Social Security Fund
Kenya
National Social Security Fund
Rwanda
Social Security Fund of Rwanda
Tanzania
National Social Security Fund
Uganda
National Social Security Fund
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covers 15 percent (Barya 2011). Lack of coverage is due in part to contribution evasion by employers and employees who are covered under
the law but who do not contribute. Also, coverage for self-employed
workers is generally voluntary, and workers in the informal sector generally are not covered (Table 11.2). Most people in old age depend on
traditional arrangements through their families or clans.
Table 11.2 Workers Not Covered by Social Security, 2012
Country
Workers not covered
Burundi
Self employed
Kenya
Employers with less than five employees; persons earning
less than Kshs1,000 a month
Rwanda
Self-employed
Tanzania
Self-employed; household workers
Uganda
Employers with less than five employees; persons aged 55
and older

Some programs for government employees have converted from
noncontributory to contributory, meaning that government employees
contribute toward their funding. Some programs have also moved from
pay-as-you-go toward funding. The regulatory authority over the programs is in nearly all cases under the Ministry of Finance rather than
the Ministry of Labor.
Countries in the region formerly under the influence of the British as colonies (Tanzania, Kenya) or protectorates (Uganda) have had
provident funds, which are defined contribution plans that provide
lump sum benefits (Table 11.3). As defined contribution plans, they are
funded. Countries around the world with those systems have tended to
move away from them and switch to social insurance pension systems,
Table 11.3 Type of Social Security Fund, 2012
Country
Type of social security fund
Burundi
Social insurance
Kenya
Provident fund
Rwanda
Social insurance
Tanzania
Social insurance
Uganda
Provident fund
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which are defined benefit systems where benefits are based on a benefit
formula. While Tanzania has converted its provident fund to a social
insurance defined benefit pension, Kenya is planning to convert their
provident funds to a defined contribution pension. Uganda is considering doing the same. Provident funds have the disadvantage that they
do not provide a stream of benefits that protects the recipient against
poverty during old age, thus providing no insurance against an unexpectedly long lifetime. A further problem with provident funds is that
frequently the interest rate declared on the fund is less than the inflation
rate, which, combined with high administrative costs, has resulted in
low benefits (Gillion et al. 2000).
The social security systems of the region generally have retirement
ages that are low by international standards (Table 11.4). Mandatory
retirement at low ages in some countries is another problem. The countries need to adopt social security and pension programs that encourage
work of skilled persons at older ages in order to make better use of their
human resources.
Some of the social security programs in the region have high administrative expenses. Some funded systems managed by government
agencies have made questionable investments, resulting in financial
losses to the funds. Perhaps relating in part to those two problems, contribution evasion by employees and employers is also a major problem.
In some countries, public employees are covered under a plan that
is different from private sector employees. Some countries have multiple programs for private sector employees (Table 11.5). Some countries
have several different plans for different sectors of public employees,
creating a need for reform that would harmonize the plans and provide
equal treatment for all citizens. Preferential treatment of government
employees is an issue in some countries. They have lower contribution
Table 11.4 Early Retirement Age for Social Security Old Age Benefits,
2012
Country
Early retirement age
Burundi
60
Kenya
50
Rwanda
55
Tanzania
Any age
Uganda
45
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Table 11.5 National Social Security Fund or Multiple Funds, 2012
Country
Single or multiple funds
Burundi
Single
Kenya
Single
Rwanda
Single
Tanzania
Multiple
Uganda
Multiple

rates, a lower retirement age, and extremely generous benefits. Members of parliament and judges generally are covered by preferential
pensions. In some countries, the generosity of the pensions for public
service employees is further enhanced in that they are not subject to
taxation.
Some countries in the region allow workers and employers to opt
out of the mandatory social security program as long as they participate
in an alternative program. It has been thought that having competitors
for the national program would encourage greater efficiency and lower
costs.
In order to encourage the mobility of workers across countries, social security systems need to provide portability so that workers can
combine work in different countries in order to meet qualifying conditions to receive benefits (Table 11.6). In some countries, workers must
work for a minimum of 15 years to qualify for benefits. A proposed law
in Kenya in 2012 would enable workers working temporarily in other
countries in the EAC to continue participating in the social security
program in Kenya. It would also encourage the development of agreements with other EAC countries so that social security contributions in
the other countries would be sent to Kenya for Kenyan workers who
returned to Kenya when they retired (Mutegi 2012).
Table 11.6 Number of Years for Vesting in Social Security Fund, 2012
Country
Number of years
Burundi
15
Kenya
3
Rwanda
15
Tanzania
15
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The EAC countries are members of several other regional organizations, which have overlapping interests and goals concerning pensions,
and which may not include all of the EAC countries. These include
the East and Central African Social Security Association (ECASSA),
which was formed in 2007, and which also includes Zambia (ECASSA
2012). ECASSA, headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, attempts to help the
countries meet common challenges they face in their social security
systems, including low coverage. It also encourages the development
of multicountry agreements facilitating the transfer of social security
credits across countries in the region.1
The remainder of this section discusses the social security and mandatory government-provided systems in each of the countries.
Kenya
Types of plans
Kenya has a provident fund for private sector employees that was
established in 1965. In 2011, 4.6 million people were registered, of
whom 1.2 million were active (EAC 2011). The total value of assets in
this program exceeds the total value of funds in mandatory programs in
the other four countries combined (Katto 2012). As of 2012, legislation
converts this fund to a defined contribution pension fund.
Kenya has four different types of pension programs: 1) the NSSF,
for private sector workers; 2) the Civil Service Pension Program, for
government workers; 3) employer-provided occupational pensions, for
private sector workers; and 4) individual pension programs, for private
sector workers. The employer-provided occupational pensions account
for 61 percent of total assets, the NSSF accounts for 38 percent, and
individual pension programs account for 1 percent. The Civil Service
Pension Program is unfunded. The accumulated assets in the funded
programs equal 20 percent of GDP, exceeding the level in Germany,
Italy, and Sweden in the early twenty-first century (Odundo 2004).
Financing
All private sector employers with at least five employees must
register and pay contributions to the NSSF for their employees. These
employers are responsible for assuring that all their employees are reg-
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istered and that contributions are paid on their behalf. Other employers
may voluntarily participate. Participation is voluntary for people who
are self-employed. Data indicate that 10 percent of the population are
paid employees (Machira 2011).
Both the employer and the employee contribute 5 percent of earnings, up to 200 shillings a month. Because of a low ceiling on earnings, most people contribute the maximum. However, a bill proposed in
2012 would raise the contribution of both employer and employee to 6
percent and convert the fund from a provident fund to a social security
fund (Daily Nation 2012).
A major problem with the system has been a low ceiling on earnings, which has resulted in low contributions. In 2008, the low ceiling
resulted in the maximum contribution equaling 1.3 percent of average
pay. The ceiling is low because it is not adjusted for inflation and the
growth of earnings. As of 2008, it had only been adjusted twice since
1965, in 1997 and 2001 (Raichura 2008).
Participants making mandatory contributions can increase their savings by also making voluntary contributions. The NSSF is encouraging
employers to make contributions electronically, including through mobile phones. The NSSF, however, has had a problem correctly allocating contributions to the accounts of workers and as of 2008 had a large
suspense account of unallocated contributions. The NSSF is responsible for collecting contributions, but an alternative approach would be
collection through the tax collecting agency, the Kenya Revenue Authority (Raichura 2008).
In 2011, the NSSF transferred the management of 65 percent of its
assets to external fund managers. Previously, the investment of all the
funds had been managed by the government, where it had been subject
to pressure to make investments that would benefit high government
officials (Mchira and Ngigi 2012).
Benefits
As is typical of provident funds, the NSSF provides a single lump
sum benefit rather than a pension benefit in the form of an annuity.
Proposals for conversion to a social insurance system have been considered, but priority has been given to the development of the Retirement
Benefits Authority, which regulates the activities of all private sector
retirement benefit plans, and is discussed later in the chapter.
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Benefits can be claimed at age 55 for persons who have stopped
working (NSSF 2012). Workers are also eligible for a benefit at age
50, called the withdrawal benefit, if they have left regular paid employment. The social security program also provides a disability (invalidity)
benefit at any age for full disability preventing work, and at age 50 for
a partial disability. An emigration grant is available for people permanently emigrating from Kenya.
Benefits are low for several reasons. The low ceiling on contributions is one cause. The ceiling in 2011 was Ksh4,000 a month, or about
U.S.$50. The ceiling should be raised and adjusted in line with inflation
or the growth of earnings in order to assure that benefits are more adequate. In addition, the NSSF has had high administrative expenses relative to the low level of contributions it collects—they have exceeded
50 percent of contributions. Associated with this problem, some service
providers to the NSSF have paid kickbacks to government officials in
order to be chosen.
A minimum rate of return of 5 percent annually is guaranteed, so
the fund can at times have an unfunded liability, even though it is a defined contribution plan (EAC 2011). Before 2009, the minimum guaranteed rate was 2.5 percent. That low rate provided a disincentive for
participation in the fund (Raichura 2008). There is little connection between the crediting rate and the investment rate of return earned, with
sometimes the crediting rate being higher, but frequently being lower,
than the investment rate of return.
A pilot program is providing noncontributory benefits for people
aged 65 and older because most people in that age group do not qualify
for benefits based on their having made contributions while working.
Reform
One of the problems with implementing reforms relating to the
NSSF is that it is under the Labour Ministry, while the Retirement Benefits Authority that regulates it is under the Finance Ministry (Odundo
2004).
As of 2012, legislation proposes converting the NSSF from a provident fund to an insurance fund. A defined contribution plan would be
retained for the formal sector, while a defined benefit plan would be
instituted for the informal sector. Contributions would be raised from
10 percent to 12 percent of pay, split evenly between the employer and
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employee. An important change is that there would be no ceiling on pay
covered by the program, solving a problem with the current system,
which has a low ceiling on pay. This program would also provide unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and maternity leave. The new
program would provide annuity benefits rather than a single lump sum,
as is provided in the current program.
Tanzania
Tanzania is composed of two distinct geographical and administrative areas. Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, which is a nearby archipelago off the coast in the Indian Ocean, have two separate social security
funds. Under the agreement forming the union between Tanganyika and
Zanzibar, provision of social security benefits is not a union function
(Barya 2011).
Types of plans
Tanzania mainland has a social insurance system for the private
sector. It has about 460,000 active members (Mutero 2010). In 1997,
that fund replaced the National Provident Fund, which had been established in 1964. The NSSF covers private sector employees, parastatal
employees, and nonpensionable government employees. The NSSF has
launched a campaign to encourage private sector workers to participate,
particularly women and workers in the informal sector.
The NSSF and several other pension funds, including the Parastatal
Pension Fund, are placed for administrative purposes under the Ministry of Labour and Youth Employment (Simbeye 2012). The Parastatal
Pension Fund is for employees in government controlled enterprises,
but it has also extended its coverage to private sector employees who
wish to participate. It has two pension programs and about 100,000
active members (Mutero 2010). The Traditional Pension Program, a
defined benefit program, is for employees of government owned enterprises. The Deposit Administration Program, a defined contribution
program, is for other private sector workers (International Labour Organization 2012).
The NSSF and the Parastatal Pension Fund are the two largest publicly managed pension funds in Tanzania (Assad and Selemani, n.d.).
Tanzania has six publicly managed mandatory pension funds. The other
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four are the Public Service Pension Fund, the Government Employees
Provident Fund, the Local Authorities Pensions Fund, and the Zanzibar
Social Security Fund (Ngotezi 2010). With the exception of the Government Employees Provident Fund, all the funds are defined benefit
plans. The Local Authorities Pension Fund was converted from a provident fund in 2005. It has about 70,000 active members (Mutero 2010).
Except for the Zanzibar Social Security Fund, all funds are under
the supervision of the Social Security Regulatory Authority, which is
under the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Labour and Employment provides general supervision over the NSSF (International Organisation of Pension Supervisors [IOPS] 2011b).
The Government Employees Provident Fund enrolls people who
work for the government on contracts, who then switch to the Public
Service Pension Fund if they become permanent employees. Their contributions are transferred from the Government Employees Provident
Fund to the Public Service Pension Fund when they make that change.
These programs cover about 5 percent of the labor force (IOPS 2011b).
Special noncontributory (the participant does not contribute) systems
have been established for the military and for political leaders (IOPS
2011b). In order to encourage competition across programs, workers
can choose to participate in any of the six government-managed pension programs.
Financing
In Tanzania, the total (employer plus employee) contribution rate
for social security is 20 percent, of which the employee cannot contribute more than 10 percent. This contribution rate is considerably higher
than for the other countries in the region (Table 11.7). The employee
and employer contribution rate varies across plans. The provident fund
that preceded the NSSF had a contribution rate of 20 percent, but it was
decided that a rate of 10 percent for a funded pension system would be
adequate. Rather than reduce the contribution rate, Tanzania decided
to retain the provident fund at a lower contribution rate and then phase
it out as other social security benefits were introduced (Gillion et al.
2000).
For the NSSF, both the employer and employee contribute 10
percent of earnings, but this contribution also funds medical benefits
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Table 11.7 Social Security Contribution Rates, 2012 (%)
Country
Total
Employee
Burundi
10
4
Kenya
10
5
Rwanda
6
3
Tanzania
20
10
Uganda
6
3

Employer
6
5
3
10
3

and other nonretirement benefits. Self-employed persons who voluntarily join the NSSF contribute 20 percent of their declared earnings.
This high contribution rate discourages self-employed persons from
participating. It also discourages the provision of employer-provided
pensions. Employees in the Parastatal Pension Fund also contribute
10 percent of their earnings. However, government employees receive
preferential treatment. Participants to the Public Service Pension Fund
and the Local Authorities Pension Fund only contribute 5 percent of
their earnings (IOPS 2011b).The NSSF invests its money in projects
and investments in Tanzania, primarily in interest-bearing investments,
such as government and corporate bonds, money market investments,
and loans (NSSF, Tanzania 2010a).
Benefits
For the NSSF, benefits can be claimed at age 55 with 180 months
(15 years) of contributions. However, workers can collect their benefits
before retirement age—they can claim benefits at any age as long as
the person has not worked for six months. In 2012, the Social Security
Regulatory Authority (SSRA) proposed ending this provision, called
withdrawal benefits. Public opposition to ending withdrawal benefits
forced the SSRA to withdraw its proposal. Compulsory retirement occurs at age 60 (NSSF, Tanzania 2010b).
Old-age pension benefits from the NSSF are paid in two parts. An
initial lump sum benefit equals 24 multiplied by the monthly benefit.
In addition, monthly benefits are paid. Benefits received between ages
55 and 59 are reduced by 0.5 percent for every year before age 60. This
reduction is far less than what would be actuarially fair, which would be
more like 6 percent, providing an incentive to take benefits at earlier ages.
Thus, the NSSF discourages work in paid employment at older ages.
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Zanzibar
The Zanzibar Social Security Fund was established in 1998, which
was the last social security system established in the region. The Zanzibar Social Security Fund covers both public and private sector employees. As of 2006, it covered about 35,000 workers (EAC 2011). Employees contribute 5 percent and employers contribute 10 percent of
earnings. Thus, the contribution rate for the Zanzibar Social Security
Fund is less than the rate for the Social Security Fund of Tanzania.
Workers can receive retirement benefits at age 60, which is the mandatory retirement age, but workers leaving employment can receive benefits at age 55.
Uganda
Types of plans
Uganda has a provident fund that was established in 1967. It covers
all private sector employees working for employers with five or more
employees. Membership is voluntary for employers with less than five
employees. Workers between the ages of 16 and 55 participate. As of
2011, the NSSF had about 500,000 registered members and 400,000
active contributors, and covers about 3.5 percent of the working population (Katto 2012). Civil servants are covered under the Public Service
Pension Program, while members of the military are covered under the
Uganda Post Defense Forces program.
Financing
For the NSSF, the employer contributes 10 percent of earnings and
the employee contributes 5 percent, with no ceiling on earnings (Wafuja
2011). Contribution evasion is widespread, with most eligible employers and employees not contributing. To deal with this problem, in 2011
the NSSF offered defaulters a temporary amnesty period, during which
they could pay contributions they owed without having to pay the 10
percent interest on late payments (Wafuja 2011).
The NSSF has misused funds it is entrusted for investing. For example, it has purchased property from a government minister at an
inflated price (Barya 2011). In addition, it has fraudulently paid large
amounts to “ghost” beneficiaries, with the money actually being paid to
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high government officials. In 2012, the Ugandan government temporarily suspended payment of benefits while it attempted to resolve the
issue. In 2012, the NSSF was considering loaning U.S.$400 million,
or about one-third of its funds, to the government to help pay for the
construction of roads (Reuters 2012).
Benefits
Benefits from the NSSF can be claimed at age 55 as a lump sum
payment, whether or not the person has stopped working, or at age 50
if the person has been out of employment for at least a year. The NSSF
also provides a disability benefit, a survivors’ benefit, and an emigration
benefit for persons permanently leaving the country (NSSF, Uganda
2012).
Each year interest is credited to each worker’s account, based on
the rate of return received on the national fund. Benefits are based on
the amount contributed by the worker and the worker’s employer to the
fund and the interest rate credited to the fund. In 2011, the NSSF cut the
crediting rate from 7 percent to 6 percent, in part because of a lawsuit
against the fund for cancellation of a building contract. In that year, the
inflation rate was 28 percent, so the real value of the future benefits for
workers declined by more than 20 percent (Ojambo 2011). The NSSF
has provided a negative rate of real return (subtracting the inflation rate)
in most years since its founding.
A pilot program funded by the World Bank is providing noncontributory benefits to persons aged 70 and older in some provinces.
Reform
The NSSF is being converted from a provident fund that only provided lump sum payments to a pension plan that will either be a defined
benefit plan or a defined contribution plan, with that decision currently
pending.
In order to encourage greater competition in the provision of retirement benefits, plans are in the works to allow other programs to compete, allowing workers to opt out of the NSSF and participate in another
program (Kiwanuka 2012). During a phase-in period, workers will be
required to make a reduced contribution to the NSSF. It was thought
that this policy would reduce costs and increase efficiency.
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Rwanda
Types of plans
Rwanda’s social insurance system, founded in 1956, is called the
Social Security Fund of Rwanda and is a funded defined benefit program. The Rwanda Social Security Board was formed by the merger of
the Rwanda Medical Insurance and the Social Security Fund of Rwanda.
It covers all public and private sector employees (IOPS 2011a).
Financing
The employer and the employee both contribute 3 percent. Contributions also provide insurance coverage against occupational injuries. Self-employed persons can be voluntarily covered, and they pay
6 percent of earnings. In 2011, it had 300,000 active members (EAC
2011), or about 5 percent of the employed workforce (National Bank
of Rwanda 2008).
In Rwanda, self-employed groups can contribute to the social security fund as a federation. An example is the Rwanda Federation of
Motorcyclists’ Cooperatives, which promotes the use of motorcycles
as taxis. Its 10,000 members send contributions to the federation each
month, 8 percent of which goes toward social security (Kamndaya
2011).
Benefits
Benefits can be claimed at age 55 if the person has ceased working
and has at least 15 years of contributions. A bill in 2012 in Parliament
proposed raising the age to 60 (Karuhanga 2012). For people who have
worked at least 15 years, the retirement benefit is 30 percent of the average of the final 3 or 5 years of work, whichever average is higher, plus
2 percent for every year of work beyond 15 years. Thus, for someone
who had worked and contributed for 16 years, the benefit would be 32
percent of the average of the final 3 or 5 years of work (Rwanda Social
Security Board 2012).
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Burundi
Types of plans
Burundi’s social insurance system was established in 1962 under
the Minister of Public Functions, Work and Social Security. It covers
both private and public sector employees.
Financing
The employer contributes 6 percent of earnings and the employee
contributes 4 percent, for a total of 10 percent, up from 6.5 percent in
2010. The total contribution rate for military personnel is 14.6 percent,
up from a rate of 9.5 percent in 2010. The contribution rates were raised
because an actuarial study indicated that the previous contribution rates
were not adequate to pay for the benefits promised (EAC 2011). Civil
servants and judges have a special system.
Benefits
Benefits can be claimed at age 60. Early benefits are available at
age 55 for workers “prematurely aged,” and benefits can be claimed
at age 45 for workers in arduous occupations. Monthly benefits equal
30 percent of the average of the last 3 or 5 years of monthly earnings,
whichever is higher, plus 2 percent of average monthly earnings for
every 12-month period of coverage exceeding 180 months (15 years).
Benefits in payment are adjusted according to changes in the cost of
living, depending on the finances of the system (U.S. Social Security
Administration 2011).

PENSION REGULATORS
This section considers the pension regulators in each of the five
countries (Table 11.8). The pension regulators cover private sector pensions and may cover some pensions in the public sector. Pension regulators and regulations have been established to protect the interest of
workers.
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Table 11.8 Name of Retirement Benefits Program Regulatory Authority,
2012
Country
Name of regulator
Year took effect Oversight ministry
Burundi National Social Protection
2013
President of Burundi
Commission
Kenya
Retirement Benefits
2000
Ministry of Finance
Authority
Rwanda National Bank of Rwanda
—
Ministry of Finance
Tanzania Social Security
2008
Ministry of Finance
Regulatory Authority
Uganda Uganda Retirement
2013
Ministry of Finance
Benefits Authority

Kenya
The pension regulator in Kenya, the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA), is under the Ministry of Finance. It is managed by a board
of five members from the private sector appointed by the Minister of
Finance, as well as the Commissioner of Insurance, the Chief Executive
of the Capital Markets Authority, and a representative of the Minister
of Finance. Thus, a majority of its board members are from the private
sector, giving it some autonomy from government influence (Odundo
2004).
The RBA expenses are paid for in part by a tax on pension assets. The RBA uses a risk-based approach to supervising the pension
industry, based on the size and risk associated with each pension fund.
It regulates the NSSF and private sector pension funds but not pension
funds for civil servants. The NSSF is the only government-managed
pension fund that it regulates. Before the RBA became operational in
2000, pensions were regulated solely under trust and income tax laws.
In 2011, Kenya developed a trustee training program for trustees of
pension plans. Previously, trustees often had no special background that
qualified them for that responsibility.
The Kenyan Auditor General also plays a role in the governance of
pensions for public sector workers. It must verify and approve payment
of benefits.
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Tanzania
Tanzania has a pension regulator, established in 2008, the Social
Security Regulatory Authority (SSRA), under the Ministry of Finance,
which became operational in 2010. It shares regulatory authority with
the Bank of Tanzania, which, in cooperation with the Social Security
Regulatory Authority, is responsibile for investment issues relating to
pensions. Together they are preparing investment guidelines for the
pension funds (Simbeye 2012).
Uganda
Uganda is in the process of establishing a pension regulator, the
Uganda Retirement Benefits Authority, which is under the Ministry of
Finance. The law establishing this agency was passed in 2011, with the
agency expected to become operational in 2013. This agency will regulate employer-provided pensions in both the private and public sectors.
It will require all pension programs to register.
Rwanda
Rwanda has a pension regulator, the National Bank of Rwanda,
which is under the Ministry of Finance. Its Social Security is under the
Rwanda Social Security Board. The Rwanda Social Security Board has
a director of pensions.
Burundi
Burundi in 2012 passed legislation establishing a pension regulator,
the National Institute of Social Security and Professional Risks. It is not
yet fully operational.

PRIVATE SECTOR PENSIONS
Most private sector workers with pensions in East Africa are covered under defined contribution plans, and until recently, most govern-
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ment workers had defined benefit plans (Mushi 2012). The only country
in the region with a substantial number of pensions provided by private
sector entities is Kenya (Katto 2012). Most of the pensions in the region
for private sector workers are government-managed pensions. For this
reason, most of the assets in pension programs in Tanzania, Uganda,
and Rwanda are held by government-managed programs (Mutero
2010). The same holds true for Burundi.
The pensions receive favorable tax treatment according to either
the EET tax regime, which refers to exempt (tax deductible) contributions, exempt investment earnings and taxed benefits, or the TTE tax
regime (Uganda), which refers to taxed contributions, exempt investment earnings, and exempt benefits (Table 11.9). However, many lowincome workers do not pay any income tax, effectively making the tax
regime for pensions for them EEE, which stands for contributions being
exempt from taxation, investment earnings being exempt from taxation,
and retirement benefits being exempt from taxation.
Funded pensions tend to invest primarily in government securities,
with all five countries having government debt markets. They also invest in real estate. In the EAC, with the exception of Kenya, opportunities for investing domestically in stock are limited. Burundi does
not have a stock exchange. The stock exchange in Rwanda listed two
stocks at the end of 2010 (Yabara 2012). The Nairobi Stock Exchange
is the largest in the region. The Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (Tanzania) has 15 listed companies, and the Uganda Stock Exchange has 10
listed companies. The Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda stock exchanges
have signed a memorandum of understanding, permitting cross listing
of stocks. The Uganda National Social Security Fund owns 80 percent
of the Uganda stock market. Kenya permits a maximum of 15 percent
of a pension portfolio to be invested in other countries. Some of the
Table 11.9 Tax Regime for Retirement Benefit Programs, 2012
Country
Tax regime
Burundi
EET
Kenya
EET
Rwanda
EET
Tanzania
EET
Uganda
TTE
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other countries have not permitted investments outside the country, thus
prohibiting investment in other EAC countries (Mutero 2010), but that
is changing as part of the move toward a common market.
Pension funds in Kenya held 26 percent of their assets in stocks in
the East African Community in 2011, almost all of which was in the
Nairobi Stock Exchange (RBA 2012a). Reflecting the relative importance of pension funds in the different countries, pension funds hold
2 percent of government bonds in Rwanda and 4 percent in Burundi,
compared to 27 percent in Kenya, 23 percent in Tanzania, and 15 percent in Uganda (Yabara 2012). Pension funds in Kenya are subject to
regulations as to the maximum percentage of their portfolios that can be
invested in different asset classes.
Kenya
Kenya has an EET tax regime, but that characterization is a simplification of the actual tax regime. Investment earnings are not taxed
while accruing. However, a Retirement Benefits Levy is charged on the
assets of pension funds, varying from 0.2 percent of assets for funds
up to Ksh500 million (Kenyan shillings) to 0.05 percent of assets for
funds with more than 5 trillion shillings (RBA 2012b). Tax-exempt contributions are capped at Ksh20,000 a month. Lump sum payments of
Ksh600,000 are tax free. Further, benefits received at age 65 and older
are tax free, and benefits received at younger ages are tax free up to a
limit (IOPS 2009). Tax-exempt benefits after age 65 are designed to
encourage workers to postpone receipt of benefits.
Employers may establish defined benefit or defined contribution
plans. About 90 percent of private sector pension plans are defined
contribution plans (Raichura 2008). Employers have shifted from defined benefit toward defined contribution programs over the past decade (RBA 2012a). All pension programs and providers are required
to register with the RBA. The RBA Web site in 2012 listed 1,216 registered pension programs and 22 individual pension plan providers
(RBA 2012c). Retirement benefits vest after one year of work (Raichura
2008). Defined benefit programs are required to have an actuarial valuation every three years.
Anyone who wants to save for retirement can establish an Individual Retirement Benefit program (IRB). Prior to 2003, IRBs in Ke-
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nya did not receive any special tax preference. Since then, workers
can make tax-deductible contributions up to a limit, receive tax-free
investment earnings, and receive tax-free benefits for 10 years, up to a
limit per year. Most IRBs are provided through insurance companies.
In 2005, Kenya established an Insurance Policy Compensation fund to
protect members of IRBs in the case of the insolvency of insurance
companies. The fund is financed based on a levy of 0.25 percent of premiums charged both on policyholders and on the insurance companies.
The motivation for the fund is to reduce the risk and instill confidence
in Kenyans in saving for retirement this way (RBA 2007). As of 2009,
Individual Retirement Benefit programs covered less than 1 percent of
the workforce (IOPS 2009). Membership grew rapidly from 2010 to
2011, however, increasing from 25,000 to 41,000 (RBA 2012a).
An estimated 15 percent of Kenya’s labor force is covered under
some form of retirement benefits program (RBA 2007). To deal with
low coverage and issues of low financial literacy, the RBA, in conjunction with the Kenyan Institute of Education, has undertaken a public
education campaign starting in 2009 concerning the importance of saving for retirement. It has held roadshow events and had an advertising
campaign, and it is working on a financial education curriculum for
schools. The RBA has taken a holistic approach to financial education,
combining it with education on health and mental health. Initially, the
program targeted workers aged 50 and older but has expanded to include younger workers. It is attempting to change Kenya to a savings
culture rather than a consumption culture.
In addition, the Mbao Jua Kali Pension Plan is an innovative program organized by the RBA that targets informal sector workers but is
open to anyone. It is a voluntary program where workers register by
paying Ksh100 and can pay a minimum of Ksh20 a day toward their retirement. (Ksh20 equal roughly U.S.$0.25.) It was started in June 2011
and by 2012 had 37,000 members. Mbao is Swahili slang for 20 shillings, or one Kenyan pound. Jua kali means hot sun in Swahili and is
the term used to refer to workers in the informal sector. It refers to the
working conditions in the informal sector, which is about 80 percent of
the labor force (Raichura 2008). Participants can pay by M-Pesa, which
is a mobile phone money transfer system (in Swahili, M stands for mobile and pesa stands for money).
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The main mobile money service provider, Safaricom, charges the
individual Ksh2 and the pension plan Ksh3 for money transfers, so in
essence there is a 2 percent fee to the worker for a transfer of Ksh100
but a 10 percent fee for a transfer of Ksh20. Payments can also be made
through an alternative provider, Airtel Money. Previously, without this
technology, it was not feasible to have a pension program with such low
contributions because of the high transactions costs, which are fixed
costs, relative to the transactions. This system is relatively new but appears to be a promising innovation. Its success in providing meaningful
benefits will depend in part on participants eventually being able to
make larger contributions than the minimum required.
Starting in 2009, to encourage participation in pension plans and
the development of a market for mortgages, the government allowed
pension program participants to use up to 60 percent of their defined
contribution pension accounts as security for mortgages. This amount
can also be used to guarantee a loan for renovating a home. Mortgage
lending in Kenya generally requires a down payment of 10 percent of
the purchase price of the house. However, with pension-backed mortgages, lenders can lend up to 115 percent of the purchase price, with the
borrower using the amount above 100 percent to pay for closing costs.
This program provides an immediate, tangible benefit to workers for
participating in a pension plan or social security. The house is the first
form of guarantee of the mortgage. If an individual loses his job and
defaults on his mortgage, but the value of his house exceeds the amount
remaining on the mortgage, the house is sold and the individual does
not lose any of his pension.
While the mortgage program undoubtedly will encourage the
growth of the mortgage market, and may encourage participation in
pensions, in part to be used for this purpose, the success of this program as an aspect of retirement income policy will depend partially on
how many people lose their pensions if they have to default on their
mortgages. That in turn will depend on the qualifying conditions to receive a mortgage. If mortgages are extended to people who do not fully
qualify, and thus have a greater risk of default, this may become more
of a problem in the future, particularly if housing prices fall. A similar
program in South Africa has had difficulty assuring that the loans were
not diverted for other purposes (Mutero 2010).

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

256 Turner

Kenya has relaxed the preservation of benefits rule so that participants can withdraw up to 50 percent of the employer contributions to
their defined contribution pension plans, and up to 100 percent of their
own contributions, at any age before retirement. In addition, they can
withdraw up to 50 percent of the accrued value in a defined benefit plan
(RBA 2011).
Tanzania
Tanzania has an EET tax regime. The high contribution rate of
20 percent to the mandatory social security fund may be a factor discouraging the development of employer-provided pensions in the private sector. A study in 2012 indicates that there are a small number of
employer-provided pensions in the private sector, perhaps about a
dozen, primarily for multinational companies (Kiwanuka 2012).
To encourage greater efficiency in fund management, governmentmanaged pension funds are competing with the National Social Security Fund as substitute programs for workers. The Government Employees Provident Fund is seeking to enroll self-employed workers in
the private sector in its Voluntary Savings Retirement Program. As of
2011, it had enrolled about 3,000 persons. The Parastatal Pension Fund
has also extended its coverage to encourage voluntary enrollment by
private sector employees and the self-employed, as well as workers in
the informal labor sector (Kamndaya 2011). The Local Authorities Pension Fund is for employees of local governments, but is also seeking
self-employed members to voluntarily join.
Uganda
Uganda has a TTE tax regime, where both contributions and investment earnings are taxed, but benefits are not taxed. The tax exemption
of pension benefits is written into the Ugandan Constitution, making
it particularly difficult to change. Investment earnings are only taxed
on investments in fixed income securities, such as government bonds.
Investment income from other assets, such as real estate and stock, is
not taxed. Anyone earning less than about U.S.$90 a month is exempt
from tax. The elderly do not pay any tax because of an age exemption.
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As of 2011, the NSSF was the main provider of retirement benefits
in the private sector (International Social Security Association 2011),
but Uganda has some private sector pensions. These are primarily defined contribution plans, but they can be defined benefit plans. One estimate puts the number of programs at more than 50 (Mutero 2010).
These programs have mandatory vesting of benefits after one year of
participation (Kiwanuka 2012).
Rwanda
Rwanda has an EET tax regime. Employer and employee contributions and investment earnings are taxed at 30 percent, while benefits are
tax free (IOPS 2011a). Pensions are generally managed by insurance
companies. There are an estimated 40 private sector pension programs
(Mutero 2010).
Individuals can voluntarily establish personal pension funds, which
are generally managed by insurance companies. For personal pensions,
contributions are tax free. Investment earnings are taxed, and benefits
are tax free (IOPS 2011a).
Burundi
Burundi has an EET tax regime and a few private sector defined
contribution plans. As of 2012, it is considering a law to regulate employer-provided pensions.

PUBLIC SERVICE PENSIONS
As of 2012, the pensions for government employees in the EAC
are defined benefit plans (Table 11.10). These plans generally predate
the NSSF. Some of them provide benefits that are overly generous by
international standards and that contain other generous features, such as
commutation to lump sums on favorable terms. Particularly considering that government sector work is generally not physically arduous,
the plans tend to provide early retirement benefits at young ages (Table
11.11). Another generous feature is that they generally are calculated
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on the single year of highest pay. Calculation using such a short period
creates the possibility of a person receiving a pay increase in the final
year for the purpose of raising his pension. Further, even more generous
pensions are sometimes received by members of parliament, judges,
and other high officials, sometimes after only limited periods of service.
The EAC, however, does not provide a pension for EAC secretariat employees, but instead provides a lump sum payment when they end their
service, based on their salary and years of service.
Kenya
Public sector employees as of 2012 were covered by the Public
Service Pension Program, which is an unfunded defined benefit plan
administered by the Pensions Department in the Ministry of Finance.
In 2013, all defined benefit plans for which the Kenyan government has a liability, a total of 40 programs, will be converted to defined
contribution plans to reduce the risk to the government. Worker contributions will be required. Workers aged 45 and older will remain in the
old defined benefit programs. People younger than age 45 will be completely transferred to the new defined contribution program, with a contribution made to that program by the government to compensate them
for the benefits already accrued under the old program. The government
will manage the investments of the defined contribution program. Individual choice of investments will not be an option. According to the bill
being considered at the end of 2012, the government would contribute
15.5 percent of salary for civil servants, and employees would contribute 7.5 percent (Republic of Kenya 2012).
Starting in 2009, the normal retirement age for the Public Service
Pension Program was raised from age 55 to 60, but early retirement
Table 11.10 Pensions for Government Sector Employees, 2012
Country
Type
Burundi
Contributory defined benefit
Kenya
Defined benefit, converting to defined contribution
Rwanda
Contributory defined benefit
Tanzania
Contributory funded defined benefit, multiple plans
Uganda
Unfunded noncontributory defined benefit
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Table 11.11 Early Retirement Age for Government Sector Employees,
2012
Country
Type
Kenya
50
Tanzania
55
Uganda
45 with 10 years’ service, less than 45 with 20 years

is still available at age 50 for workers with 10 years of service (Were
2009). Women can retire on grounds of marriage at any age with 5 years
of work. As of 2008, the program had about 406,000 active members. A
separate program applies for the armed forces.
The Public Service Pension Program provides generous benefits,
which are based on 2.5 percent multiplied by years of service multiplied
by final base pay. Up to 25 percent of the benefit can be taken as a lump
sum, which is calculated at a very generous rate (20:1). One aspect of
the benefit calculation that is not generous is that there are not regular enhancements for benefits in payment to take into account inflation
(Raichura 2008). By comparison, the U.S. Civil Service Retirement
System benefit is calculated as 1.5 percent for the first 5 years, plus 1.75
percent for the second 5 years, plus 2 percent for years beyond 10 years,
multiplied by the high 3 years of average pay (U.S. Office of Personnel
Management 2012). The pension benefits are paid through banking accounts, though for a number of retirees without banking accounts they
are paid through the Post Office Savings Bank (Raichura 2008).
LAPTRUST is a funded contributory defined benefit plan for employees of local government that was started in 1929. It had 25,800
active members in 2011. Employees contribute 12 percent of pay while
employers contribute 15 percent. Perhaps in part because of the high
contribution rates, many of the 175 local government agencies are in
arrears on their payments. LAPTRUST has registered a defined contribution program in line with the requirement that all defined benefit programs that are a liability to the national government convert to defined
contribution programs, so as to reduce the risk to the national government finances (Kiwanuka 2012). The defined benefit program closed to
new members starting August 2012.
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Tanzania
The Public Service Pensions Fund, under the Ministry of Finance,
covers central government employees, who contribute 5 percent of their
salary. It has about 250,000 members (Mutero 2010). Starting in 1999,
the unfunded defined benefit program was converted to a funded program. The program was created in 1954, predating the National Provident Fund, which was started in 1964. Benefits can be claimed at age
55, with mandatory retirement at age 60 (Public Service Pensions Fund
2012).
As with other government pensions in the region, the Public Service Pensions Fund provides generous benefits. The basic benefit is calculated as total months worked multiplied by final annual salary multiplied by 1/(540) (Public Service Pensions Fund 2012). The final factor
is equivalent to 2.2 percent multiplied by years of service. The Political
Service Retirement Benefits Act of 1999 established a special pension
fund for members of parliament and other elected officials, who receive
preferential pensions (Barya 2011).
Local government employees are covered under the Local Authorities Pensions Fund. In addition to providing generous benefits, those
benefits are tax exempt (Public Service Retirement Benefits Act 1999).
Certain high government officials receive even more generous
pensions. Judges, the Director General of Intelligence, the Inspector
General of Police, and other high officials receive pensions that are 80
percent of final pay, and these can be received after short periods of
service. In addition, these officials are given a car and sufficient money
to pay for a driver for four years, all of which are tax free. These generous pensions create a major conflict of interest for high public officials
when it comes to the reform of civil service pensions.
The Chief Justice receives an even more favorable pension, that
being equal to 80 percent of the salary not of himself but of the current incumbent holding that office, plus a lump sum payment equal to
50 percent of the salary he received while holding that office (Public
Service Retirement Benefits Act 1999). By comparison, Supreme Court
Justices in the United States receive 100 percent of their final salary,
provided they have served at least 10 years and that the sum of their
age and years of Supreme Court service is at least 80 (Longley 2012).
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In Zanzibar, public service employees are covered under a separate
system, which began in 1990, predating the country’s social security
program (Zanzibar Social Security Fund 2009).
Uganda
Preferential pensions are provided to government employees.
Employees of the police, army, prisons, civil service, or government
teaching service are exempt from contributing to the NSSF because
they have their own pension systems. Members of parliament and their
staffs are covered under the Parliamentary Pensions Act of 2007 (Barya
2011). Judges have particularly favorable pensions and are eligible for
a pension after one year of service (Barya 2011).
The pensions for government employees are unfunded defined
benefit plans. The Public Service Pension Program, managed by the
Ministry of Public Service, covers most civil servants. As of 2012, it
has about 269,000 participants. The Armed Forces pension has about
45,000 participants (Katto 2012). It was established in 1939, predating
the Public Service Pension Program, which was established in 1946. An
earlier program was established in 1939 for public service employees,
but it excluded African employees and only covered colonial Europeans
(Inter Ministerial Task Force 2012).
Covered workers do not contribute to the Public Service Pension
Program, with the funds coming from general government revenue. A
reform proposal in 2012 would make the program contributory. The
minimum qualifying age for benefits is 45 with continuous service of
10 years, with compulsory retirement at age 60 (Barya 2011). Workers
with 20 years of contributions can retire at any age. There are no penalties for early retirement. Female employees are eligible for a special
pension if they retire because of marriage (Pensions Act 1946).
As well as having generous provisions for early retirement, the
Public Service Pension Program has a generous benefit formula, calculated as 2.4 percent of final gross pay multiplied by the number of years
of service, with the maximum capped at 87 percent of gross pay (after
36.25 years of work). They vest after 10 years of work. The pensions
are indexed to wages, which is generally more generous than price indexation (Nyakundi 2009). Pensions are paid either in Uganda shillings
or U.S. dollars and are paid for a maximum of 15 years.
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Pensions are not being paid to some retirees, however, because of
a lack of sufficient funds to provide such generous benefits, creating a
problem of arrears. The Pensions Act has a provision that public servants cannot contest in courts (Pensions Act 1946). According to Kiwanuka (2012), the unfunded liability for this program is an astounding 63
percent of GDP.
The generosity of this system can be compared to that of the Civil
Service Retirement System for federal government workers in the
United States. In that system, maximum benefits of 80 percent of the
average of the highest three years of earnings are received after 42 years
of work, with these benefits being indexed to prices once in payment.
The Civil Service Retirement System was closed to new entrants in
1980, and a less generous pension system has since replaced it. The
pensions for civil servants in Uganda are thus substantially more generous than for civil servants in the United States.
The Public Service Pension Program and other plans for civil servants and other government employees are run by the Ministry of Public Service. The Public Service Pension Program covers about 2.8 percent of the workforce, which is larger than the 2.3 percent covered by
the private sector program, the National Social Security Fund (Barya
2011). In addition, the military is covered under the Armed Forces Pension Program. Until 1994, local government employees had their own
program, which was a provident fund, but since then they are covered
under the Public Service Pension Program (Nyakundi 2009). Because
many local governments do not have much money, the central government pays for their pension expenses.
Rwanda
The National Social Security Fund in Rwanda covers all private sector employees and all public sector employees, including the military.
Burundi
Civil servants and judges in Burundi are not covered by the National Social Security Fund, but are instead covered by special programs. Pensions for civil servants are noncontributory, but as of 2012
they are being restructured to require employee contributions.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has surveyed the social security and pension systems
in the five countries of the East African Community. It has described
pensions for both private and public sector workers. As well as describing the basic features of the systems, it has focused on areas of innovation and also on areas in need of reform. Extending coverage to workers
in the informal sector is a major challenge in all of these countries.
Kenya and Rwanda have innovative programs to extend coverage to
workers in the informal sector by facilitating the regular collection of
contributions of small amounts. Regulating pensions to help protect the
interests of participants is another issue, and now all of the countries
have in place pension regulators. Some of the countries have pensions
for government employees that are overly generous by international
standards.
Some of the countries discourage the provision of private sector
pensions by high mandatory contribution rates for social security, but
Kenya has low mandatory contribution rates and has successfully developed a pension sector with more than 1,000 pension plans.

Notes
I have received valuable comments from David Rajnes.
1. The EAC countries are also members of the East African Trade Union Confederation (EATUC), which is an organization of labor unions, with Burundi having observer status, and the East African Development Bank. In addition, the government
officials involved in the retirement systems of these countries work with, and are
influenced to some extent by, other international organizations, such as the World
Bank, the International Labour Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the
International Organisation of Pension Supervisors, the African Development Bank,
and by private sector nongovernment organizations such as the Gates Foundation
and the Financial Services Volunteer Corps.
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Defined contribution pension plans are widespread among the
Americas. Pension actuaries use the pension replacement rate as a
benchmark to measure how much a worker’s preretirement income is
replaced by its pension. Although this measure is intended to make the
system efficient, the postretirement challenge for workers is to be able
to purchase at least the basic market basket. Income projections used in
pension replacement benchmark rates do not capture this because workers’ incomes are not efficiently linked to macroeconomic variables in
Latin America. This chapter proposes the use of macroeconomic variables such as the Consumer Price Index and the basic market basket
to develop a benchmark indicator of basic income replacement as an
alternative to the replacement rate. This indicator is calculated along
with the replacement rate by country and compared to illustrate the efficiency level of their current defined contribution plans.

REPLACEMENT RATES
A pension is intended to replace a worker’s income after his working
lifetime. Because of this replacement objective, the pension serves the
269

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

270 Gómez-Hernández and Ramírez de Jurad Frías

same purpose as the worker’s preretirement salary, that is, to purchase
goods like the basic market basket, health care, housing, entertainment,
and other needs or goods. Upon retirement, the pension amount is often
the only source of income for retirees; this is the main reason why the
pension amount is compared with the salary, defined as the Traditional
Replacement Rate (TRR), which is the ratio of the pension amount and
salary upon retirement
TRRt =

f

ä

t
(12)
y
t

S

,

where ƒt is the amount in the fund at the end of the accumulation period,
(t) is the worker’s individual account under the defined contribution
plan, ӓ is the annuity factor used to convert a lump sum to an annuity, and St is the projected salary for the accumulation period (t). The
traditional replacement rate is affected by the contribution rate to the
pension plan, the fees charged, the rate of return received, and the starting salary.
In the Americas—North, Central, and South—the race between inflation and salary is often lost by the salary, that is, salaries are often
adjusted by employers at a rate below the inflation increase. Therefore,
the salary is not an item that is necessarily linked to macroeconomic
variables. For this reason, the authors believe the current replacement
rate approach underestimates the future effectiveness of pension income due to price increases in the set of goods.
Three aspects are affected when salary and macroeconomic variables are unlinked:
1) country-wise comparison between different geographies, economies, and currencies,
2) determination of money purchase levels for goods upon in and
out of work lifetime periods, and
3) notion of pension plan efficiency and retiree satisfaction levels.
The authors identified the basic market basket variable as a candidate to benchmark a defined contribution plan, particularly because this
is a standard measurement performed by most if not all of the central
banks in the Americas. The minimum satisfaction level or replacement
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rate under this measure is when the pension amount is sufficient to purchase the basic market basket.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the implementation and growth of defined contribution plans,
many authors have tried to model and project the final amount in the
individual accounts at retirement. Vigna and Haberman (2001) analyze
the financial risk in defined contribution plans using dynamic programming through a model that incorporates a regime of fixed and variable
income. The main conclusion of this research is the sensitivity of the
projected amounts in the fund to the returns during the accumulation
period.
Gómez-Hernández, Vidal, and Enrique (2009) compare the competitiveness of the defined contribution plans in Mexico, Chile, and
Argentina. They conclude that in Argentina and Chile, the pension obtained is greater than in Mexico mainly because of high commissions
in Mexico. Ramírez de Jurado Frías (2010) proposed a revised model
for Vigna and Haberman (2001) and implemented it to analyze the
Mexican regulatory framework, showing various curves for projected
accumulated amounts of the individual accounts at retirement.
In the latest G20 report for pensions (OECD 2011), the OECD uses
two benchmarks to measure pension entitlements: the replacement rate
and pension wealth. It also provides comparisons of replacement rates
between various OECD members and G20 countries.

METHODOLOGY
We calculated the working life contributions and investment returns
until age 65 for a worker with $0 initial account balance and entry age
of 25. The accumulative model uses the current regulatory framework
in various countries of the Americas with defined contribution plans.
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We selected a group of nine countries with defined contribution
pension plans in the Americas. The selected countries may provide a
fair representation of the current situation from the perspective of the
benchmark indicator of basic income replacement. The nine countries
are Canada, the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colombia, Brazil, and Chile; thus, North, Central, and South America
are each represented by three countries. For details about the selected
countries—population size, mortality, and annuity factors—refer to Appendix 12A.
The basic market baskets were then projected to retirement age (65)
by country using the consumer price index. The projected income or
final projected salary at age 65 is compared to the projected basic market basket at age 65 for an arbitrary and fixed annual salary increase
assumption of 2 percent real per annum. The Basic Satisfaction Level
(BASAL) is then calculated as the ratio of the accumulated fund at retirement, converted into an annual benefit by the annuity factor and
divided by the basic market basket at age of retirement. (In medicine,
basal commonly refers to the minimal level that is necessary for health
or life.) These BASAL values are then used to compare by country the
efficiency of the defined contribution systems.

MODEL
The BASAL postretirement is defined as the ratio

BASAL t 

f

ä

t
(12 )
y

Pt

,

where f t is the accumulated fund for accumulation period (t) of the
worker’s individual account under the defined contribution plan and
Pt is the projected basic market basket for the accumulation period (t).
The accumulation period t is the difference between the entry age (x)
and retirement age (y).
The accumulated fund at retirement age (t) of the worker f t is also
defined as
µi
λi

 −δ i
f i +1 = f i (1 − yi ) e µ i + yi eλ i e −δ i + Si (c − β )(1 + s ) (1 − yi ) e 2 + yi e 2  e 2 ,
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where fi is the accumulated fund value under the defined contribution
plan during year i or period [i,i + 1], the factor c is the contribution percentage over the pre-retirement salary Si at year i, β is the commission
charged on the value of the contributions (known also as commission
on entry fee and death and disability insurance fee), the factor s is the
real salary increase, yi is the percentage allocated to fix return instruments during the period [i,i + 1] and (1 − yi) the percentage allocated
to variable return instruments during the same period [i,i + 1], µi is the
force of interest for fix return instruments and λi the force of interest for
variable return instruments and δi are the commissions on rates of return
(or assets under management) charged.
The projected basic market basket cost at retirement age (t) of the
worker PBt is given by
PBi + 1 = Bi(1 + j) y − x,
where PBi is the projected basic market basket value during year i or
period [i,i + 1], Bi is the annualized basic market basket value at the
year i, and is an average of the rates at which the historical values of Bi
increased (or decreased).

DATA DESCRIPTION
Information was collected from original and secondary sources.
Below is a brief description of the data. In order to model the accumulation of contributions and returns, the authors relied on data from
the International Association of Supervisors of Pension Funds (AIOS).
Data were collected on rates of return, contributions, commissions, investment portfolios, and salaries. Other data for countries not included
in the AIOS report was collected from the original country source. The
mortality factors used to calculate the annuities came from the documentation issued by the regulators or the country legislation relative to
their pension plans. Basic market basket or basket of goods costs came
from the central banks or minister of statistics from the respective countries. Other inputs, parameters, or assumptions used in this chapter have
been set by the authors and are documented in Appendix 12B.
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RESULTS
Figure 12.1 shows the benchmark comparison for BASAL and TRR
rates. These are compared side by side to illustrate their differences, although these values are not entirely comparable as they use a different
basis in their calculations; that is, BASAL uses the basic market basket
and TRR uses projected salaries. The x-axis shows the country names
segmented by regions in the Americas, whereas the y-axis shows the
ratio between the final accumulated fund amount value converted into
an annualized pension and the basis or item (basic market basket or
salary).
Figure 12.1 Benchmark Comparison for BASAL and Replacement Rate
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BASAL— basic basket

Ratio of final pension by item
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The Costa Rica pension system relies on pension fund managers added to a public
system. In this chapter only the pension fund manager system was taken into account
to obtain the results.
b
The Uruguay pension system relies on a private system administrated by the Uruguay
Central Bank plus a public pension system. In this article only the UCB fund was
taken into account to obtain the results.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
a
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ANALYSIS
Comparing the BASAL levels in Figure 12.1, we conclude that
Costa Rica holds the lowest BASAL from all the countries with 0.07,
followed by Brazil with 0.10 and Uruguay with 0.40. The low BASAL
in Costa Rica and Brazil indicates that workers in these countries will
not have enough resources at retirement to buy 1.0 basic market basket
if they rely solely on the basic pension system. In other words, an average worker in Costa Rica and Brazil can expect to buy 0.07 and 0.10
basic market baskets, respectively, at retirement with his or her pension.
The reason for this is because Costa Rica charges two kinds of fees:
an entry fee and a high percentage of charge on returns. This reduces
considerably the amount accumulated at retirement by the worker. Another key factor is that in Costa Rica only 3.85 percent of salary is
contributed to the pension fund. Additionally, the high 10-year average
basic market basket inflation for Costa Rica and Brazil (11.8 and 17.1,
respectively) reduces the purchasing power over the accumulation period; salary growth is assumed to be 2.00 percent real annually.
On the other side we have Chile, which holds the highest BASAL
followed by United States. The reason for this high level of BASAL is
because Chile only charges one kind of fee (an entry fee with no charge
on returns), reducing considerably the total amount charged at the end
of the cumulative period. Another difference with respect to Costa Rica
(the lowest BASAL) is that the contribution percentage of the salary is
higher in Chile: 10.0 percent.
In North America there are small differences in the values obtained
for the BASAL: Mexico, 1.69; United States, 1.86; and Canada, 1.60.
This suggests that upon retirement age the workers from this region will
be able to buy more than 1.50 basic market baskets with their monthly
pensions. The annual salary increase rates in these countries are similar
to the increase rates seen in the 10-year average basic market basket
inflation, so these results were expected.
The results are consistent with Gómez-Hernández and Stewart
(2008), who find that El Salvador has the lowest 40-year weighted
charge (fee) ratio of the 21 countries analyzed, and Costa Rica one of
the highest. The results for the TRR benchmark suggest Colombia has
the highest TRR at 3.31 and Canada the lowest with 0.26. This low
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value of TRR would appear to be a problem for the Canadian workers. However, the Canada Pension Plan is designed to provide a 0.25
TRR upon workers retirement, and Canadian workers rely on other
complementary pensions to increase their retirement incomes, as well
as receiving benefits from the old-age security program, which is a social security benefits program that is financed out of general revenues.
For Colombians, the 3.31 TRR value, which is the result of a relatively
high contribution rate and the highest rates of return of any country considered, seems appealing, but this value cannot tell Colombian workers
how much purchasing power they will have with a monthly pension
3.31 higher than their latest preretirement salary. In fact, Canada has
higher purchasing power with a BASAL of 1.60 versus 1.17 for Colombia (Table 12.1).
Comparing the results between BASAL and the TRR benchmarks,
the difference in values is evident. Colombia has the highest value of
TRR 3.31 but a BASAL of 1.17. Chile has the highest value of BASAL
3.08 and TRR of 2.18. In Colombia, the TRR value is misleading, as
it would suggest that retirees have done a good job saving for retirement; they are receiving 3.31 times their salary when converting their
individual retirement savings into a monthly pension, while in reality
Colombian workers would be able to buy only 1.17 basic market baskets. For Chile, the BASAL and TRR do not appear to be critically
different, still TRR cannot reflect the final salary purchasing power at
retirement.

CONCLUSION
For future research, it would be relevant to consider the use of a
benchmark like BASAL to tie the future workers’ incomes upon retirement with macroeconomic variables. A standardized methodology
tied to the macroeconomic environment would help the contributory
systems to benchmark, identify, quantify, and address potential issues
concerning purchasing power at retirement age.

In order to view this proof accurately, the Overprint Preview Option must be checked
in Acrobat Professional or Adobe Reader. Please contact your Customer Service Representative if you have questions about finding the option.

Job Name:

--

/356308t

Appendix 12A
The Americas are composed of 35 sovereign states. We make an arbitrary
region segmentation into North, Central, and South America and select an arbitrary assortment of nine countries that provide defined benefit contribution
pension schemes to the working class.
With the selected countries, we intend to show, compare, and determine
the defined contribution systems efficiency when it comes to replacing income
upon workers retirement. Although arbitrary, the selected countries provide
a reasonable representation of the benchmark indicator of basic income
replacement.
Table 12A.1 Summary of Population Size, Mortality Tables, and
Annuity Factors
Region/country
North
Canada
Mexico
United States
Central
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Colombia
South
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay

Total
Percent of
population people aged 65
in millions
and older

Mortality table name

Annuity
factor

33
110
312

14.80
6.20
13.30

ICA2020
EMSS 97
2008 PY IRC 430 Static

14.11
11.87
13.70

3
7
47

5.60
5.20
6.70

SP-2005
SP-2005
Ren ISS 80-89

13.08
13.08
11.87

190
17
3

6.50
9.40
13.50

AT 83
MI-2006
MI-2006

13.92
11.95
11.95

SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from data collected from various sources.
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Appendix 12B
Table 12B.1 Historical Annual Basic Market Basket Prices ($, U.S.)
North

Central
South
United Costa El Sal- ColomYear Canada Mexico States
Rica vador
bia
Brazil Chile Uruguay
2001 4,418 1,183 6,612
n/a
881 1,759
n/a
3,321 3,025
2002 4,517 1,244 6,716
n/a
866 1,867
n/a
3,403 3,159
2003 4,644 1,291 6,870
n/a
866 1,965
n/a
3,499 4,008
2004 4,730 1,362 7,052
411
877 2,055 1,232 3,536 4,441
2005 4,834 1,415 7,291
474
912 2,137
687 3,644 4,683
2006 4,929 1,465 7,527
545
936 2,220 1,259 3,768 4,969
2007 5,037 1,510 7,741
608
996 2,329 1,582 3,934 5,324
2008 5,154 1,555 8,038
740 1,085 2,482 1,004 4,276 5,726
2009 5,168 1,602 8,010
909 1,195 2,653 1,578 4,340 6,276
2010 5,263 1,645 8,141
894 1,103 2,845 2,512 4,406 6,725
2011 5,416 1,727 8,398
967 1,227 3,062 4,048 4,476 7,213
2012 5,580 1,752 8,544
985 1,214 3,308 6,609 4,550 7,881
SOURCE: Prepared by the authors from data collected from various sources. The authors collected historical Consumer Price Index (CPI) data and determined the average increase rate over a 10-year period. Additionally collected average basic market
basket household costs per country and applied CPI to roll back/forward the basic
market basket. Certain underlying assumptions were made to have data consistency,
for example Chilean ministry of social development only provides basic market basket per individual, so original cost was multiplied by five to reflect the household
annual basket.
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Year
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2,560
2,299
451

2,633
2,295
483

2,745
2,330
545

2,822
2,375
543

2,940
2,349
578

3,031
2,275
492

3,110
2,247
548

3,215
2,207
607

438
313
245

448
298
300

459
452
334

479
459
364

556
474
458

567
518
480

441
522
486

461
560
538

665
539
348

656
614
379

666
681
471

693
685
511

715
794
634

739
685
632

762
877
912

791
1,012
987

--

SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin. Data for Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and the United States come from various sources.
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Region/country
North
Canada
United States
Mexico
Central
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Colombia
South
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
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Table 12B.2 Average Monthly Salary ($, U.S.)
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Table 12B.3 Pension Funds Composition, December 2010 (%)
Region/country
North
Canada
United States
Mexico
Central
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Colombia
South
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay

Fix rate

Variable rate

33.2
38.0
58.9

66.8
62.0
41.1

62.4
84.7
39.9

37.6
15.3
60.1

49.0
11.7
83.9

51.0
88.3
16.1

SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin. Data for Mexico, Canada, Brazil, and the United States
come from various sources.

Table 12B.4 Pension Fund Annual Returns (%)
Region/country
Average annual return
North
Canada
6.2
United States
8.0
Mexico
10.2
Central
Costa Rica
15.1
El Salvador
4.0
Colombia
12.6
South
Brazil
6.0
Chile
9.2
Uruguay
9.2
SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin. Data for Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Canada, Brazil,
and the United States come from various sources. Percentages shown for Colombia,
Mexico, and Chile are the weighted average of the target or risk portfolio returns for
each of those countries.
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Contributions
Contribution
(4)

Fee over
contributions
Total
(5) = [3(4) + (3)] (6) = (1)/(4) + (1)
—
—
—

3.85
10.30
11.50

0.09
0.13
0.12

—
0.21
0.21

8.00
10.00
14.94

—
0.13
0.11

—
0.25
0.16

/356308t

NOTE: — = not applicable or not necessary input for purpose of BASAL or traditional replacement rate calculation.
a
Fee per transaction. Death and disability coverage is provided by public plan but its cost is included in the aging contribution period.
b
Additional fees apply for rollover and voluntary contributions.
c
Additionally, a custodial fee applied to balance. The average rate as of December 2007 was 0.0002%.
SOURCE: 2010 AIOS Bulletin with original footnotes translated into English. Data for Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Canada, Brazil, and the
United States come from different sources.

--

—
—
—
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Table 12B.5 Fees and Contributions, December 2009
Fees
Death and
Salary
disability
percent
insurances
Net fees
(1)
(2)
(3) = (1) − (2)
Region/country
North
Canada
—
—
1.32
United States
—
—
0.78
Mexico
—
—
1.81
Central
Costa Ricaa
—
—
0.40
El Salvador
2.70
1.20
1.50
Colombiab
3.00
1.41
1.59
South
Brazil
—
—
2.00
Chile
3.37
1.87
1.50
Uruguayc
2.62
1.01
1.62
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13
Pension Fund Governance
Adam Samborski
Poznań School of Banking

This chapter analyzes the formal institutions of corporate governance for pension plans. It applies this analysis to open pension funds,
which are mandatory individual account plans, operating in Poland.
Each pension fund has a specific institutional arrangement, which determines to a large extent its effectiveness. Such an arrangement sets
the pension fund under the influence of many stakeholders. The primary objective of regulations in the governance area of pension funds
becomes a minimization of potential agency problems—conflicts of
interest that may arise between the pension participants and those responsible for the fund’s management.

PRINCIPAL–AGENT PROBLEM
In agency theory, agency relationships are understood as contracts
under which a principal engages a third party (agent) to perform certain actions on their behalf in dealing with a second party, which is the
provider of the service. The essence of agency theory can be reduced to
two basic assumptions. First, expectations and objectives of principal
and agent are various and remain in conflict (difference of interests,
different objective function). Second, it is very difficult and expensive
for the principal to check the agent’s work. In agency theory the basic
concept is the agency relationships (Szczepański 2010).
In pension arrangements, the plan participant is the principal, the
plan sponsor is the agent, and the financial institution managing the
pension funds is the second party. This implies the need for the principal to delegate certain powers to the agent to make certain decisions.
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288 Samborski

Then an agency relationship arises, which can be a public contract
(formal, explicit) or an implicit contract (informal). The purpose of the
contract is to ensure such actions of the agent so that he/she strives to
maximize the principal’s benefits. However, between the agent and the
principal there is an asymmetry of information. This can lead to the
agency problem, which usually occurs in two situations: hidden action
of the agent, and hidden information or hidden knowledge possessed by
the agent (Mesjasz 2002). In the first situation, the agent takes action,
the course or outcome of which cannot be observed by the principal,
resulting in the risk of moral hazard (the inclination of someone who is
imperfectly checked to take part in behavior which may be dishonest or
undesirable). In the second situation, the agent has information about
environment variables, which the principal does not have before or after
the conclusion of the contract. Ex ante asymmetry can lead to adverse
selection, with the party having the superior information benefiting at
the expense of the party with inferior information (Mesjasz 2002).
Agency problems can be prevented by concluding a complete contract, which will take into account all possible aspects and options of
future situations. However, drawing up a complete contract is not feasible. Thus, we are dealing with incomplete contracts between principals
and agents (Mesjasz 2002).
Agency problems can be limited in three ways:
1) reduction of information asymmetry,
2) seek harmonization between the principal’s and the agent’s objectives, and
3) building trust.
There are two options for reducing information asymmetry:
screening (the principal keeps track of the agent in the corporation)
and signaling (the agent gives specific signals to the principal, such
as reports). Second, the interests of the principal and the agent can be
harmonized by introducing incentive schemes (such as managerial options). Third, the agency problem can be reduced by agents building
reputational capital that they want to maintain (Brink 2007).
Shaping the behavior of the agent in such a direction that his or her
actions diverge from the principal interest as little as possible requires
incurring certain costs, including drawing up contracts, monitoring and
controlling the conduct of the agent by the principal, ensuring the interests of the principal, and residual loss (Aluchna 2002).
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AGENCY PROBLEMS IN PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS AND
WAYS TO LIMIT IT
Three levels of retirement provision can be distinguished under
pension plans. The first two are mandatory and consist of redistributive
and saving parts. The third, however, is voluntary: individual or occupational. The first level, redistributive, includes programs to ensure the
minimum subsistence level for pensioners. The second level, savings,
is designed to provide pensioners with a target retirement standard of
living comparable to that when they were economically active. Within
these levels, the programs are further classified by source (public, private), or the way to determine the pension benefits (Samborski 2011).
The following discussion addresses the second level—more precisely, private pension plans and funds—and the third level of pension
provision. (The discussion does not apply to pension plans financed
using book reserves, as in Germany.)
Assuming that the pension fund, like any organization, is a nexus of
contracts, one can identify different expectations of pension funds stakeholders, but also areas of potential conflicts (Hess and Impavido 2004).
Pension fund governance is, therefore, a mirror image of corporate governance in joint stock companies, which consists of a set of relations
between the company’s management, supervisory board, shareholders,
and other stakeholders (OECD 2002). Pension fund governance, as well
as corporate governance, deals with the posting of property rights by
the principal to the agent, and consequently relies on the professional
skills and management effectiveness of the agent (World Bank 2007).
Private pension plans operate on the basis of the agency relationship
between the plan members and beneficiaries, and the persons or entities
involved in administering or funding it (such as a plan administrator or
a plan sponsor). Governance under such plans includes all of the relationships between the entities and persons involved in the operation of
a retirement plan, and it provides the structure through which the objectives of the retirement plan are established and the means to meet those
objectives (OECD 2002).
Pension fund governance deals with issues of pension fund control
and seeks to answer two basic questions: 1) in whose interests should
checks on pension funds be carried out, and 2) who should monitor
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and control the pension funds on behalf of their members? The basic
principles of corporate governance are applicable here: transparency,
accountability, fairness, and responsibility (World Bank 2007).
Nonetheless, pension fund governance is much more complex than
corporate governance because of the larger number of parties directly
involved in pension fund operations. Therefore, all the rules of corporate governance do not apply here. Pension fund members do not
generally exercise control through voting on fund administration, asset
management companies, and their employees. It is difficult for fund
members to dismiss a body managing the fund if it fulfills its duties improperly. In such cases the only solution for fund members is to change
the fund or make claims for damages (World Bank 2007).
Governance in private pension plans and funds includes managerial
control of the organization and means of regulation, including liability
of management, and how it is monitored. The primary objective of regulation in pension funds governance is to reduce the potential agency
problems or conflicts of interest that may arise between fund members
and those responsible for managing the fund, which could negatively
affect the security of retirement savings (Stewart and Yermo 2008).
From this perspective, pension fund governance comes down to two
issues: to protect the rights and interests of pension funds members, and
to ensure the safety of sources of funding for future retirement benefits
(World Bank 2007). It is worth considering, however, whether pension
fund governance should be limited to minimizing the agency problems
occurring between pension fund members and the entity responsible for
managing the fund.
The pension fund can be considered as a nexus or network of explicit and implicit contracts between all entities in the relationship with
it. Hence, pension fund governance cannot be confined only to deal
with agency problems; its aim should be understood broadly to ensure
good performance of the pension fund while maintaining low costs for
all stakeholders (Stewart and Yermo 2008). Good governance, therefore, should be correlated with high rates of return on investment and
low cost of capital (World Bank 2007).
Good governance of pension funds has a lot of benefits, which include building trust between all stakeholders, and reducing the need for
specific regulations or facilitating supervision. It is also conducive to
improving the efficiency of corporate governance in portfolio compa-
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nies. The better managed the pension fund, the greater the opportunity
to multiply the value of investments through the policy of active shareholders. Good governance in the pension fund must take into account
the risk. The more sophisticated the investment strategies, the stricter
and stronger the pension plan supervision must be (Stewart and Yermo
2008). The basis of pension fund operations should be, therefore, trust
and development of long-term relationships with all stakeholders.
In pursuing these objectives, it is worth looking at the Guidelines
for Pension Fund Governance elaborated by the OECD. The guidelines
contained in them may be useful in the implementation of strategies for
building trust and developing long-term relationships with all stakeholders. These guidelines are divided into two groups: governance
structure and governance mechanisms.
Governance structure should provide the appropriate division of
operational and supervisory responsibilities, and define the responsibilities and abilities of those entrusted to pension fund responsibilities
(OECD 2002). Thus, it includes the following eight points:
1) Identification of responsibilities. There should be a clear
identification and separation of operational and oversight responsibilities in the governance of a pension fund.
2) Governing body. Every pension fund should have a governing body vested with the power to administer the pension fund
and which is ultimately responsible for ensuring the adherence
to the terms of the arrangement and the protection of the best
interest of plan members and beneficiaries.
3) Accountability. The governing body should be accountable to
the pension plan members and beneficiaries, its supervisory
board (where relevant), and the competent authorities.
4) Suitability. Membership in the governing body should be subject to minimum suitability (or nonsuitability) standards in order
to ensure a high level of integrity, competence, experience, and
professionalism in the governance of the pension fund.
5) Delegation and expert advice. The governing body may rely
on the support of subcommittees and may delegate functions to
internal staff of the pension entity or external service providers.
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6) Auditor. An auditor, independent of the pension entity, the governing body, and the plan sponsor, should be appointed by the
appropriate body or authority to carry out a periodic audit consistent with the needs of the arrangement.
7) Actuary. An actuary should be appointed by the appropriate
body or authority for all defined benefit plans financed via pension funds.
8) Custodian. Custody of the pension fund assets may be carried
out by the pension entity, the financial institution that manages
the pension fund, or by an independent custodian (OECD 2009).
Pension funds should have appropriate control mechanisms,
communication, and incentives to encourage good decision making,
proper and timely implementation, and regular reviews and assessments
(OECD 2002). The mechanisms of governance include the following:
•

Risk-based internal controls. There should be adequate internal
controls in place to ensure that all persons and entities with operational and oversight responsibilities act in accordance with
the objectives set out in the pension entity’s bylaws, statutes,
contract, or trust instrument, or in documents associated with
any of these, and that they comply with the law.

•

Reporting. Reporting channels between all the persons and entities involved in the governance of the pension fund should be
established in order to ensure the effective and timely transmission of relevant and accurate information.

•

Disclosure. The governing body should disclose relevant information to all parties involved (notably pension plan members
and beneficiaries, plan sponsors, supervisory authorities, and
auditors,) in a clear, accurate, and timely fashion (OECD 2009).

ADDRESSING THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN PENSION FUNDS
IN LIGHT OF POLISH EXPERIENCE
This analysis of governance solutions in pension funds in Poland
is limited to open pension funds (see Figure 13.1), which are manda-
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Figure 13.1 Structure of the Pension System in Poland
Mandatory
Public pensions:
• Age determines membership of old or new scheme.
• The new system is based on notational accounts.

Private pensions: personal:
• Open pension fund (OFE).

Voluntary
Private pensions: occupational:
• Employee pension fund (PPE).

Private pensions: personal:
• Individual retirement account (IKE, IKZE).

SOURCE: IOPS (2009).

tory individual account pension plans. Through the pension funds, part
of the employee’s earnings (collected by the Social Insurance Institution—it also manages the public pension plan) is invested in individual
accounts. These accounts are managed by one of several funds. Employees buy from their fund a retirement annuity, which, when they
retire, will serve as a source of retirement income. The amount of annuity depends on the amount of cash accumulated during one’s career and
the effectiveness of their investment.
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Open pension funds can be created only by a general pension society (hereafter Society) acting as a joint stock company. The dominant
shareholders of general pension societies are financial institutions, including international insurance companies, Polish financial institutions,
and various consortia of Polish and international financial institutions
(Kerner and Reinhardt 2010). The duration of the fund is unlimited.
The fund acquires a legal personality upon being entered in the register
of funds, then the fund authority becomes the Society. The basic document governing the internal affairs prevailing in the fund is the Articles
of Association.
The objectives of the company are solely devoted to the creation
and management of funds and their representation to third parties. The
general society creates and manages (for a fee) only one open fund. The
share capital of the company cannot be raised by public subscription. A
purchase or acquisition of company’s shares requires an approval of a
supervisory authority, which is the Financial Supervision Commission.
The governing bodies of the Society are the Management Board, the
Supervisory Board, and the general meeting. The Management Board
of the Society cannot have fewer than three members, and it may also
have an audit committee. Unless the Articles of Association provide
otherwise, the general society board members are appointed and dismissed by the general meeting. The member of the Management Board
must be a person who meets the following requirements:
•

has full legal capacity;

•

has not been convicted of an offense against property, credibility of documents, business transactions, trading in money and
securities, tax offense;

•

has higher education;

•

holds a work experience of no less than seven years; and

•

gives guarantee of the due performance as the board member.

At least one-third of the board should hold a university degree in
law, economics, or be included in the list of investment advisors.
The Supervisory Board member of the Society must be a person
who meets the requirements for the management board members in the
first two points and gives guarantee of due performance as a member of
the Supervisory Board. At least half of the Society Supervisory Board
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members should have a degree in law or economics. Moreover, at least
half of the members of the general pension society are appointed from
outside of shareholders of the Society and other related entities. The Society is responsible to the members of the fund for any damage caused
by failure to perform or improper performance of their duties in managing the fund and its representation. The membership of the open fund
follows the conclusion of the contract with the fund (Act of 28 August
1997).
The pension society receives from the pension fund a fee levied in
the form of a percentage deduction from the amount of premiums (contributions) paid, not more than 3.5 percent, except that the deduction is
made before the conversion of contributions into accounting units. In
addition, the pension society charges a fee at the rate specified in the
Articles of Association. This rate cannot exceed the amount calculated
according to the scale specified by law. The rates of management fees
decrease with each increase in fund assets exceeding the successive assets thresholds by the fund. Costs related to transactions of purchase or
sale of fund assets and costs associated with the storage of assets by the
depositary are covered by the fund assets. In addition, pension societies
incur a fee for the contributions transfer and the costs of supervision
and the Insurance Ombudsman. There is also the cost of the guarantee
fund that insures the pension funds (Sołdek 2011).
The pension fund invests its assets in accordance with the law,
seeking to achieve a maximum degree of safety and profitability of the
investments made. The legislature defines the investment limits.
The open fund, which has received contributions for at least 36
months, determines each year at the end of March and September the
rate of return for the last 36 months and reports it to the supervisory
body. On this basis, the supervisory body calculates the weighted average rate of return of all open-end funds and releases that information to
the public. The weighted average rate of return is the basis for calculating the minimum required rate of return that applies for all open pension
funds. When the rate of return of an open pension fund for the period of
36 months is smaller than the minimum required rate of return, a deficit
arises in an open fund, which sponsors of the open fund will pay.
The fund is obliged to choose a depositary, to whom, by an agreement, it entrusts the storage of its assets. A depositary can only be a
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bank. The agreement with the depositary for the fund assets storage
should specify in detail the duties of a depositary and the fund.
The open fund is obliged to publish a prospectus once a year in
a national daily newspaper dedicated to the fund announcements and
advertising. The fund’s prospectus should contain its Articles of Association, information on the fund’s investment performance, and
approved annual financial statements of the fund. The Society and the
fund provide periodic reports to the supervisory authority and current
information on their activities and financial position (Act of 28 August
1997).

CONCLUSION
The basic sources of conflicts of interest in the pension funds occur
in the relationships between fund members and the management entity
on the amount of fees charged by the Society.
The pension fund is a legal entity. The managing body of the fund
is the pension society established as a joint stock company. Such a
solution entails reducing the efficiency of the management authority
focused on the best interests of pension plan members. Pension funds
have been established in the majority of cases by the general pension
societies in which dominant shareholders are financial institutions. As
a result, financial institutions easily introduce their candidates to the
supervisory boards of societies. It may turn out that the financial institution controls both the Supervisory Board and the Management Board.
Therefore, it is proposed to take steps aimed at increasing the independence of supervisory boards in general pension societies.
Furthermore, the low level of society’s economic awareness and the
low interest in retirement issues encourage societies to undertake expensive marketing campaigns to attract as many members as possible.
Such campaigns usually lead not to improved investment performance
of the fund but to higher administrative costs and fees incurred by fund
members. Hence, I propose a statutory reduction of fees that pension
societies charge, and linking their pay to the results of open pension
funds investment. In addition, greater emphasis should be laid on finan-
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cial education relating to the pension system operating principles in the
Polish society.
A wider analysis of detailed internal regulations in the area of governance would be advisable, both in open pension funds and in general
pension societies. The problem, however, is that such legal solutions
have not been made public. This remark does not apply to principles
of corporate governance in investment operations of open funds and
their Articles of Association, which are publicly available. To explain
the reasons for varying the rate of development of individual pension
funds, the institutional analysis should be applied not only to formal
institutions of corporate governance, but also informal institutions. The
results of such analyses would allow for studying the issue of improving the efficiency of Polish pension funds investment from a different
perspective.
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Social security privatization with individual accounts and employerprovided defined contribution systems shift responsibility for investment decisions to individual workers. With social security privatization,
workers usually have some choice as to how the money in their individual accounts is invested. The choices workers make can have an
important effect on their levels of retirement income. By comparison,
in traditional social security and pension systems, fewer burdens for
decision-making responsibility are placed on individual workers. Instead, decisions regarding financial management of investments are
made by financial professionals. A further distinction is that in traditional defined benefit plans workers do not bear financial market risk,
while in privatized defined contribution plans workers do bear this risk.
This raises the issue of how to communicate to workers who are financially unsophisticated to the possible consequences of financial market
risk.
Proponents of social security privatization and defined contribution
systems argue that workers are capable of learning about financial markets and investments and making good financial decisions. Traditional
economics, which assumes well-informed, rational decision makers,
supports that position. Behavioral economics, however, focuses on the
difficulties that many workers have making financial decisions. Many
workers are not interested in, and some are not capable of, learning the
financial information needed to adequately manage an individual ac-
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count. In addition, the market for financial services is more complex
and less transparent than most other markets for goods and services
(Rajnes 2003).
In part because of problems clients have encountered when they
seek financial advice, trust in financial services is at a low level. A
recent survey in the EU finds that many people mistrust pension and
investment services, ranking 50th among the services surveyed and
ranking lower in trust than the market for used cars or for gambling
(KPMG 2011).
In this chapter, we discuss financial literacy and financial advice
as weak links in social security privatization and employer-provided
defined contribution systems. They cause programs to take on added
expenses to try to reduce the effects of worker investment errors and
bad advice. Widespread financial education has become a necessary
part of social security privatization.
We begin by discussing the lack of financial literacy and some of
the types of errors that workers make in managing individual account
pensions. We document that lack of financial literacy is widespread in
a number of countries. We then discuss in turn financial education and
financial advice as possible responses. Financial education is often seen
to have limited success, in part because of a lack of interest by workers. This discussion is followed by commentary on problems that have
arisen with financial advice, including legal issues that arise when advisers do not have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their
clients. We explain how the structure and level of advisory fees may result in conflicts of interest that may affect the quality of advice provided
to individuals. Then we explain how laws and regulations are evolving
in different countries in response to the conflicts of interest. We offer
conclusions in a final section.

ERRORS INVESTORS MAKE
Making investment decisions is a complex process that requires an
understanding of risk diversification as well as knowledge about different types of investments. A recent U.S. survey finds that 34 percent of
investors were “overwhelmed” by the options facing them (Cornfield
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2012). Another study finds that only 31 percent of U.S. workers are
confident in their ability to manage their investments during retirement
(Yakoboski 2005). A Canadian study finds that workers rated choosing
the right investment for their individual account pension plan (RRSP
plan in Canada) as more stressful than seeing the dentist (Canadian
Press 2005).
While traditional economic theory assumes that investors do not
make systematic errors, increasingly economic theory, using insights
from behavioral economics, suggests otherwise (Turner 2003). Pension
participants make at least three types of investment errors: 1) insufficient diversification of their investment portfolios, 2) inappropriate
level of risk holdings in their investment portfolios, and 3) inappropriate
portfolio adjustments, for example, in response to a market downturn.
With insufficient diversification, participants in some individual account systems purchase investment funds that are too narrowly focused
on a particular segment of the investment market. For example, one
study of U.S. defined contribution plan participants finds that most held
either no equities (48 percent) or only equities (22 percent) in their portfolios, rather than diversifying (Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén 2003).
Thus, with inappropriate levels of risk holdings, some investors hold
investment portfolios that are either too conservative or too risky. With
inappropriate portfolio adjustments, some investors tend to chase returns, purchasing the mutual funds that have risen and selling those
that have fallen in value. A further error may be lack of sensitivity to
fees, causing pension participants to spend too much in fees (Hastings,
Mitchell, and Chyn 2011).
Sweden has attempted to provide investment information to the
participants of its privatized social security system. Survey results concerning the mandatory individual account system in Sweden, where
workers can choose from more than 600 mutual funds (Turner 2004),
suggest that some participants may have been confused about their participation in the investment process. While 18 percent actually chose
their investments (rather than taking the default), 34 percent thought
they had (Betson 2001). Another Swedish survey indicated that of
those Swedes who made a choice, 73 percent could not name all the
funds they had invested in, and 41 percent could not name any of them
(Jarvenpaa 2001).
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A World Bank survey of the privatized social security systems in
Latin America finds that workers and retirees encountered problems
in making a number of decisions required of them by those systems
(Devesa-Carpio and Vidal-Meliá 2002). These decisions extend beyond
simply making investment decisions regarding the composition of their
investment portfolios. They had difficulty choosing a pension fund
management company, deciding whether to make additional contributions, whether to switch into the privatized system (when that choice
was open to them), what form to receive benefits (phased withdrawal,
annuity), and choosing a life insurance company to provide an annuity.
The errors participants make can be due to their lack of information
when making investment decisions. Lack of information can include
lack of knowledge about investing and lack of information about stock
markets. Pension participants may lack information for financial decision making because of both the amount of information they have
assimilated and the amount available to them. As a result of government or employer attempts to overcome the lack of information, some
workers may suffer from the opposite problem—information overload
(Agnew and Szykman 2004). They may have too much information,
which also causes difficulties for workers when attempting to make investment decisions.

FINANCIAL LITERACY
A major reason why pension participants make investment errors
may be a lack of financial literacy. Many do not have basic financial
knowledge, lacking an understanding of financial terms and how financial markets work. For example, studies generally show that people do
not know what happens to bond prices when interest rates rise (Lusardi
2006). In another survey in the United States, only a third of respondents correctly answered three questions about inflation, interest rates,
and risk diversification (Lusardi and Mitchell 2006). Many people
may not understand commonly used financial market jargon, such as
“equity.” A survey of pension participants finds that 10 percent did not
know what the word fund meant (Russell 2012).
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Causes of Financial Illiteracy
Numeracy is an aspect of financial literacy; it is the ability to apply simple mathematical concepts. One example of a lack of numeracy
is exponential growth bias, which results in a lack of understanding
of compound interest. Studies have shown that many people have a
tendency to do linear (straight line) projections of growth of account
balances, rather than exponential (upward curved) projections that are
the result of compound interest. For this reason, they underestimate the
benefits of saving because they underestimate its future value (Stango
and Zinman 2009).
Literacy is a basic skill needed for financial literacy. A study in the
United Kingdom finds that one-fifth of young persons aged 16–19 have
low levels of literacy (17 percent) and numeracy (22 percent), making
it difficult for them to function in the labor market (Shepherd 2010).
These people would also have difficulty dealing with issues relating
to investments. Data from the World Bank indicate that small minorities of people are illiterate in some countries that have privatized their
social security systems. For example, the literacy rate in El Salvador
is 84 percent, in Peru it is 90 percent, and in Mexico it is 93 percent.
These rates are high compared to some poor African countries, such as
Ethiopia (World Bank 2012). In the United States, the state of Alabama
has an adult literacy rate of 85 percent (National Center for Educational
Statistics 2012).
Prevalence of Financial Illiteracy
In some countries with generous traditional social security systems,
financial literacy is not a major policy issue. Countries where the retirement system relies on defined contribution plans, either as part of
privatized social security or as voluntary plans, place a greater burden
of financial literacy on their workers. A study of financial literacy in
28 countries finds that, according to its measure, the leading countries
for financial literacy are Brazil, Mexico, Australia, United States, and
Canada (Ribeiro 2012). Nearly all of these countries place heavy reliance on defined contribution plans.
Even in countries that rank relatively high in financial literacy, many
people lack basic financial knowledge. For example, a study in Canada
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finds that 16 percent participating in an employer-provided pension
plan did not know whether the plan was an individual account (defined
contribution) or traditional pension (defined benefit) plan (Schellenberg
and Ostrovsky 2008). A study in the United States finds that fewer than
one-third of young adults had basic knowledge about risk diversification, interest rates, and inflation (Lusardi, Mitchell, and Curto 2010). In
the United States, studies document that many workers lack basic financial knowledge (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell 2006; McCarthy and Turner
2000). For example, surveys have found that many people do not know
that they are paying fees for the management of the investments in their
defined contribution plans (Turner and Korczyk 2004). Studies have
indicated that a lack of financial literacy is prevalent in many countries.
International research demonstrates that many workers lack financial
literacy in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Italy, New Zealand, and the United States (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011).
Gender plays a role in the lack of financial literacy—women on average are less financially literate than men (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011).
Reasons for this could include a division of labor in some households,
where men take responsibility for financial decisions, or it could be that
women are less confident in dealing with numbers. The groups who are
the least financially literate also are those who are the most financially
vulnerable—minorities, women, and people with low levels of education and income (Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn 2011). Thus, those most
in need of financial skills to deal with a privatized social security system are the least well-equipped, making them even more vulnerable.
Chile is a leader of the social security privatization movement, having privatized its social security system in 1981. In Chile, according
to the 2009 Social Protection Survey, 94 percent of respondents indicated that they did not know anything about the pension options that
existed (IOPS 2011). This lack of knowledge existed even though the
pension system had been in existence for more than 25 years. A study
in Chile finds that workers with lower levels of financial literacy and
lower education and income tend to rely on their employers, coworkers,
and friends more than on cost fundamentals in choosing a pension fund
(Hastings, Mitchell, and Chyn 2011). As a result, they may make poor
fund choices that adversely affect their retirement security.
One problem for people with low levels of financial literacy is that
people tend to think they know more than they do. For example, in an
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Australian survey, 67 percent indicated that they understood compound
interest, but only 28 percent were able to determine the correct answer
to a problem involving that concept (OECD 2006). Before governments
can successfully provide financial education, they need to convince
workers that they need it.

FINANCIAL EDUCATION
Growth
The growth in financial education provided by governments and
employers in a number of countries is a direct result of the increasing importance of defined contribution plans as voluntary or mandatory
parts of retirement income systems. Financial education can cover such
topics as investment terminology, asset allocation, risk tolerance, and
retirement goal setting (Olsen and Whitman 2007). The cost of financial education becomes one of the costs of social security privatization,
though it often is not included in studies that compare the advantages of
privatized to traditional social security programs and compute the rates
of return in privatized systems. Using financial education to address
the lack of financial literacy of pension participants is not a quick fix; it
needs to be a long-term and sustained effort, which can be quite costly
(Ashcroft and Stewart 2010).
Several international organizations, such as the OECD and the International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS 2011), have taken
an interest in financial education for pension participants in individual
account pension systems. In 2008, the OECD created the International
Network on Financial Education.
A survey by IOPS (2011) found that 16 out of 19 financial supervisors of pension systems provided some type of financial education. The
pension supervisors not providing financial education tend to be fairly
young, with intentions of providing financial education in the future. In
Chile, the pension supervisory authority has a specific budget set aside
for financial education (Ashcroft and Stewart 2010). Chile has launched
several initiatives to encourage financial literacy, and in Mexico, the
pension supervisory authority has undertaken a comprehensive pro-
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gram of financial education (IOPS 2011). This program has provided
financial education not only to workers and those nearing retirement,
but also to school children. In the United States, 13 out of the 50 states
require that children in secondary (high) school are required to take a
class in personal finance (Malcolm 2012).
In 2009, more than 20 U.S. federal government agencies had
programs aimed at improving financial literacy (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2011). One of the often overlooked aspects of these
programs is their cost, as they are funded with general government tax
revenues.
Along with financial education, there has been an increased focus
on the content of periodic statements provided to pension participants,
which is part of an effort to improve communication. These statements
are being used to attempt to improve the financial literacy of participants and their understanding of their pension plans. However, there is
little consensus as to what information, beyond basic account information, should be provided and how. In particular, there is no consensus as
to whether projections of possible future account balances should be included and how they should be calculated so as to indicate the possible
effects of financial market risk. Communicating to pension participants
about risk is a difficult and unresolved aspect of financial education
(Antolin and Harrison 2012).
Effectiveness
In the United States, financial education often occurs at the workplace. Evidence suggests that financial education programs have had
some success in helping people who participate in them make better
decisions concerning saving for retirement (Hathaway and Kahtiwada
2008). Studies of workplace financial education programs have shown
improved financial literacy after taking the programs (Clark, Morrill,
and Allen 2012). These results, however, may be affected to some extent by selection bias in that positive results are found for programs for
people who voluntarily participate because of their interest in learning
about the subject. Some studies show limited effects of financial education, which may be in part because the financial education provided
was of limited duration, such as a one-time presentation. Also, some
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people have difficulty following through on their intentions for making
changes following financial education (Lusardi 2006).
Studies indicate that many people are not interested in financial
education. One U.S. survey finds that 56 percent of employees did not
review the educational material provided by their pension plans. In
that survey, 52 percent said that they do not have the time, interest, or
knowledge to manage their 401(k) plan adequately (Gray 2012). These
results indicate that provision of information alone is insufficient to
deal with problems of financial literacy.
The effectiveness of financial education may depend in part on details as to how it is presented, with behavioral economics providing
insights as to effective methods. A study of Chilean workers (Hastings,
Mitchell, and Chyn 2011) finds that framing investment information
relating to investment choices as gains rather than losses had a large
effect on the way the information was perceived, particularly by people
with lower levels of education.

TRANSPARENCY
An alternative to dealing with problems of financial literacy is to
make financial products more transparent in their features and costs. Often, pension participants and other investors do not understand the fees
they are paying (Turner and Korczyk 2004). A lack of understanding
about fees may in part be the result of a lack of transparency. In addition,
attempts can be made to standardize financial products, simplify them,
and limit their possible features so as to facilitate comparability across
financial products (Inderst and Ottaviani 2012). A further approach is to
standardize disclosure, to make it easier for clients to compare costs and
risks across financial products. In addition, attempts have been made to
assure that disclosures are made in “plain English,” that is, that they are
written in language that is comprehensible by people with low levels of
education.
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DEFAULTS
Transparency and financial education, however, rarely are sufficient to deal with the problems many participants face when given
the responsibility for managing their investments (Ashcroft and Stewart 2010). One way of dealing with the lack of interest in and lack of
knowledge of about financial market issues of some participants in
privatized social security systems is to establish defaults that provide
reasonable outcomes for workers opting out of the decision-making
process. Studies have shown that defaults can have a major impact on
pension participants in some circumstances (Choi et al. 2002; Madrian
and Shea 2001). Sweden has a default investment in its mandatory individual account system for people not choosing an investment (Turner
2004). Australia has also established a system of investment defaults
for its mandatory individual account system (Muir 2012).
Defaults are a form of implicit advice, incorporating decisionmaking outcomes that experts view as desirable. With defaults, individuals who lack interest or knowledge in making financial decisions rely
on the default investments to be a reasonable option. In addition, others
who are knowledgeable may accept the default as a form of advice.

FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
The traditional policy approach to affect people’s behavior is
through financial incentives. Individuals do have financial incentives
to overcome financial illiteracy and make effective investment decisions, because doing so would presumably improve their investment
decisions and ultimately the amount of money they had accumulated
at retirement. However, it seems that the incentives are not sufficient to
have much effect on behavior. This may be due in part to the lack of a
clear connection between achieving financial literacy and the financial
rewards from doing so.
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BANNING SOME PRODUCTS OR PRACTICES
Another approach to protecting unsophisticated investors is to
ban certain financial products or practices. For example, in the United
States, financial advisers are not permitted to charge fees based on the
performance of the clients’ portfolios, except for wealthy clients who
are presumably sophisticated investors. Similarly, in the United States
participants in defined contribution plans and Individual Retirement
Accounts are prohibited from making certain investments, such as using their pension funds to purchase a home, short selling, or investing
in collectibles, such as art work.

FINANCIAL ADVICE
Because of a lack of interest and engagement among some workers,
there has been limited success with financial education. Therefore, attention has also focused on providing financial advice. While financial
education provides general information about investments and financial markets, financial advice provides specific suggestions as to what
investments to make. The use of advisers allows for specialization and
economies of scale in the acquisition of financial skills and knowledge.
With advisers, not everyone needs to become an expert. Financial expertise can be a specialized skill rather than one that is generally held.
However, workers with low financial literacy may be vulnerable to exploitation through bad advice when the adviser can profit by steering
clients to more expensive options.
Financial advisers can assist clients in several ways. They can
provide financial advice, financial education, decision support, and marketing information, and they can manage the individual’s investments.
Decision support is education targeted to help a client reach a decision.
Marketing information may appear to the client to be unbiased advice
but is designed to sell a product. Many advisers assist their clients in
carrying out their advice. If they provide financial management, they
make investment decisions and carry them out, generally without involving the individual investor in the decision (Turner and Muir 2012).
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Problems with Financial Advice
Workers seeking financial advice concerning investment decisions
may encounter problems relating to the advice they receive, including
the use of jargon and confusing terminology relating to fees, lack of
knowledge about the client’s goals and risk tolerance, lack of disclosure
about fees, conflicts of interest of financial advisers that affect the quality of advice, lack of fiduciary protection against conflicts of interest,
and a problem called “hat switching.” With hat switching, a financial
adviser has different levels of responsibility to the client depending
on the circumstances. For example, under some circumstances in the
United States advisers are required to provide advice in the best interest
of their clients, while in other circumstances they are only required to
provide advice that is suitable for their clients. For a financial adviser
to provide quality advice, he must have some knowledge of the goals
and risk tolerance of the client. This issue is sometimes formalized in
“know your client requirements” that establish minimum standards for
advisers concerning information they obtain from their clients.
Financial advisers have conflicts of interest when they have a financial stake in the advice that they provide. For example, that occurs
if the adviser receives greater compensation when he recommends investments with higher fees for the recipient of the advice. If the adviser
is also a salesperson, he will probably advise purchasing the financial
products he sells rather than other products.
Information that financial advisers provide to participants can be
tainted by conflicts of interest that the advisers have. Mutual funds,
for example, often provide information about investing, but rarely does
that information include the advice to determine how much the person
is paying in fees, and to look for low-cost providers and funds. Lack of
knowledge about fees charged can lead to participants paying higher
fees than if they were better informed.
Part of the problem arising from conflicts of interest is that financial
advisers do not have a fiduciary duty to their clients in some countries.
For example, in the United States stockbrokers generally do not have a
fiduciary duty to their clients when they advise them. Financial advisers have a clear information advantage over their clients that they can
exploit for their gain when they do not have a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interest of their clients. This may result in agency costs, which
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clients incur when an agent does not act in the best interest of the client. Agency costs can include the client paying higher fees, taking on
greater risk, and having too much trading of their portfolio (churning).
A lack of both educational standards for advisers and uniform certification requirements, combined with insufficient regulation of conflicts of
interest, prevent financial advisers from achieving the quality expected
of an advice professional.
An audit study in the United States has documented a number of problems with the financial advice that clients receive (Mullainathan, Noeth,
and Schoar 2012). The study finds that advisers push for actively managed portfolios with high fees, even if clients start with well-diversified
portfolios with low fees, and that financial advisers tend to profit from
investor errors. For example, some investors sell during downturns and
buy during upturns, known as “chasing returns.” Rather than “debiasing”
their clients, some advisers support that strategy, presumably because it
involves greater sales commissions for themselves, even though it results
in worse outcomes for their clients.
Australia has recognized the importance of pension participants receiving quality financial advice in its system of mandatory individual
accounts. It recently commissioned a study where it rated the quality of
financial advice that people received. Out of 64 cases reviewed, only
two people received what was considered to be high-quality financial
advice. The majority (37 people) received adequate advice, while a
significant minority (25 people) received poor quality advice. People
receiving poor advice received advice that was inappropriate for their
situation. Forty-two percent of people do not trust financial advisers and
would not follow their recommendations (Kell 2012). Most people are
not capable of judging whether the advice they are receiving is good. In
the Australian study, most people who received poor advice thought that
they had received good advice (Kell 2012). People may have difficulty
assessing the quality of advice they receive. Nonetheless, according to a
survey by the Investor Protection Trust, about 20 percent of adults aged
65 or older in the United States report having “been taken advantage of
financially in terms of an inappropriate investment, unreasonably high
fees for financial services, or outright fraud” (Infogroup/ORC 2010).
A study conducted in Singapore concerning the quality of financial advice received by “mystery shoppers,” people who took part in
the study, finds that frequently financial advisers did not obtain enough
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information from their clients to make suitable recommendations (Monetary Authority of Singapore 2012). For example, less than half asked
about the clients’ risk preferences. The study also finds that fees were
not disclosed or discussed in nearly half of the cases. In 28 percent of
the cases, the advice was judged to be suitable by independent financial
experts, in 40 percent the advice might be suitable, and in 28 percent the
advice was not suitable for the clients’ needs.
Financial advice can provide a valuable service to clients. However, a U.S. survey finds that 83 percent of those surveyed indicated that
they would be interested in receiving professional assistance in managing their 401(k) plans, but only 10 percent took advantage of that option
when it was offered (Gray 2012).
Effects of Financial Advice
Several studies have examined the effects of advice. Hung and
Yoong (2012) examine survey data relating to defined contribution
plan participants to study whether advice resulted in improved results.
They find little evidence of improved results. In an experiment, they
find some evidence that unsolicited advice was ineffective, but when
participants actively solicited advice the advice resulted in improved
outcomes. Employees with low levels of financial literacy were more
likely to solicit advice and to benefit from the advice.
Because of conflicts of interest, recipients of advice may actually
have worse outcomes than those not receiving advice. A study in Germany of bank customers who used a financial adviser compensated
through commissions finds that the portfolios of those customers who
used a financial adviser had lower rates of return net of costs (Hackenthal, Haliassos, and Japelli 2011). Similarly, a U.S. study finds that
mutual funds recommended by financial advisers underperformed other
mutual funds on a risk-adjusted basis, taking into account fees (Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2009).
Financial Advice Reforms
A number of countries are considering the issues of the quality of
financial advice and its cost, and are considering reforms that would
increase consumer protection.
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United States. The U.S. Department of Labor is working on proposed regulations to improve the quality of advice to pension plan
participants. Proposals have been made to extend fiduciary standards
that apply to investment advisers and brokers.
United Kingdom. In order to improve the quality of advice, the
UK has made it illegal for advisers to receive commissions for selling
products to clients. Advisers who sell products tend to recommend the
products they sell, which may not be the best products for particular
clients. Instead, advisers will be required to charge their clients fees for
their services, which will reduce conflicts of interest. It will have the
further advantage that the compensation advisers receive will be more
transparent. This reform is being made because the receipt of commissions has been viewed as a root cause of the pension misselling scandal
in the UK. Previously, financial advisers receiving commissions for
making recommendations concerning pensions to clients had an obligation to make recommendations in the best interest of the client, but it
had become clear that because of commissions that approach was not
working.
One criticism of banning commissions is that a single fee paid at the
time of the advice may be too expensive for some clients, effectively
preventing them from receiving advice. If the upfront fees are too expensive for a client to pay at one time, advisers in the UK are permitted
to spread the fee charged over a period of time (BBC 2010).
An additional new requirement in the UK is that advisers will be
required to tell their clients if their advice is independent, meaning that
they provide advice over a full range of investment options, or if it is
restricted, meaning that the advice they provide is only over a limited
range of investments options, such as the options provided by the company they work for (Osborne 2010).
In addition, as of the end of 2012, a new agency in the UK, the
Financial Conduct Authority, will be responsible for protecting consumers in financial markets. A regulatory issue this agency will face is
the trade-off between protecting some consumers from detriment by not
permitting certain risky investment products, while limiting the choice
of others.
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Australia. Australia is implementing legislation to improve the
quality of advice (Kell 2012). To address problems associated with
financial advice, Australia has instituted the Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) reform, which takes effect in July 2013. By eliminating
commissions for advisers, the reform eliminates the problem of “hat
switching,” which occurs when an adviser receives fees for advice but
also receives commissions depending on what he advises that the client purchases. In addition, advisers have a statutory requirement to act
in the best interest of their clients, which is commonly considered to
be a fiduciary duty. Thus, when they recommend a financial product,
they will have the duty to recommend the product that is in the best
interest of their client, not the one that is merely suitable. Also, the
reform attempts to improve the transparency of fees. When advisers
provide ongoing advice, they will be required to renew their fee agreements with clients every two years. In addition, the reforms attempt to
facilitate the provision of “scaled” advice, which would be advice on
a limited set of issues, rather than a full-scale review of their financial
situation.
The Netherlands. The Netherlands Minister of Finance is considering legislation to improve the quality of advice, including requiring
that every adviser have a college degree, that there be more emphasis on
continuing education for financial advisers, and that examination questions for advisers’ certification correspond more to the actual situations
for which they provide advice (Schlingmann, Schutte, and Somsen
2012).
Singapore. Singapore is considering reforms of the way financial
advice is provided. The Singapore regulator has already introduced limits on fees (KPMG 2011).
India. India has banned load fees charged on purchases of investment products (KPMG 2011).
While a number of countries are taking steps to increase the availability of unbiased financial advice to pension participants, the question
remains whether implementing costly reforms will help participants in
terms of improving pension outcomes.
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LEGAL ISSUES
As the foregoing discussion indicates, countries around the world
face similar issues when structuring a legal framework intended to
increase access to financial advice while also ensuring that advice is
not degraded by conflicts of interest, fraud, or misrepresentation of the
adviser’s qualifications. Examples also exist to illustrate the potential
legal issues that result when a population is not financially literate.
Misselling in the United Kingdom
In the late 1980s, UK citizens were permitted to choose more individualized pensions, known as personal pensions, where they could
select the pension provider rather than participate in the public pension
scheme or a scheme offered by their employers. Insurance companies
and financial advisers aggressively sold personal pensions without
complying with the regulations that required them to understand the
risk preferences and financial positions of their customers. A study
commissioned after the misselling came to the attention of regulators,
who concluded that the lack of regulatory compliance was widespread
(Muir 2009).
The misselling caused many employees who bought personal pensions to be worse off than if they would have stayed in their employers’
occupational scheme. At least at the time, the benefits formulas of occupational schemes tended to result in higher benefits than the investment
returns on the personal pensions. Also, only employees (not employers)
contributed to personal pensions. In comparison, employers typically
did contribute to occupational schemes. So, the employees who were
sold personal pensions forfeited their employers’ contributions and received lower returns on the money they personally contributed (Muir
2009).
Some experts held both the financial services industry and the regulatory system to blame for the misselling scandal. The financial services
industry provided compensation incentives for their sales forces to market personal pensions. This illustrates the potential effects of conflicts
of interest, particularly when a new market opens up because of a rapid
shift in a country’s retirement funding paradigm. At the same time,
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regulators had little experience with the products being sold and the
marketing techniques being used because of the shift in the paradigm to
increase employee choice (Muir 2009).
Australia’s Attention to Defaults
Australia does not have any history of shifting its government-run
social insurance scheme to a privatization model. However, there is
a sense in which there is a shadow privatization scheme in existence.
Australia’s government-run system, known as the Age Pension, is a
pay-as-you-go pension program that is both means and asset tested.
Australia also has a mandatory employment-based system, known as
the Superannuation Guarantee (SG System), which requires employers to contribute 9 percent of most income for most employees to an
individual account (Muir 2011). Because the Age Pension is means and
asset tested, retirees with higher SG System account balances are less
likely to qualify for the Age Pension. Thus, there is a sense in which the
SG System is a privatized Age Pension for those fortunate enough to
accumulate substantial account balances.
In 2010, a panel constituted by the Australian government to study
the SG System released its report, which has come to be known as the
Cooper Report. The two-part report addresses many perceived deficiencies in the SG System and made recommendations for improvement.
The panel’s findings on the importance of defaults are of particular
interest here. The panel determined that having a financially literate
population as a long-term goal would be useful. But, critical to the
Cooper Report’s recommendation is its finding that shorter-term issues
could not be resolved through education and financial literacy. Instead,
it based its recommendation for a low-cost, more heavily regulated default system on the principle that not all members of the SG System are
able or want to be involved in investment selection. Australia is currently in the process of moving toward the “MySuper” default product
recommended in the Cooper Report (Muir 2011).
Regulation of Investment Advice in the United States
The United States has not moved to privatize Social Security, although as noted earlier such privatization has been considered. The
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issues of financial literacy and financial advice, however, have become
more important as the population ages, as the United States becomes
increasingly reliant on a defined contribution paradigm, and as the twin
problems of high unemployment and a volatile stock market challenge
retirement wealth creation.
A detailed discussion of the U.S. regulatory structure that applies
to mutual funds, investment advice, brokers, and related financial
services industry entities is beyond the scope of this chapter. At its essence, the complexities derive from two sources. The first is the state
government and federal government dichotomy. Each state has some
regulatory power over financial services industry entities that are active
in the state. The federal government effectively has regulatory authority
over all financial services entities. In some instances a state or multiple
states may impose higher standards than imposed by the federal regulators. In others, the federal regulations may be more strict than those of
the states. The second set of complexities results from the way regulatory power is allocated within a state and particularly at the federal
level. The primary division of power at the federal level is between the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Employee Benefits
Security Administration (EBSA). The SEC’s mandate is to focus on
investor protection. EBSA is charged with overseeing the regulation of
private-sector employer-based retirement plans, including defined contribution plans (Turner and Muir 2012).
Over the past two years, the most controversial regulatory issue of
import for this chapter has been whether the SEC or EBSA will apply
fiduciary obligations to a larger set of financial services entities and
individuals. EBSA proposed regulations to accomplish that in 2010
and—after congressional hearings, widespread publicity, and significant industry concern—withdrew the proposed regulations in 2011.
Reportedly efforts continue to revise the proposed regulations for reissue. In response to a legislative requirement, the SEC staff studied the
differing levels of client obligation discussed above, from fiduciary to
suitability, as well as the hat-switching problem. In a report issued in
2011, the SEC staff recommended adoption of a single federal fiduciary
standard that would apply to brokers as well as investment advisers.
The costs and benefits of such an approach remain under study (Turner
and Muir 2012).
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CONCLUSION
An aspect of social security privatization and employer-provided
defined contribution systems that raises their costs is that they place
greater responsibility on workers for making financial decisions. They
shift financial decision-making from professionals to individual workers. Proponents of privatization and defined contribution systems argue
that workers should be capable of making these decisions, while opponents argue that many workers lack interest in acquiring the necessary
knowledge. Studies have documented widespread financial illiteracy in
many countries, with this issue being more important in countries with
privatized social security systems. While lack of literacy and numeracy
are causes of lack of financial literacy, financial literacy rates are considerably lower than literacy rates. Furthermore, financial illiteracy is
most prevalent among people who are already economically vulnerable—women, minorities, and those with less education and income.
The requirements for financial literacy placed on them by privatized
social security systems only increase their economic vulnerability.
Financial education has been the focus of efforts to deal with financial illiteracy, but studies have documented that it often has limited
success, perhaps because many workers are not interested. Some programs of financial education may have been ineffective because they
have been of limited duration. In addition, some workers have had difficulty following through on changes that they intended to implement
following financial education. Thus, while some programs have succeeded in improving financial knowledge, they have done less well in
changing financial behavior.
The limited effectiveness of financial education shifts the focus in
some countries to issues of financial advice. Workers seeking financial
advice, however, have encountered a number of problems, the most significant of which perhaps is conflicts of interest that financial advisers
may have, combined with not having a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of their clients. Conflicts of interest arise because of the ways
that the compensation of advisers is determined. For example, a financial adviser may receive higher compensation when he recommends a
financial product that charges higher fees to the recipient of the advice.
Studies in several countries have documented that many clients are re-
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ceiving financial advice that is not appropriate for their needs. The level
of fees charged is another issue. Frequently, fees are not disclosed or
are not disclosed in a manner that is salient to the client. Because of
the problems with the quality and cost of financial advice, a number of
countries are considering reforms of the ways that financial advice is
provided.

Note
We have received valuable comments and assistance from David Rajnes.
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security pensions by, 130–131
financial education provided by,
33–34
national, and pension plans, 6–7, 13,
30–31, 222–227
provincial, and social security plans,
9, 220, 228
societal role of, and politics, 6, 111–
112
as source of pension contributions,
186, 221, 223–224, 229–230
GPFG. See Government Pension Fund
Global
GPFN. See Government Pension Fund
Norway
Great Britain. See United Kingdom (UK)
Greece, 19, 26, 146t, 157t
cutbacks in social security income,
15, 16, 17, 18
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), selected
countries and, 121t, 194, 228
Guernsey, GPFG investments in, 146t
Health care
aging population and public finance
on, 192–193, 193f
government spending for, 112, 186
Hong Kong, 9, 146t, 220, 228
Housing
pre- and post-, bubble in Ireland,
53–54, 55
as retiree assets, 83, 84t–85t, 186
Hungary, 15, 22
addition of mandatory individual
accounts to social security in, 7,
21, 59
among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t

as emerging market in global
economy, 55, 141, 146t
fees for personal pension in,
compared to PRSA, 42t, 43
Ibero-American Multilateral Social
Security Agreements, delivery
of social security benefits to
international workers in Hispanic
countries, 29–30
IFSRA. See Irish Financial Services
Regulatory Authority
IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Immigrants, 77, 119
probability of low pension income
for, 8, 88t, 96–97, 97–98
Income, 65, 124
deciles of, and tax relief, 56–57, 57f,
58–59
worker, 205t, 206, 269
See also Retirement income
India, 29, 314
as emerging markets in global
economy, 145, 146t
extending social security coverage in,
28, 31
Individual accounts as government
mandate, 5–6, 7–8, 9, 13
defaults in, for investors who eschew
choice, 23, 32–33, 308
drawdowns in, 208–209
fees for, 22–23, 34, 296, 301
financing benefits of, 228–229
increased contribution rates for, 18,
34–35
social security with, 20–21, 35, 59,
186, 204, 219, 271, 299
worker’s financial literacy as issue
with, 11, 33–34, 302–305
Individual accounts as voluntary, 9, 10,
22–23, 28, 40, 103, 221
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
as U.S. defined contribution
system, 32
Indonesia, GPFG investments in, 146t
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International agreements
retirement benefits, 29–30, 77
workforce cross-country mobility,
29–30, 239
International Association of Supervisors
of Pension Funds (AIOS), as data
source, 273
International currencies
Australian dollar, 186
Chinese renminbi with yuan units,
220, 221, 223, 232n1
Norwegian krone vs., 141–142,
149nn1–2
International Labour Organization,
influence on EAC of, 263n1
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 111,
112, 263n1
International Network on Financial
Education, created by OECD, 33
International Organisation of Pension
Supervisors (IOPS)
financial education and, 33, 305–306
influence of, on EAC, 263n1
International Update: Recent
Developments in Foreign Public
and Private Pensions (newsletter),
35n
Investment funds
assets in, 55, 159–160, 205t, 207t,
212t, 253
decisions about, and investor
protection, 23, 189, 308–309
errors investors make with, 300–302
financial advice about, 11, 34, 44,
171–172, 171f, 309–312
financial advice reforms and, 312–
314, 318–319
international, 6–7, 23–24
(see also Government Pension
Fund Global)
management of, 189, 211, 220, 230–
231, 294–297
(see also Financial markets and
services)
performance measures for, 175–176,
178t, 180n1, 269, 271

rate of return on, 141–142, 281t, 295
risk and, 33, 186, 208–209, 209t
(see also Pension risk)
IOPS. See International Organisation of
Pension Supervisors
IRAs. See Individual Retirement
Accounts
Ireland, 31, 39–60, 157t
extending voluntary pension coverage
in, 30, 59
five-part retirement income system in,
39–40
GPFG investment in, 145, 146t
national savings plan for retirement
in, 27
(see also Personal Retirement
Savings Account)
pension reforms in, 4–5, 7, 31–32, 39,
59–60
pre– and post–property bubble in,
53–54, 55
raised retirement age in, 14–15
Irish Financial Services Regulatory
Authority (IFSRA), number of
PRSA providers predicted by, 45
Irish Insurance Federation, number of
PRSA providers predicted by, 44
Irish Life Assurance Company,
fees compared with AVC plan,
41–43, 42t
Israel, 31, 147t
Italy, 146t, 304
multitier pensions in, 17, 24, 26, 157t
politics in, and cutbacks in benefit
generosity, 16–17
Japan, 304
automatic adjustment mechanism in,
17, 26
expanded taxes in, to fund retirement
benefits, 18–19
pensions in, 14, 32
politics in, and cutbacks in benefit
generosity, 16–17
population growth rate in, 193–194
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Japan, cont.
securities from, in GPFG, 144–145,
146t
world’s largest pension fund in, 129,
136
Jensen’s Index, as investment
performance measure, 176, 178t,
180n1
Jersey, GPFG investments in, 146t
Job loss, 40, 55, 60n1
Journalistic investigations, PRSA fees
and, 43–44
Kazakhstan, 7, 21, 146t
Kenya, 10, 252
defined benefit pensions and public
sector in, 31–32
pension regulatory authority in, 31,
250, 250t
private sector pensions in, 252t, 253–
256
public sector pensions in, 258–259,
258t, 259t
Kenyan social security, 240–243
benefits, 241–242
contribution rates, 240–241, 245t, 263
coverage, 4, 28, 236–237, 237t, 240
National Social Security Fund, 20,
236t, 237t, 239tt
reform, 16, 242–243
retirement age, 238t, 242
KiwiSaver program, as nationwide
default savings, 33
Kuwait, rising retirement age in, 15
Labor market, supply-side orientation of
economic policy and, 114
Latin America, 28
efficiency of defined contribution
pensions in, 272–276
investments and, 147t, 302
PAYG financing for social security in,
20–21
retirement income problems in some
countries of, 39, 269

Latvia, 15
among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
automatic adjustment mechanism and
notional accounts in, 24, 26
cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
Lesotho, social pensions in, 29
Life expectancy
average, calculated and indexed,
24–26
increasing, and longevity, 117–118,
211
retirement age eligibility and, 4,
13–15
sustainability coefficient and, 102–
103
women compared to men and, 30, 97
Lithuania, 21, 22, 146t
multitier pensions in, 156, 157t
Lobbying, Irish pension companies and,
41, 43–44
Luxembourg, 63, 146t, 157t
Maastricht Treaty (1992), EU economic
policy since, 112–114, 115, 123–
124
Macedonia, 7, 21, 153, 156
Malaysia, 146t
extending social security coverage in,
28, 31
Maldives, The, social pensions in, 29
Malta, multitier pensions in, 157t
Mauritius, social pensions in, 29
Mbao Pension Plan, cell phone
technology and, 28
Mercosur. See Southern Common Market
Mexico
demographics of, 277t, 279t, 280t
efficiency of defined contribution
pensions in, 274t, 275–276
as emerging market in global
economy, 141, 146t
financial education program
developed by, 33, 305–306
mandated individual accounts in, 18,
21, 22
pensions in, 271, 281tt, 282t
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Middle East, GPFG investments in, 146t,
147t
Monetary policy
IMF and, 111, 112, 263n1
NCE strict rules vs. discretionary
decisions for, 113–114
Morocco, GPFG investments in, 146t
Namibia, social pensions in, 29
National Employment Savings Trust
(NEST), United Kingdom and, 5,
33
National Pension Reserve Fund (NPRF),
drawdown in Ireland of, 27
National Rural Pension Plan, 222–227
benefits, 225–226
China with, 9, 218
contributions and rules for making
them, 223–224
coverage of, 28, 217, 222–223
noncontributory benefit of, 226–227
regional variations in, 227
voluntary nature of, 28, 31
National Welfare Fund, pension benefits
in Russia, 27
NCE (New Classical Economics). See
under Economic policy
Nepal, social pensions in, 29
NEST. See National Employment
Savings Trust
Netherlands, The, 146t, 304, 314
pensions in, 34, 63, 157t
retirement age in, 14, 26
New Pension Scheme, India, 28
New Zealand, 14, 147t
financial illiteracy in, 23, 304
low-rate poverty in, and pension
proposal, 59–60
national savings plan for retirement
in, 27, 33
pension pacts with Australia by, 30,
199
NGPF. See Norwegian Government
Pension Fund
Nigeria, unification of social security
systems in, 19–20

NOK (Norwegian krone), 132
GPFG international investments in,
142, 142t, 143–145, 143f
GPFN assets in, 135–136
pension fund value in, 129, 137f, 138,
142t, 146t–147t, 148t
pension funds from oil production in,
136, 141
Nonpensionable employment
poverty reduction proposal for, 59–60
PRSA and, 50, 54, 58
workers with, as PRSA sales market,
50
North America, 147t
efficiency of defined contribution
pensions in, 272–276
See also component countries, i.e.,
Canada; Mexico; United States
Norway, 136
benefit rights protection in, 25, 27,
131
organization of social security
program in, 129–131
retirement income cutbacks in, with
reduced benefit accrual rate, 17,
18
social security financing, 6–7, 18, 24,
27
(see also Norwegian Government
Pension Fund [NGPF])
social security reform and principles
in, 24, 130, 131–134
Norwegian Government Pension Fund
(NGPF), 6–7, 129–149
smaller part of, GPFN, 6, 129, 135–
136
See also details of larger part, i.e.,
Government Pension Fund Global
(GPFG)
Notional account plans, 24, 65, 133, 156,
219
NPRF. See National Pension Reserve
Fund
Occupational pensions, 40, 50, 157t
coverage by, 54–66, 54t
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Occupational pensions, cont.
fees for, 41, 42t
investment effectiveness of, in
Poland, 174–178, 178t
risk classification of, 165–167, 167t
risk measurement of, in Poland, 167–
174
as tier-II in Swedish system, 66, 80,
81f, 82f
voluntary for employees, 41, 42t, 293f
Oceania, GPFG investments in, 147t
OECD countries. See Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and
Development countries
Oil extraction, Norway revenues from,
6–7, 129, 136, 138
Old Age Contributory Pension
as mandatory social security in
Ireland, 40, 60n3, 157t
See also Australia’s plan, Age
Pension
Older workers, 188
employment changes for, 66–67, 67f,
68f
incentives to delay retirement, 104,
117, 120, 122
OMC (Open method of coordination).
See under European Union (EU)
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)
countries, 18, 55, 129, 271
benefits in, 16, 19
financial education and, 33, 305
poverty rates, 59, 63
retirement in some, 14–15, 15–16, 39
Pakistan, substitute for social security
in, 31
Panama, 21, 147t
Paraguay, social security benefits to
international migrants, 29–30
Pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing, 9, 22,
31
in CEE countries, 7, 20, 155–156,
157–159, 164
as claim on future production, 119–120

Latin America and, for social security,
20–21, 156
notional or nonfinancial accounts
with, 24, 156
Portugal and, 6, 7, 102, 109–110
PAYG. See Pay-as-you-go financing
Pension companies, 207, 294
Ireland and, 41, 43–44, 50
misselling by, and UK scandal, 45,
315
private, in CEE countries, 158, 176–
178, 177t
Pension Fund Associations (AFP),
competition for lowest investor
fees among, 23
Pension incomes, 124
at 65–74 years of age, 81f, 105t
average, in China, 220, 221
government contributions to, 185, 202
See also Retirement income
Pension Plan for Rural and Urban
Residents, as Wuhan city system,
227
Pension reforms
age eligibility and, 4, 13–14, 40
governance issues in, 10–11, 287–319
increased workforce coverage with,
40–41
international studies, 3–4
(see also specific countries)
rationale for, 11, 213–215
trends in, 4–5, 7–8, 9–10, 30–34, 35
Pension risk, 23
in employer-provided pensions, 7–8,
165–167, 167t
governance issues and, 10–11
investment portfolios and, 33, 186,
208–209, 209t
most important, for employers, 169–
170, 169f
principal–agent problem, 287–292
(see also under Polish social
security pension reform)
ways to limit, in private funds, 32–33,
289–292
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Pension types
defined benefit, 5, 31–32, 63, 157t
disability, 87, 88t
earnings related, 14, 64, 157t
flat-rate, 14, 41, 157t
government mandated, 18, 39, 59,
102, 157t, 293f
guarantee, 65, 80, 93–94, 98, 188–
189, 204, 206
hybrid plans, 34, 35, 66
notional, 24, 65, 133, 157t, 158
old age, as contributory, 60n3, 225
open, 287, 293f, 295
private, 59, 119, 187, 189
social, as noncontributory, 29, 40,
221, 225, 226–227
voluntary, 30–31, 39, 40, 119, 157t
See also Defined contribution
pensions; Occupational pensions;
Personal pensions; and under
Gender
People’s Republic of China. See China
PERAs. See Personal Equity and
Retirement Accounts
Personal Equity and Retirement
Accounts (PERAs), Philippines, 31
Personal pensions, 41–43, 42t, 46, 54–
55, 54t, 157t
as tier-III in Swedish system, 66
Personal Retirement Savings Account
(PRSA)
access to, 45–54, 46f, 47f, 49f, 58
effect of, on pension coverage, 47f,
54–55, 54f
employers and, 40, 45–48, 46f, 58
fees, 40, 41–44, 42t, 58
Ireland and, 4, 30, 45
objectives of, 27, 39–41, 57–59
owners of, and annuity alternatives,
44, 50, 60n3
providers of, 40, 42t, 43–44
(see also Pension companies)
results of, and inequities, 54–57, 54f,
56t, 57f, 58–59
self-employment and, contracts,
48–54, 49f, 50f, 51f, 52f, 53f, 57f

standard vs. nonstandard, plans
offered, 41, 44, 48f, 51, 52–53, 52f
Peru, 21, 28, 29
investments in, 24, 147t
Philippines, The, 29, 30–31, 146t
Pillar reforms in social security, 39
first pillar, 21, 131, 132, 158
multi pillar, 22, 39, 132, 134, 155,
158, 185–186, 219
second pillar, 155–156, 158, 159
third pillar, 157t, 158, 163
Poland
among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
as emerging market in global
economy, 55, 141, 146t
Polish occupational pension reform,
164–180
fund managers for, 176, 177t
investment effectiveness of, 174–178,
177t, 178t, 180n1
investment risks in, vs. broader
financial market, 170–171, 170f,
179
irrational preferences expressed
about, 171–172, 171f, 179–180
nonexistent Employees’ PensionInsurance Fund in, 165
regulation opinions of employers
about, 173–174, 174t
risk assessment survey of employers
and, 167–174, 169f, 170f, 179
risk management and, 165–167, 167t,
172–173, 173f
voluntary supplement yet
undeveloped in, 157t, 164–165
Polish social security pension reform,
7–8, 15, 157–160
fees for personal pension in, 42t, 43,
293f, 295
leadership within CEE countries, 153,
155, 156, 158
notional accounts in, 24, 164
PAYG in, 156, 158, 164
principal–agent problem addressed in,
292–296, 293f
privatization in, 22, 59, 163
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Polish social security pension reform,
cont.
See also Polish occupational pension
reform
Politics, 109, 160
cutbacks in benefit generosity and,
16–17
societal role of governments and, 6,
118
speech in, to justify reforms, 112,
125n9
Portugal, 25, 101–125, 147t
pensions in, 17, 19, 157t
public sector in, and troika, 111–112
social security benefits to
international migrants, 29–30
Portuguese social security pension
reform, 101–125
aging population in, 120, 123
critical analysis of, 104–110, 105tt,
107f, 123, 125n8
economic performance and budgetary
equilibrium in, 117–120, 124,
125nn10–11
economic policy and present crisis in,
101, 102, 120–123, 121t, 124
EU influence on, 101, 102, 112–117,
123–124
main legislative changes, 102–104,
125nn1–7
PAYG in, 6, 7, 102, 109–110
social rights retrenchment strategy,
16, 17, 111–112, 125n9
Poverty measurement, 59, 63
Poverty reduction
defined benefit pension and, 59–60
means testing for social assistance,
29, 40, 109
methods to achieve, 117, 215–216
Principal–agent pension problem
addressing, with Polish experience,
292–296
risk of, 10–11, 287–292
Private sector, 9, 34, 102
defined contribution pensions and, 31,
32, 66, 252–257

retirement income managed by, 39,
58, 59, 158
Privatization, 316
cutbacks in, 21–23, 159
social security, with individual
accounts as government mandate,
20–21, 318
Provident funds, 20, 35, 237t, 238
PRSA. See Personal Retirement Savings
Account
Public sector, 19, 194, 228
defined benefit pensions in, 31–32, 187
EAC pensions for, 257–262, 258t
troika in Portugal and, 111–112
workforce in, 9, 31, 102, 125n2
Residence pensions, as obligatory, 157t
Retirement, 17
double payment problem in some
countries, 7, 22
encouraging later, with reforms,
15–16, 86, 103
international agreements to facilitate,
29–30
lifestyle standards for, 190–191, 191t,
272–273
working definition of, 99n6
Retirement age, 24, 67
flexible, 40, 44, 58, 133, 210, 238t
legal, 102, 132–133, 225.259t
raising, as government mandate, 4,
13–15, 34, 66, 119, 160, 185
Retirement Annuity Contract, owners of,
50, 60n3
Retirement income, 39, 63...
annuity alternatives for, 60n3
Australian support for, 185–186,
202–203, 202t, 210–215
benchmarks for, 269–271
better, as ASFA project, 63, 213–215
capital, and income inequality, 83–85,
84t–85t
changing views about, and trends,
13–30
comparing, of women and men (see
under Gender)
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Retirement income, cont.
deciles of disposable, 87, 90t–91t, 92
high-, countries and retirement, 4, 8,
9, 15, 27
low-, groups and, 6, 9, 35, 86,
88t–89t, 97–98, 206–208, 212
national savings plans for, 27, 39
redistribution proposal for, 59–60
replacement rates in, 16–17, 105–106,
107–108, 269–271
Ricardian equivalence, fiscal policy and,
113
Riester plan, as German hybrid pension,
34
Risks, employer-provided pensions and,
7–8
Romania
among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
upon breakup of Soviet Union, 7, 21
Rural areas, workforce in, 9, 27–28, 31,
222–227
Russia, 15, 21, 27
as emerging market in global
economy, 141, 145, 147t
Rwanda, 235, 252
pension regulatory authority in, 250t,
251
private sector pensions in, 252t, 257
public sector pensions in, 258t, 262
Rwandan social security
benefits, 248
contribution rates, 245t, 248
coverage, 236, 237t, 248
retirement age, 238t, 248
Social Security Fund of Rwanda, 236t,
237t, 239tt, 248
Saint Kitts–Nevis, provident funds and, 20
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
provident funds and, 20
Savings plans, 66
evaluation of newly introduced
products, 41, 44
retirement income and, 5, 27, 33, 39,
117, 125n11, 203

Scandinavia, 6
income distribution of older people
in, 76–77, 98–99n4
See also component countries, i.e.,
Denmark; Faeroe Islands; Finland;
Iceland; Norway; Sweden
SEC. See U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission
Self-employment
annuity alternatives for, in Ireland, 44,
60n3
contribution rate toward social
security pensions and, 130–131
probability of low pension income
and, 86, 92–93, 98, 206
PRSA contracts and, 48–54, 49f, 50f,
51f, 52f, 53f, 57f
social security extension to, 28, 189,
206, 237t
Seychelles, provident funds and, 20
Sharpe ratio, as investment performance
measure, 175, 178t, 180n1
Sierra Leone, unification of social
security systems in, 19–20
Singapore, 18, 146t, 314
Slovakia
among CEE countries, 153, 156, 157t
cutbacks on privatization in, 22, 159
mandatory individual accounts to
social security in, 7, 21
Slovenia, 7, 156, 157t
Small businesses, social security
extension to, 28, 237t
Social accounts, PAYG defined benefit
plan, 220
Social assistance, 63, 65
means testing for, 29, 40, 109, 185,
186
purpose of, 106–107, 110
Social insurance, as defined benefit plans,
237–238, 237t
Social Insurance Fund, 135, 237t
Social protection
benefit rights as, 25, 27, 131
supply-side economic policy and,
114–115
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Social security reforms
cross-country mobility and, 29–30,
219, 239
international studies, 3–4
(see also specific countries)
issues in and rationale for, 11, 39
for pension coverage, 39, 102
(see also Pillar reforms in social
security)
trends in, 4, 13–30, 34–35
voluntary programs as, 9, 31
South Africa, 29, 146t
South America
efficiency of defined contribution
pensions in, 269–282
See also component countries, e.g.,
Brazil; Chile; Uruguay
South Korea, 16, 28, 146t
Southern Common Market countries,
mutual social security benefits
among, 29
Soviet Union, breakup of, 7, 21
Spain, 25, 147t
encouraging later retirement with
reforms in, 15–16
pensions in, 17, 157t
social security benefits to
international migrants in, 29–30
Stakeholder program, limited fees on,
42t, 43
Superannuation, 316
contribution increases for, 204, 206
definition, 187
See also under Australian pensions,
history of
Sustainability, pensions and, 27, 191–
201, 193f, 197t, 198t, 200t, 215
Sustainability coefficient, calculating
pension benefits and, 102–103
Swaziland, 15, 20, 29
Sweden, 18, 63–99, 304
benefit generosity and automatic
adjustment mechanism in, 25, 26
NGPF investments in, 136, 147t
pension plans in, 5–6, 7–8, 157t
(see also Swedish pension system;

Swedish Premium Pension
system)
retirement age in, 15, 16
social security in, 16, 18, 24, 63...
Swedish pension system
causes for income gaps in, 86–92,
88t–89t, 90t–91t
income distribution from age 50
and older, 71–77, 71f–72f,
73f–74f, 75f–76f, 78f–79f
income distribution measurements,
70–71, 98–99n4, 98n3
income from capital and, 83–85,
84t–85t
occupational pensions as tier-II, 63,
66, 94f, 95f, 163–164
pension incomes by gender, 77–82,
78f–79f, 82f
personal pensions as tier-III, 66, 94f,
95f, 96–97
social security pensions (old and new)
as tier-I, 63, 64–66, 80, 81f, 82f,
94f, 95f
unclear who is still working vs. has
retired, 67–69, 99nn5–6
Swedish Premium Pension system,
defaults for investment choices in,
23, 301
Switzerland, 14
politics in, and cutbacks in benefit
generosity, 16–17
securities from, in GPFG, 144, 145,
147t, 148t
Taiwan, GPFG investments in, 146t
Tanzania
pension regulatory authority in, 31,
250t, 251
private sector pensions in, 252t, 256
public sector pensions in, 258t, 259t,
260–261
Tanzanian social security, 243–246
benefits, 245
contribution rates, 244–245, 245t
coverage, 27, 236, 237t, 243–244
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Tanzanian social security, cont.
National Social Security Fund, 20,
236t, 237t, 239tt
Zanzibar, 243, 246
Tax penalties, proposed, 215
Tax relief
Australian pensions and, 195–201,
197t, 198t, 200t, 202
equitable, proposal from academic
research, 59–60
personal pension savings plans and,
66
private pensions with EET or TTE,
regimens, 252252t
PRSA and, 55–57, 56t, 57f, 58–59
self-employment lump sum and, 60n3
voluntary contributions to defined
contribution plans and, 185, 186
Taxes, 29, 39, 190
flat-rate, 186, 215
income, 19, 192
payroll, 18–19, 185
Thailand, 19, 21, 28, 146t
Tier-based social security. See Pillar
reforms in social security
Trade unions, 31, 66, 187, 220, 263n1
See also Collective bargaining
agreements, pensions and
Transitional Retirement Benefit, New
Zealand, 14
Treynor ratio, as investment performance
measure, 175, 178t, 180n1
Trinity College Dublin, Pension Policy
Research Group, tax relief
proposal from, 59–60
Troika, components of, 111
Tunisia, extending social security in, 27
Turkey, GPFG investments in, 147t
Uganda, 20, 252
pension regulatory authority in, 31,
250t, 251
private sector pensions in, 252t, 256–
257
public sector pensions in, 258t, 259t,
261–262

Ugandan social security, 246–247
benefits, 247
contribution rates, 245t, 246–247, 263
coverage, 236, 237t, 246
National Social Security Fund, 236t,
237t, 239tt, 247
reform, 247
Ukraine, GPFG investments in, 147t
Unemployment, 98, 119
Portugal and, 111, 120–122, 121t
PRSA and, 49, 49f, 50–53, 50f, 51f,
52f, 53f, 54
United Arab Emirates, GPFG
investments in, 147t
United Kingdom (UK), 14, 17, 18
fees and employees’ accounts in,
22–23, 34, 42t, 43, 60n2
financial knowledge programs in, 33,
313
former colonies and protectorates of,
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About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit research
organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to employmentrelated problems at the national, state, and local levels. It is an activity of the
W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was established in
1932 to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn
Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of employment income during
economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of publications.
Activities of the Institute comprise the following elements: 1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional social scientists; 2) a competitive grant program, which expands and complements the internal research
program by providing financial support to researchers outside the Institute; 3) a
publications program, which provides the major vehicle for disseminating the
research of staff and grantees, as well as other selected works in the field; and
4) an Employment Management Services division, which manages most of the
publicly funded employment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute’s research, grant, and publication programs are to 1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of public
and private employment and unemployment policy, and 2) make knowledge
and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their pursuit of solutions
to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include causes, consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and income
maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work arrangements;
family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
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